


UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AT LOS ANGELES



M E M O I R S

OF THE

LATE WAR IN ASIA.

WITH A

N A R R A T I V E

OF THE

IMPRISONMENT AND SUFFERINGS

OF OUR

OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS:

BY

AN OFFICER OF COLONEL BAILLIE'S DETACHMENT.

V O L. I.

L O N D O N:

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR;

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3845

TO THE READER.

THE RELATIONS already published of the late Military Transactions in India, compiled chiefly from Gazettes, are too partial to give an adequate idea of the skill and exertions of our opponents, and too general to record the merit and the fate of individuals in our own fleets and armies. It is the object of these Memoirs, at the same time that they illustrate the connection of Military Affairs with politics, the nature and the relations of different actions to one another, and their influence on the general result of the war, to describe not only our own, but the valour and address of our enemies, and to particularise the merits and the hardships of our countrymen and others in our service: for the promotion of their interest, if they have survived their sufferings; for perpetuating their names, if they have not; and, in both cases, for the satisfaction or consolation of their anxious relations and friends.

Nor is it to these only that the fate of men distinguished by merit, or suffering, or both, will be interesting. All mankind naturally enter, by sympathy, into the situation of one another; but particularly into that of the generous, the brave, and the unfortunate. The particulars relating to our officers and soldiers, who fell at different times into the hands of Hyder-Ally-Khan, and Tippoo-Sultan-Bahauder, communicated by certain of those sufferers, and for the most part by one gentleman, who persevered in the midst of the utmost danger, in keeping a journal of what passed from day to day in the principal prison of Seringapatam, impress the mind with all the force of a deep tragedy:—A tragedy continued by too perfect an unity of time and place, and of *suffering*, if not of *action*, for the space of near four years; while death, according to the image of our great classical poet, “shook his dart over their heads, but delayed to strike.”—It is hoped that no reader of humanity will be offended at the mention of many facts and circumstances, at first sight, of no consideration. Though trivial in themselves, they derive an interest from their relation to persons in whom we are concerned, and to whom they were not indifferent.


The Narrative of what happened to our men under confinement with the Barbarians, is not only affecting, but in some measure instructive. As natural convulsions discover the hidden strata of the earth and ocean, so violent moral situations tear up and display the passions and powers of the human soul. The sensibility of our captive countrymen and friends was powerfully excited, and the energy of their minds called forth in most ingenious contrivances to beguile the languor of total inoccupation, to supply conveniencies and comforts, and, on some occasions, to elude a sudden massacre. The strength of their sympathy with one another; the relief they found, under strong agitation, in pouring forth, or in adopting strains of affecting though unpolished poetry; the longing of circumcised Europeans and slave-boys, though in the enjoyment of unconstrained exercise and air and all the necessities of life, to join their countrymen in irons and exposed to assassination and poison; that sudden impatience under confinement, and vehement desire of liberty which seized on the minds of all the prisoners on the certain and near prospect of a release; the excitement of their joy incapable of composure, and carried to painful excess; their bursts of gratitude to the man to whose exertions they owed their deliverance from confinement,

ment, and their chief consolation under it; their anxiety to make some pecuniary recompense to such of the poor natives as had treated them with kindness, &c. These are no uninteresting subjects of observation, nor less pleasing that they exhibit human nature in an amiable light.

In the prisons on the coast of Malabar, particularly that of Seringapatam, we see the condition of human nature, as it were, inverted, Man, with unbounded liberty, and the world for materials, becomes acquainted with the qualities and relations of things, and advances in the arts by slow degrees. Our countrymen, immured in a narrow prison, with a very limited command of instrumentality and matter, supplied the deficiency of these by knowledge and invention.—But that which to the contemplative reader of the narrative will perhaps seem, amidst a variety of incidents and situations, the most worthy of attention, is, the impression that was made on the minds of the prisoners, after so long a confinement in the gloomy jail, by external objects, and the fair face of nature,


The Writer of the Memoirs has drawn his materials either from the most authentic written memorials,

memorials, or from men of strict honour, who were spectators of the transactions, or actors in the scenes described. If, after every endeavour to investigate, and with the sincerest desire to state the truth, any error shall have been inserted prejudicial to any man, neither means nor inclination is wanting to make due reparation.—All representations on this head, left for the Writer of the Memoirs at the Publisher's, shall meet with proper attention.—For though neither the compiler of these memorandums, nor the gentlemen who have furnished them, have prefixed their names, it is not their wish to shun reasonable inquiry and explanation.







Col. Bullen's situation with Tippecoe, near Vincennes, Sept. 16th 1810.



Plan of the principal Rooms of Springfield.



- 1 Corner Rooms each with 24 Cells
- 2 Verandas marked off each with 24 Cells
- 3 Inner Yard
- 4 Old Cook Room with 10 Cells
- 5 Mr. May's Kitchen Garden
- 6 Small Prisoner's Bath
- 7 Yards
- 8 Small Prisoner's Cook Room
- 9 House



- a Hospital & Cells
- b Cellery Veranda
- c Prisoner's Bath
- d Prisoner's Cook Room
- e Capt. Rankin's Garden
- f Old Mud Wall
- g Mud Wall 18 Feet high
- h Outer Door of the Prison
- NS Each corner Room of the Prison about 16' Long by 12' Wide

M E M O I R S

O F T H E

L A T E W A R I N A S I A.

THE difficulties under which Great Britain laboured at the commencement of 1780 in the west, begun by the exercise of power over a kindred nation, continued by intestine division, and prolonged by the incapacity of Commanders in Chief, exciting at once the hopes and the revenge of her enemies in the east, united the discordant Marratta states, Hyder-Ally-Cawn, the Soubah of the Deccan, the Rajah of Berar, and almost all the lesser powers of Hindostan, in a confederacy against the English. This formidable association, which was encouraged by emissaries from France, and confirmed by military succours from the

French islands of Mauritius and Bourbon, was a source of great danger and alarm to our government in Asia, as well as of suffering to individual British subjects: for hence the devastation of the Carnatic, the excision or capture of three armies, and the imprisonment, torture, and assassination of more of our officers and soldiers than had ever before fallen into the hands of our eastern enemies. But the genius of one man, contending against fluctuating counsels at home, and the opposition and errors of his colleagues in office abroad, restored peace and prosperity to the British settlements in India, and liberty to the numerous captives dispersed in different jails on the coast of Malabar, in constant apprehension of those murderous attacks that had been made from time to time, by regular and fixed gradations, on their unfortunate fellow-prisoners and countrymen.

The territories of the Marrattas, if we except that which was lately usurped by Hyder-Ally-Cawn, extend from Travancore, near Cape Comorin, at the southern extremity of the peninsula of Hindostan, to
the

the river Paddar, which discharges itself in the Gulph of Scindy, and which divides Guzzarat from the dominions of Persia.— On the east, they are bounded by the Carnatic, the Company's northern Circars, and the dominions of the Nizam-ul-Muluck, the Soubah of the Deccan-Bazalet Jung : but the province of Catac stretches in a winding course to the Bay of Bengal.

The Marratta states in the Deccan are the only people of Hindostan who were never effectually subdued, and who never unanimously acknowledged themselves vassals to the throne of Delhi. The great Aurengzebe himself, unable to conquer the Marrattas, found it prudent, for the sake of peace, to yield to them the sovereignty of the Deccan. They even carried the terror of their arms into the heart of Delhi, whence they carried off vast treasures; and they continued their depredations, first in the country around that seat of empire, and then in the kingdoms of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa; until, in consideration of the cession of Catac, and an annual tribute of twelve lacks of rupees, they concluded a treaty of peace with

with Alverdi Cawn, who had usurped the soubahship of Bengal, in 1750.

Their natural fastnesses and inaccessible mountains, which conspired with their native bravery to preserve the Marrattas from the Mogul yoke, account for their predatory habits, their neglect of agriculture, and invincible love of arms. Among this race of warriors that generous hospitality, both towards strangers and each other, which in former time so eminently characterized the manners of the east, is still observed with sacred, and even superstitious exactness.

The Marrattas, like the other nations of Hindostan, were originally governed by princes distinguished by the title of Rajah*, whose throne was established

* The nominal Prince of the Marrattas, from the last Kings who actually reigned, SAHOO or SOU, and RAM, is in popular language sometimes called among that nation SOU, and sometimes RAM-RAJAH. There were among the Hindoos other titles of sovereignty; as Ranah, Rajah. Subordinate characters were known by the names of Paddah, Suddar, Zemindar, Polygar, &c.—The titles of Visier, Seubah, Nizam, Nabob, Omrah, &c. were introduced by Mahomedans.

at Setterrah. United under this head, they were always powerful and invincible; but, in process of time, each subordinate chief assuming the prerogatives of an independent prince, and one link of that chain which united them being broken, they were separated into a number of petty states; yet they still continued to yield a kind of tacit allegiance to the Ram-rajah, who had a power of assembling the chiefs, and ordering out their troops as often as any public cause required their service.

The Marratta revenues were originally very great. Before the usurpations of Hyder Ally Cawn, in the kingdom of Myfore and around it they amounted to about seventeen millions of British pounds. It is computed, that their annual revenue is equal still to twelve millions.

Their military establishment, which is composed of cavalry, is yet about three hundred thousand: but these are not to be considered as regulars, or permanent troops, but as an established militia. In judging

of the Marratta force, we are also to observe, that it is an invariable custom among the troops, when an expedition is concluded, to retire with what plunder they may have seized to their respective abodes, leaving with the chiefs only what may be called their body-guards.

The Sou, or Ram-rajah, exists now but in name. The actual administration of government, as well as the sovereign authority, is possessed by a family of the Bramin cast, under the title of Paishwa, or Chancellor: and, in case of infancy, the state is governed by a Regent, who is generally the nearest of blood. Nana-row seized at the same instant the reins of government and the person of the Ram-rajah, whom he confined in a fortress near the metropolis, Setterah. This usurper dying, left behind him two sons, Mada-row and Narain-row; the first of whom, being the eldest, succeeded him in the assumed office of Paishwa. Ionogec-Boosla, or Bouncello, the father or immediate predecessor of Moodage-Boosla, Rajah of Berar, was one of
the

the pretenders to the throne of Setterah, as nearest of kin to the confined Ram-rajah ; at the same time Roganaut-row, called also Ragobah, was a pretender to the office of prime minister, even during the life-time of his nephew ; for which Mada-row kept him under confinement.

But the Paishwa feeling in himself the symptoms of decay, and foreseeing his approaching dissolution, was moved with fraternal tenderness towards Narain-row, his young brother and lineal successor ; whose youth and inexperience exposed him to the machinations of his crafty and intriguing uncle, though in prison.

Had Mada-row, on this occasion, observed the cruel policy of the east, he might by a hint or a nod have removed the cause of all his fears concerning his brother ; but he was a man of a humane disposition, and his mind was purified from all ideas of poison or assassination by the near approach of death. Divided between humanity towards his uncle, and affection for his brother,

ther, he embraced the generous resolution of effecting a reconciliation between the objects of his tenderness and that of his compassion. He caused Roganaut-row to be released; and, having made such arrangements as he thought the most likely to remove all uneasiness or dissatisfaction from the minds of both parties, he placed the hands of the youth into those of his uncle, and, shedding tears of joy, tenderly embraced them: “ I intrust,” said he, “ the young man to your care: I recommend him to your protection. Give him your advice in the administration of government; guard him from the snares and plots of his enemies. He never advised your confinement; he was always an advocate for your enlargement: let all remembrance of former grievances, on either side, die with me.” The young man, it is said, and even Roganaut-row, on this occasion, dissolved in tears.

Mada-row died in November 1772; and Narain-row in the September following, when he was in the twenty-third year of his

his age. The cause and circumstances of this young man's death, were these: Gopincabow, the mother of Madah and Narain-row, had disgusted her eldest son by a dissolute and vicious life; in consequence of which, she withdrew to Benaras, in the dominion of Oude, then hostile to the Marhatta government, and at a vast distance from Poonah. Just before his death, Madah-row expressed a desire to see her, which she refused with contempt; therefore, dreading her influence over the unformed mind of his brother Narain-row, he earnestly cautioned him to beware of her artful councils. Some circumstances having appeared in the conduct of Roganaut-row, creating suspicions of a foul design upon his nephew, the rumour thereof reached Benaras, whence Gopincabow wrote to her son, cautioning him against the arts of his uncle, and even recommending to confine him again, as his brother Madah-row had found it necessary to do for his own security, if he should not chuse to anticipate his designs by an obvious stroke still more decisive. This letter in its way fell into the
hands

hands of Roganaut-row's adopted son, then under the care of Moodajee Boosla, in Berar, which he conveyed to his father in Poonah. Roganaut-row instantly determined to secure his own freedom and life, together with the administration of the government, without a competitor, by one blow; as neither of the brothers had children, nor was it then known that the wife of Narain-row was pregnant. Two Soubadars of the Durbar guard he made choice of for the accomplishment of his purpose. Simmerfing and Mahomet Iffouff were consulted; who, after some consideration, engaged, for two lacks of rupees, and two strong forts for their future protection, to perform the horrid deed. An occasion offered to attach a third to their plot. Tulajee, a favourite servant, had been raised by Narain-row to the command of a troop of horse near his own person. That young man having committed an act of violence on a Soubadar of rank and condition, upon complaint thereof, Narain found it necessary to degrade and confine the favourite: however, upon application, he was not
only

only released, but restored to rank and favour ; but the disgrace sunk into his spirit, and he secretly menaced revenge. The conspirators associated him in their design, and fixed the day, place, and manner of carrying it into execution. On the 18th of August 1773, after the Paishwa had withdrawn to his retirement as usual in the evening, he was alarmed by an uproar and information that a body of armed men were forcing themselves into the apartments. He instantly suspected that his uncle meditated his death ; and he flew into the apartment and arms of Roganaut-row, imploring him to take the government and spare his life. Ragobah was moved with great compassion ; and he spoke to the Soubadars : but the matter had gone too far to be receded from with security. Tulajee seized Narain-row's legs, and a sepoy disengaged his arms which embraced his uncle. Tulajee struck the first blow, which was followed by Simmer-sing and Mahomet Iffouff,

The office of paishwa, which was not only a tempting object of ambition, but
which,

which, to the unfortunate Ragobah seemed necessary to his liberty and personal safety, he did not long enjoy. During an expedition which carried him to a distance from his capital, the council, which consisted of Bramins, formally deposed him, charging him with the assassination of his nephew, and announcing the pregnancy of Narain's widow, who was soon after delivered of a son. In these circumstances Roganaut-row fled to Bombay, where, in consideration of certain territorial concessions, he obtained protection, and a promise of support in his pretensions to the throne of Poonah. The asylum thus granted to Roganaut-row, incensed the Marrattas on the one hand; while, on the other, it amused the English with a prospect, not only of a valuable accession of territory, but of the usual spoils which Indian revolutions present to the views of successful European allies.

Hostilities having quickly commenced, the marine of Bombay sustained, with the bravery of British seamen, the troops in the
reduction

reduction of the island of Salsette, which was effected not without considerable loss to the assailants; while that of Baroach cost the life of General Wedderburn, one of the best and bravest officers that belonged either to the Company's service or the British army. The Company felt his loss soon thereafter, in the defeat of the Bombay army under Colonel Keating.

Such was the situation of the Company ¹⁷⁷⁴ with regard to the Marratta state, when the new government, composed of Mr. Hastings, General Clavering, Colonel Monson, Mr. Barwell, and Mr. Francis, commenced in October 1774. The treaty with Ragobah having been concluded, whether from inadvertence or design, without the sanction of the Governor-general and Council, was disavowed. The newly arrived members, General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, forming a majority in the supreme council, availed themselves of that superiority which the act of parliament gave them, in certain cases, over the other presidencies, and sent an officer of rank, Colonel Upton,

Upton, to negotiate with the Marratta court a peace on almost any terms : which was at length concluded and ratified, on the first of 1776. March 1776. This peace is known by the title of the Poorunder Treaty, and sometimes by that of the Treaty of Poonah. It was signed, on the part of our government, by Colonel Upton; and, on the side of the Marrattas, it was authenticated by the seal of the paishwa, an infant of about two years old, and by the signature of his two ministers, Saccaram-bappoo and Nana-furneze.

By this treaty, Salfette, Baroach, and other districts in the Guzzarat provinces, were ceded to the Company: they were to be paid twelve lacks of rupees at three fixed terms, to defray the charges of the war; as a security for which they got possession of several pergunnahs in mortgage, and an extent of territory of the annual value of three lacks, adjoining or near to Baroach.

On the other hand, it was stipulated, that Roganaut-row should be provided for according to his rank in a private station; that he

he should withdraw immediately from Bombay; and that no protection or assistance should be given to him, or any other subject or servant of the Marratta state who might excite any disturbance or rebellion in that country. But this provision for Ragobah was granted on the express condition that he should reside in the heart of the Marratta dominions, with a guard appointed by the Poonah ministers themselves, for his state and safety. This clause in the treaty, which left Ragobah wholly at the mercy of his enemies, having naturally alarmed his fears, he fled a second time to the presidency of Bombay, and claimed the protection of that government for the security of his person.

While Roganaut-row, under the protection of the government of Bombay, fomented dissensions in the government of Poonah, and, deceived in all probability himself, magnified both the numbers and the power of his partizans among the Marrattas, the enemies of that unfortunate chief gave open countenance to agents from France and Austria.

Austria. Formal engagements, if common report could be trusted, had passed between a majority of the Marratta chiefs and the French agent St. Lubin. The object of these, it was evident, whatever it might be, must, if attained, prove destructive to the trade of the English Company, and to the British influence in India. Thus a foundation was laid for jealousies on both sides. The Marrattas suspected that the English still entertained the design of raising Rago-bah to the administration of Poonah; and the English, that the Poonah ministers had entered into an alliance with the French, for the purpose of subverting the British power and authority in Asia.

1773. The suspicions entertained of the ministers of Poonah were soon confirmed by authorities of unquestionable credit, and by a series of facts of public notoriety. The Chevalier St. Lubin, who had made his appearance at Poonah, and was received with great honour, in the public character of a minister from the court of France, solemnly engaged to Nana-Furnese, the grand enemy

enemy of Ragobah, to bring two regiments and an hundred French officers, to be landed at Choule, a Marratta port on the coast of Malabar; the possession of which would enable his nation to form an arsenal, and collect military stores. The date of this transaction was May 1777.

The Governor-general, who had uniformly been of opinion that the measure now adopted was the only way by which the French could ever hope to regain their authority and influence in India, or to diminish ours, never doubted but the Presidency of Bombay, who were nearly concerned in its immediate operation, would take some steps in order to render it abortive. Nor would this have been a difficult matter.—The jarring members of the council at Poonah, possessed little authority as a body, and for whatever consequence they enjoyed as individuals, they depended entirely on their own vassals. The Presidency of Bombay had long discovered an ardour to revive the pretensions of Ragoah: and the slightest movements made by them in his

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favour

1778. favour would have shaken and subverted that feeble power with which they had to contend, and established their own influence in the Marratta state on its ruins. But Mr. Hastings, reluctant to renew hostilities with the Marrattas, and anxious to unite the peace of India with the safety, the prosperity, and the honour of the English East-India Company, formed a treaty for the purpose of counteracting the French influence at Poonah, and remedying all the defects of that concluded in 1776 by Colonel Upton; of which not so much as one Article had been hitherto carried into execution.

This new treaty was laid before the board of Calcutta, with a long explanatory minute, on the 23d of January, 1778. Whilst this minute lay for consideration on the table, a letter was received from Bombay, dated the 12th of December, 1777, informing the Supreme Council that a proposal had been secretly made to the Governor and Council, through their agent at Poonah, by a party which had been formed against Nana-Furness, consisting of Saccaram Bappoo, who
had

had signed the treaty, and other considerable 1778.
 men, with a powerful Rajah, Tuckajee
 Holkar, to assist them in the design of rein-
 stating Ragobah in the chief administration
 of the Marhatta state; and that they had
 agreed to join in it, requiring only, as a pre-
 liminary condition, a written application to
 the same effect, under the hands and seals of
 the confederates. On the receipt of this
 letter, the Governor-general and Council
 resolved to ratify what they had done, to
 authorize them to proceed, and to send them,
 for the purpose of carrying their plan into
 execution, an extraordinary supply of ten
 lacks of rupees. It was also resolved, to
 assist them with a military force.

The considerations that moved a majority
 in the Supreme Council to form these reso-
 lutions were as follow.

1st, In the event of a rupture with France,
 which was daily apprehended, the connec-
 tion formed by Nana-Furnese with St. Lu-
 bin, and the engagement which he had en-
 tered into, to land two regiments of Europeans

1773. with military stores at Poonah, might, if carried into effect, be productive of the most dangerous consequences to the Company's influence, and their possessions in India. This could be prevented only by the removal of the party so closely connected with our natural enemy; and Rogonaut-row was the instrument for this purpose.

2dly, To authorize the gentlemen of Bombay to take part with Ragobah, was a strict compliance with the orders of the Court of Directors, who, in a letter dated the 5th of February, 1777, declare that Ragobah's pretensions to the supreme authority, either in his own right or as guardian to the infant Peshwa, appear to them better founded than those of his competitors; and therefore, if the conditions of the treaty of Poonah have not been strictly fulfilled on the part of the Marattas, and if, from any circumstances, the Governor and Council should deem it expedient, they would have no objection to an alliance with Ragobah, on the terms agreed upon between him and the Governor and Council of Bombay.

3dly,

3dly, The restoration of Rojanaut-Row 1773.
 would have been attended by an accession
 of territory upon the Malabar coast to the
 amount of the annual expences of the Pre-
 sidency of Bombay; by which means no
 farther drains would have been made from
 our treasury in Bengal.

4thly, The restoration of Ragobah was
 not a breach of the treaty of Poonah,
 because that treaty was signed by Saccaram-
 Bappoc and Nana-Furnese only: now Sac-
 caram, the first minister in rank, with the
 principal officers of the Marratta state, join-
 ed in the proposal to the Presidency of
 Bombay for his return to Poonah.

The plan then proposed by the oppo-
 nents of Nana-Furnese for the restoration of
 Ragobah, having received the sanction of
 the Governor-general and Council, it was
 resolved to assist the Presidency of Bombay
 both with money and a considerable rein-
 forcement, in order to carry it effectually in-
 to execution. On the 23d of February,
 1778, orders were issued for forming a de-

1778. tachment of six battallions of Sepoys, one company of native artillery, with a regular proportion of field artillery, which were afterward's joined by the first regiment of cavalry and five hundred of the Vizier's Candhar horse. The whole of these troops amounted only to six thousand seven hundred and twenty-seven; yet, such is the influence of climate and custom! this small army, though under the auspices and direction of Europeans, was, of necessity, accompanied by a suit of thirty-one thousand seven hundred and twenty-nine servants and futtlers. This numerous body, under the command of Colonel Matthew Leslie, in the month of May began their march, across a country of immense extent *, and very imperfectly explored, abounding in fastnesses, intersected by defiles and navigable rivers, and inhabited by numerous and hostile natives.

It was now the wet season, and torrents of rain overflowed the country, destroying

* Fifteen hundred miles.

the roads, and rendering even small rivers 1778.
and brooks sometimes impassable. On the
first day's march from Calpee, the effect of
the heat was fatally experienced by the
troops and their numerous attendants: for
either through the ignorance of their con-
ductors, or the obstinacy of the command-
er, they moved out of their right course; and
through fatigue and want of water, several
persons died raving mad, and among these
Captain Crawford an amiable man, and
gallant officer. About ten subalterns hap-
pily recovered from dangerous illnesses.—
Our army, notwithstanding all their difficul-
ties, after a slight and ineffectual opposition
from Ballajee Pundit, the chief of the Mar-
ratta territories dependant upon Calpee, crof-
sed the Jumna the latter end of May.

The orders given to Colonel Leslie, when
he was appointed to the command of this
force, were, to march directly to Bombay,
by the shortest route he should judge most
practicable, and, in all his operations, to
obey the commands of the President and
(Vol. I.) B .4 Council

1778. Council of Bombay. The very report of the destination, answered in some measure the end of this detachment. The partizans of Roganaut-row at the court of Poonah, animated by the spirited measures of the Governor-General and Council of Bengal, suddenly assembling their forces, deprived Nana-Furnese of his authority, and appointed Moraba-Furnese in his stead.— This easy revolution, effected without bloodshed or contest, proved, at once, the weakness of the Marratta Government, and the facility with which the plan offered to the Presidency of Bombay might have been executed, if there had been a coincidence of movements between the British forces on the coast of Malabar and those under the command of Colonel Leslie, and a perfect correspondence of sentiments and inclinations between that officer and the gentlemen of Bombay on the one hand, and the Governor-General and Council on the other. But neither were the counsels of Bombay, nor the actions of Colonel Leslie, in unison with those of Mr. Hastings. When
the

the gentlemen of Bombay first heard of the 1778. march of the Bengal detachment, they sent orders to Leslie to halt. A few days after this, they ordered him to proceed on his march, but without specifying any object, or proposing any plan of operations. The fluctuating councils, and indistinct orders of the Presidency of Bombay, seemed to afford some pretext for the remissness of Colonel Leslie, who had not advanced above an hundred and twenty miles from Calpee, when he died at Chatterpore, on the 3d of October 1778.

Chatterpore, the capital of Bundelcund, the country of diamonds, is situated near the western confines of that province. Its distance from Calcutta may be computed at twenty days journey for a native courier. Here Colonel Leslie had lain near three months, committing, as has been said by some, not a few depredations; but, according to the more favourable account of others, employing his time in settling the family disputes of the Bundella chiefs.—Whatever was the cause of his delays in Bundelcund, he was recalled from his command

1778. mand on the 7th of October: but by his death Colonel Goddard had succeeded to the chief command of the army before the letter containing the order for his recall reached the Camp. The power that had been delegated to the Presidency of Bombay, of commanding the movements of the detachment was revoked, and Colonel Goddard was to be directed only by orders from the Supreme Council.

Mr. Hastings, from the extreme fluctuation and irresolution visible in the government of Bombay, judging the cause of Ragobah to be desperate, in order to accomplish the end which the support of that chief was intended to promote, had recourse to other means which were more within the compass of his own direction. When the Supreme Council determined to send a detachment to the other side of India, the Governor-general applied to the Rajah of Berar to grant the English troops a free-march through his territories, with such assistance as they might require on their way. This request was readily granted. The Rajah sent an intelligent and confidential agent
to

the banks of the Narbudda with a supply 1778.
 of grain for the subsistence of the detachment, and orders to attend it through his country, of which he advised Colonel Leslie, inviting him to take that route, and assuring him of a most friendly reception. As the Rajah had in this manner manifested a disposition to act in concert with the English, so he possessed power and pretensions which, if exerted in their cause, might greatly promote their interest. The nominal sovereign of the Marratta state, the Rajah Ram-Rajah, after languishing long in an honourable confinement at Setterah, died in December, 1777, without children. The prince who had the fairest pretensions to the office of Paishwa, as above mentioned, was Moodajee Booslah, Rajah of Berar, being lineally descended from the antient Ram-Rajahs, and the adopted son of Sahoo Rajah, the predecessor of the late Rajah Ram-Rajah, though deprived of his right by the artifices of Ballajec, who was the Paishwa when Sahoo Rajah died.

For these reasons, Mr. Hastings judged
 Moodajec

1778. Moodajee Booslah to be a proper person to supply the place of Ragobah in the plan offered to the Supreme Council for overturning the French influence with the Marattas. He possessed wealth, power, and a territory extending from the borders of Bengal almost to Poonah, and from the Cambudaj, its northern boundary, to the confines of the Deccan. Ragobah enjoyed not the advantage of either dominion or treasures, and depended solely on the precarious and fluctuating favour of the Presidency of Bombay. The Governor-general, who wished and expected the proposal of an alliance to come from Moodjee, sent the Rajah's vakeel, Beneram Pundit, an intelligent and well informed man, with whom he had held frequent conversations on this subject, to Naigpore for that purpose. These general and distant motions had been made by Mr. Hastings towards an alliance with the Maha-rajah, when an event happened which determined him to press a negotiation with that sovereign prince, and to bring it, if possible, to a speedy and happy conclusion.

On

On the 7th of July, 1778, undoubted in- 1778.
telligence was received from Cairo that war
had been declared between Great Britain and
France; at Paris on the 18th, and in Lon-
don on the 30th of March. A French
fleet, consisting of seven sail of the line,
with 4000 regular troops on board, besides
frigates, lay ready for sailing in the harbour
of Brest, under the command of the Count
D'Estaing, destination of which was na-
turally imagined to be Bombay: a suppo-
sition which was strongly confirmed by the
first advices that were received from Eng-
land. The Chevalier St. Lubin was still at
Poonah, and held frequent conferences with
the ministers of the Pailhwa, who was
hostile to Ragobah and the English; for
a second and unexpected revolution had ta-
ken place at Poonah on the 16th of June,
and Moraba-Furnese, with his principal ad-
herents, was imprisoned. In these circum-
stances, which demanded decisive counsels and
prompt execution, the Supreme Council, re-
gardless of all personal consequences, in-
stantly took possession of all the French
settlements in Bengal, and of their ships in
the

1778. the river. They earnestly recommended to the Presidency of Fort St. George, immediately to commence the siege of Pondicherry, and, if possible, to secure the friendship of Hyder Ally. It was also resolved to quicken the negotiation that had been commenced, on the grounds already mentioned, with the Rajah of Berar. The whole service of the Company could not have afforded a more proper agent than Mr. Elliot, who was dispatched on an embassy for this purpose to Naigpore the capital of the Maha-Rajah: but the Governor-general's hopes were suddenly blasted by the untimely death of that young man; of whom it is not too much to say, that he was one of the most amiable characters as well as elevated spirits that ever dignified human nature. All who knew him were his friends: even strangers, to whom report alone afforded an opportunity of admiring his talents and virtues, mourned for the death of Mr. Elliot. He fell a martyr to genuine patriotism and fidelity to the East India Company. Afflicted with a disorder peculiar to the East, which originates in
bilious

bilious obstruction, and the cure of which 1778.
requires a copious application of mercury,
his duty prevailing over every other consideration, he undertook a long and fatiguing journey, in the rainy season, without any prospect of enjoying such accommodations as might be necessary to his state of health.

After leaving the Company's territories, he discovered, that Governor Chevalier, who had secretly escaped from Chandernagore, was pursuing the same route before him. Knowing the political abilities and address of Chevalier, as well as the ambitious designs of the court by whom he was employed, and the accurate knowledge he had acquired of the politics of India, he strained every nerve to seize his person, dreading that his liberty and arrival in France might be attended with the worst consequences to the Company's affairs, and the views of Great Britain. He pushed onward by forced journies, still tracing and approaching M. Chevalier. Unfortunately, just when he had the chase in view, his progress was obstructed by a sudden overflow of the
waters

1773. waters of one of the large rivers of Catac. Regardless of the state of his health, and the medicines he had taken, by an extraordinary exertion of activity and strength, he encountered the rapid stream, and swam across the river with a few of his attendants and Sepoys. He found M. Chevalier at the metropolis of Catac ; and, although escorted only by a few Sepoys, he claimed the person of Governor Chevalier with such sensible arguments and manly eloquence, that the Rajah surrendered him.

As Mr. Elliot had but a small escort, and the longest and most dangerous part of his journey was yet to be performed, he could not, without sacrificing the object of his commission, return a guard to conduct M. Chevalier and his companion M. Moneron to Calcutta ; wherefore he engaged their paroles in writing, to surrender themselves prisoners of war, within a limited time, to the Governor-general. M. Chevalier and M. Moneron performed their engagements. Mr. Elliot pursued his route to Berar ; but died a few days thereafter.

The

The Governor General did not suffer the 1778.
 deep sorrow which he felt at this sudden and
 melancholy event to overcome the firmness
 of his mind, but by means of other agents,
 and letters to Moodajee-Boollah himself as
 well as to his prime minister Dewagur Pun-
 dit, continued to pursue his object.

The nature and end of the correspon-
 dence between the Governor-general and the
 Rajah of Berar, is clearly discovered by the
 following letter of the Rajah's to the Go-
 vernor, dated the 5th of December, 1778, and
 received the 2d of January, 1779, which for
 good sense, as well as delicacy of sentiment
 and taste, will bear to be compared with the
 most approved compositions of the antients
 or moderns.

“ Your friendly letter of the 19th Ram-
 “ zam (11th October), informing me of
 “ your having received advice of the death
 “ of Mr. Elliot, in his way to Naigpore;
 “ your concern at that event, and at the
 “ unavoidable suspensions of the negocia-
 “ tions which that gentleman was to have
 C conducted

1773. “ conducted with me on the part of your
“ government; and the delay in the esta-
“ blishment of a strict and perpetual friend-
“ ship between the Company’s state and
“ mine, (concerning which you had exerted
“ yourself so warmly), by reason that the
“ present situation of affairs would not ad-
“ mit of the delay which must attend the
“ deputation of another person from thence
“ without injuring the designs in hand ; but
“ that in your conviction of my favourable
“ disposition, from the knowledge that my
“ interests and the Company’s are insepa-
“ rably connected; and in the zeal of Be-
“ neram Pundit, whom, during the long
“ period he resided with you, you found so
“ deserving of your confidence, &c. &c :
“ That the plan proposed, and what you
“ have written, is to promote our common
“ advantage, not for the interest of one party
“ only, being convinced, that no public al-
“ liance or private friendship can be firmly
“ established without reciprocal advantages:
“ That it is on these principles you had
“ long ago planned an alliance with me,
“ the time for the accomplishment of which
“ is

“ is now come; for you conceive it to be 1778.
 “ equally for my interest as for yours, our
 “ countries bordering on each other, and
 “ our natural enemies being the same: That,
 “ in a word, you required nothing but the
 “ junction of my forces with yours, by
 “ which, though each is singly very power-
 “ ful, they will acquire a ten-fold propor-
 “ tion of strength: That the delay of the
 “ progress in the detachment intended for
 “ Bombay, had not arisen from the opposi-
 “ tion of an enemy, but from other causes
 “ improper to mention; but that it will
 “ now shortly arrive in my territories, and
 “ its operation be determined by my ad-
 “ vice: That you have given directions to
 “ Colonel Leslie, to co-operate with the
 “ forces which I shall unite with his: That
 “ as you offer me the forces of your Circar
 “ to promote my views, you in return re-
 “ quire the assistance of mine to effect your
 “ purposes; with other particulars which
 “ I fully understand, reached me on the
 “ 26th Shawand (16th November), and
 “ afforded me great pleasure. I also re-
 “ ceived duplicate and triplicate of this let-

1778. “ ter.—In the latter part of it you express,
“ that as you have made me acquainted
“ with your views, it is necessary that I also
“ communicate to you, without reserve, the
“ ends which I look to for my advantage in
“ this union: That the good faith of the
“ English to every engagement they con-
“ tract, so long as it is observed by others,
“ is universally known; and that it has
“ been the invariable rule of your conduct,
“ to support this character in all acts de-
“ pending on you, and never to relinquish
“ any design of importance formed on good
“ and judicious grounds, but to persevere
“ steadily to its completion: That having
“ thus explained to me your sentiments and
“ views, you wait only to know mine; and
“ on the knowledge of these, you shall form
“ your ultimate resolution.—

“ It is equally a maxim of sincere friend-
“ ship and good government, steadiness,
“ magnanimity, and foresight, that a plan,
“ formed on good and judicious grounds,
“ should be conducted in such a manner as
“ to end happily. You desire to learn my
“ sentiments

“ sentiments and views; and deferring to 1778.
 “ form your ultimate resolutions until you
 “ had heard further from me, is the same
 “ thing as if you had consulted me primarily
 “ on your first designs.

“ Since, after the strictest scrutiny and
 “ researches into dispositions and views of
 “ the multitude, it has been determined,
 “ on proofs of mutual sincerity and good
 “ faith, that a perpetual friendship and
 “ union be established, it will, like the
 “ wall of Alexander, for the happiness of
 “ mankind, continue unshaken until the
 “ end of time.

“ The having caused a translation to be
 “ made into English of the Hindoo books,
 “ called the Shaster and Poran, and of the
 “ history of former kings; the studying these
 “ books, and keeping the pictures of the for-
 “ mer kings and present rulers of Hind, Dec-
 “ can, &c. always before your eyes, and from
 “ their lifeless similitude to discover which
 “ of them were or are worthy of rule,
 “ and possessed of good faith; from which

1778. “ to determine with whom to contract en-
“ gagements, and what conduct to observe
“ to them respectively ;—also, the endea-
“ vour to preserve the blessing of peace, un-
“ til forced to relinquish it ;—the supporting
“ every one in his hereditary right ; and re-
“ venging the breach of faith and engage-
“ ments ; but on the submission of the of-
“ fenders, the exercise of the virtues of cle-
“ mency and generosity, by pardoning, and
“ receiving him again into favour, and re-
“ storing him to his possessions ;—the not
“ suffering the intoxication of power to re-
“ duce you into a breach of faith ;—and the
“ giving support to each illustrious house in
“ proportion to its respective merits, and in
“ matters which required a long course of
“ years to bring to perfection ;—the form-
“ ing your conduct on mature deliberation,
“ and the advice of the Company and Coun-
“ cil,—are the sure means of exalting your
“ greatness and prosperity to the highest
“ pitch.—The intention of all this is to
“ recommend universal peace and friendship
“ in the manner following : The Almighty
“ disposes of kingdoms, and places whom-
“ soever

“ soever he chuses on the seats of power 1778.
 “ and rule ; but makes their stability to de-
 “ pend on their peaceable, just, and friend-
 “ ly conduct to others.—It is not every one
 “ who is equal to the task of government,
 “ on the plan designed by the Almighty
 “ Ruler, and of ensuring his stability by
 “ a wise and just conduct.—Hind and
 “ Deccan possess, at present, very few en-
 “ lightened, but a great multitude of weak
 “ and ignorant men : The English chiefs,
 “ and you in a superior degree, possess all
 “ the virtues above recited, who coming
 “ from distant islands by a six month’s voy-
 “ age on the great ocean, by their magnani-
 “ mity and fortitude, gained the admiration
 “ of many Soubahs on this continent. It
 “ is easy to acquire a kingdom ; but to be-
 “ come a king over kings, and chief of
 “ chiefs, is a very difficult matter. The
 “ attainment of this is only to be effected
 “ by the means of friendship, by which
 “ the universe may be subjected. My con-
 “ duct is framed on these principles. The
 “ residence of Beneram Pundit at Calcutta,
 “ was solely to effect the establishment of

1778. “ the most intimate friendship ; and by the
“ blessing of God it has taken such deep
“ root, that through your means it has
“ reached the ears of the Company and
“ King of England : and our connection
“ and correspondence, carried on under the
“ veil of the vicinity of our dominions,
“ has been discovered by the Poonah mi-
“ nisters, and by the Nabob Nizam-ul-
“ Dowla ; yet, though they form various
“ conjectures and doubts, and have sent a
“ trusty Vakeel, and written repeated let-
“ ters, to endeavour to find out the motives
“ of our union, yet they remain a mystery,
“ as I make the plea of our ancient ties, and
“ junction of our territories.

“ I was impatiently expecting the arrival
“ of Mr. Elliot, who being endowed with
“ an enlightened understanding, and invest-
“ ed with full powers from you to conduct
“ the negociations, and determine on the
“ measures to be pursued, would have esta-
“ blished the ties of a perpetual friendship,
“ and have settled every matter on the firm-
“ est basis. It pleased God that he should
“ die

“ die on the journey ; and the grief I felt 1778.
“ at his unfortunate loss, who would have
“ been the means of settling all points be-
“ tween us, to our mutual content, and by
“ his negotiation with me, giving satisf-
“ faction to the Paishwa and Nabob Nizam-
“ ul-Dowla ; all which have been by his
“ death thrown back many months ; my
“ grief is not to be described, and only
“ serves to add to your affliction. I have
“ not yet recovered the shock which that
“ event gave me, as you will learn more
“ fully from Beneram Pundit. There is no
“ remedy for such misfortunes, and it is
“ in vain to strive against the decrees of
“ Providence. Had Mr. Elliot arrived,
“ such strokes of policy would have been
“ employed, that the Poonah ministers
“ would have adhered more scrupulously
“ than before to their engagements ; the
“ French, who are the natural enemies of
“ the English, would have been theirs
“ likewise ; and their suspicions from ap-
“ prehensions of support being given to Roge-
“ naut-row, which never was, nor is de-
“ signed by the English chiefs, as I learn
“ from

1778. “ from Beneram, who had it from your own
 “ mouth, and which has caused them great
 “ uneasiness, would have been entirely re-
 “ moved by Mr. Elliot and my joint se-
 “ curity.

“ The Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowla—who
 “ wrote you repeatedly on this subject,
 “ and received for answer, that you had no
 “ idea of aiding or supporting Roganaut-
 “ row; that your enmity was solely pointed
 “ against the French; and that whoever
 “ assisted the French were your enemies—
 “ would likewise by these means have been
 “ thoroughly satisfied, and your detach-
 “ ment would have reached Bombay, with-
 “ out meeting the smallest interruption;
 “ and had the Poonah ministers then acted
 “ a contrary part, I should have withdrawn
 “ myself from their friendship. But by the
 “ death of Mr. Elliot, all these designs have
 “ fallen to the ground, and must be suspen-
 “ ded until another opportunity, and the
 “ knowledge of your sentiments. It is a
 “ proverb, ‘ that whatever is deliberately
 ‘ done, is well done.’ In reply to what you
 “ write

“ write respecting your framing your ultimate resolutions I have communicated to Beneram Pundit whatever I judge proper and eligible, and which may promote them in such a manner as may not be subject to any change from the vicissitudes of fortune. For those points which I fixed on, after minute deliberation, as the most eligible that can be adopted, I refer you to the letters of Beneram Pundit. If, notwithstanding, you have any plan to propose for the reciprocal benefit of our states, be pleased to communicate it to me.

P O S T S C R I P T.

“ To your letter respecting the sending of an army to overawe the French, and to reinforce the government of Bombay; and setting forth, that the Poona ministers having broken the treaty with the English, and in opposition to the rights of friendship received an envoy of the French king, and granted the port of Choul to that nation, thereby enabling
“ them

1778. “ them to form an arsenal, and collect mili-
“ tary stores; and of their having written
“ to their officers, to permit the French
“ ships to enter their ports; and that it
“ being therefore incumbent on you to take
“ measures to contract their designs, you
“ had determined to send a strong detachment
“ for the reinforcement of Bombay, by the
“ route of Berar; and that in consideration of
“ our ancient friendship, and the vicinity of
“ our dominions, you requested, that on its
“ arrival in my neighbourhood, I would
“ cause it to be instructed in the route, and,
“ providing it with provisions and neces-
“ saries, have it conducted in safety through
“ my territories, and join a body of my forces
“ with it, which would increase and cement
“ our friendship; and that you have, at the
“ assurance of Beneram, fixed on this route
“ for its march in preference to any other;
“ In reply to this letter, actuated by its dic-
“ tates of the sincerest friendship, I waited
“ not to take the advice of any one, but
“ without hesitation wrote you, That where
“ a sincere friendship existed, the passage of
“ troops through my country was a matter
“ of

“ of no moment ; that they should proceed 1778.
“ immediately through my country. I
“ likewise informed Colonel Leslie of the
“ difficulties and dangers he would meet
“ with in the way, from dangerous moun-
“ tains, extensive rivers, &c. and also dis-
“ patched Lalla Jadda Roy, with a chief of
“ note, to the banks of the Narbudda, to
“ supply the detachment with provisions as
“ long as they were in my territory, and to
“ treat them with all the duties of hospitali-
“ ty; where he waited in expectation of their
“ arrival for six months to no purpose.—
“ They loitered away their time in the Bun-
“ dlecond countries, contrary to every rule
“ of policy. At that time all the Poonah
“ ministers were separately employed in their
“ own private affairs, or in the war with
“ Hyder Naig, insomuch that they had no
“ time to turn their attention to the con-
“ cerns of other parts, and the march to
“ Bombay might have been effected with
“ the greatest ease. The time is now past.
“ The arrow is shot and cannot be recalled.
“ As I have repeatedly written to the Poo-
“ nah ministers, with whom I keep up a
“ corre-

1778. “ correspondence on the subject of their ent-
“ couraging a French envoy, and breaking
“ their faith with the English chiefs, acts
“ highly inconsistent with honour and po-
“ licy ; the answer I have received from
“ them, I have communicated to you.—
“ The substance of what they say in their
“ own justification is this : That the French
“ Vakeel came for the purpose of traffic,
“ not to negotiate ; yet, for the satisfaction
“ of the English, they gave him his dismiss-
“ sion : That the account of the grant of
“ the port of Choul, and an arsenal, is en-
“ tirely without foundation ; and that they
“ have not the least indisposition towards the
“ English : That I will therefore write to
“ Calcutta, that you may be perfectly satis-
“ fied respecting their disposition.—My letters
“ did not produce the effect of satisfying you
“ on the subject of the Paishwa, but your
“ doubts still remained. And, actuated by
“ wisdom and prudence, you determined to
“ send Mr. Elliot to me ; and wrote to me,
“ that on his arrival at Naigpore, after he had
“ and interview with me, and learned my
“ sentiments and views, he would, in con-
“ junction

“ junction with me, form a plan for our 1773.
“ mutual honour and benefit, and give di-
“ rections to Colonel Leslie in consequence,
“ who would be guided thereby.—The
“ event of this gentleman’s deputation is
“ too well known ; and Colonel Leslie like-
“ wise, after engaging in hostilities with
“ the Paishwa’s officers and Zemindars of
“ these parts, and collecting large sums
“ of money, died. Colonel Goddard suc-
“ ceeded to the command, and pursued the
“ same line of conduct, with respect to the
“ Talookdars, as his predecessor ; and ar-
“ riving at Garawale and Garasur in the
“ territory of the Afghans, whither he was
“ obliged to march with the utmost caution,
“ being surrounded with a Marratta army,
“ who constantly seized every opportunity
“ to attack him, wrote me from thence,
“ that he should shortly reach the Narbud-
“ da, where I would be pleased to cause
“ grain and other necessaries to be prepared,
“ and a party of my forces to be ready to
“ join him.—I wrote him in answer, That
“ Lalla Jadda Roy, and Shao Baal Hazaila,
“ were waiting on that side the Nar-
“ budda

1773. “ budda which is within my territories;
“ and that the Gaut where the troops
“ should cross was two coss from hence,
“ under Haffingabad ; that Janojee Booslah
“ forded it with his army at that place, on
“ his expedition to Malawa, and that I did
“ not doubt but it was now fordable ; that he
“ should therefore cross his army there, and
“ repair to Haffingabad : That Lalla Jadda
“ Roy would exert his utmost assiduity
“ in supplying him with grain and other
“ provisions, and treat them with every de-
“ gree of hospitality ; but that, as the road
“ forward was very difficult and dangerous,
“ and thousands of the Balha Castes were
“ concealed in the holes in the mountains ;
“ who though not able to oppose him open-
“ ly, yet would do it by ambuscade and stra-
“ tagems, and cut off his supplies of provi-
“ sions ; and that, beyond that he would
“ enter the Soubahship of Barhampore, de-
“ pendent on the Paishwa : That near 4000
“ of Scindiah’s cavalry were waiting at the
“ fort of Affur, for the arrival of the Eng-
“ lish on the banks of the Ganges ; 10,000
“ more were under the command of Bagarut
“ Sundiab ;

“ Sundiab; Scindiah himself with the chiefs 1778.
“ in readiness at Poonah, waiting to hear of
“ the approach of the English; and more-
“ over in Berar, in which the Nabob Nizam-
“ ul-Dowla possesses a share with me, all
“ the Jaghirdars were in readiness with
“ powerful armies; and although the Eng-
“ lish possessed the greatest magnanimity in
“ battle, yet as every step they took would
“ be just into the mouth of danger, and all
“ the above-mentioned chiefs would set
“ themselves to cut off and destroy his pro-
“ visions, and take every opportunity of at-
“ tacking him when they saw an advantage,
“ and of harassing him night and day, con-
“ stantly surrounding his army with their
“ numerous forces, the junction of a body
“ of my forces with his would avail nothing
“ in the face of such large armies, but
“ would only involve me in the greatest losses:
“ That it neither was adviseable for him to
“ return, which would diminish the awe and
“ respect in which he was held; that I
“ would therefore write the particulars ex-
“ plicitly to Calcutta, and that whatever you
“ should think proper to intimate to him and
“ me

1773. “ me in reply, it would be adviseable to
“ abide by, and act accordingly. All which
“ time I would recommend that he conti-
“ nued at Hossingur.—That I have received
“ letters from Calcutta, filled with the
“ warmest friendship and confidence to the
“ following purport: ‘ That the detach-
“ ment should come into my neighbourhood,
“ and be guided in its operations by my ad-
“ vice: That it is incumbent on every chief
“ who enjoys the confidence of another, to
“ give such advice as may be most advan-
“ tageous to the party reposing trust, and
“ most consistent with the faith of engage-
“ ments; and that with such conduct the
“ Almighty is well pleased.’ That I had
“ also written to the Poonah ministers my
“ advice on the situation of affairs, to this
“ purport: ‘ That Mr. Elliot was deputed
“ hither to negotiate with me, but dying
“ in the journey, all the negotiations in-
“ trusted to him were suspended; that had
“ he arrived at Naigpore, I had determined,
“ from principles of attachment, to have re-
“ moved from the minds of the English the
“ doubts and apprehensions which had arisen
“ by

“ by reason of the supposed encouragement 1778.
“ of the French envoy at Poonah, and the
“ agreement to support that nation, who
“ were the inveterate enemies of the Eng-
“ lish, which had given rise to the quarrel
“ between the two states, by proving to
“ them under the sanction of solemn oaths,
“ and becoming myself guarantee, that all
“ those reports were groundless, and that the
“ Poonah ministers were steady and zealous
“ in their engagements with the English,
“ and on several accounts highly obliged to
“ them. And I would have taken from Mr.
“ Elliot, engagements, that the English had
“ no idea of affording support to Roganaut-
“ row, but were resolved to maintain their
“ treaty inviolate; and that their apprehen-
“ sions related to the French; and that
“ when I gave the English satisfaction re-
“ lating to the French, and became guaran-
“ tee, all his doubts would be removed; and
“ that if it was requisite, a fresh engagement
“ should be executed, to which he would
“ be a guarantee: That, in brief, each party
“ entertained a reasonable doubt; the Eng-
“ lish, that the Poonah ministers would join
D 2 “ with

1778. “ with the French; and the Poonah mini-
“ sters, that the English support Roganaut-
“ row: That when these suspicions no long-
“ er remained, all causes of displeasure would
“ of course cease; and that they could have
“ no objection to a detachment of English
“ forces, sent for the reinforcement of Bom-
“ bay, and to overawe the French, not for
“ the support of Roganaut-row, repairing
“ thither; and to oppose them would in such
“ case have been highly improper.” &c. &c.

SECOND POSTSCRIPT.

“ Baboo-row, the Paishwa's vakeel, has
“ observed to me in the course of conversa-
“ tion, that his master has not the slightest
“ idea of failing in his engagements with
“ the English, or of contracting any friend-
“ ship with the French; but that the treaty
“ forbids the march of English forces
“ through the Paishwa's dominions; that
“ therefore the appearance of the detach-
“ ment now on its march, is an infringe-
“ ment of the treaty.”

1778.

THIRD POSTSCRIPT.

“ Although it may appear improper to
“ repeat the same thing over again, yet the
“ importance of the subject may plead in
“ my excuse. On either part, a doubt sub-
“ sists. The Poonah ministers suspect that
“ the English forces on their march to Bom-
“ bay, though ostensibly for the purpose of
“ opposing the French, are in reality in-
“ tended for the support of Roganaut-row;
“ and that the English at Bombay, who
“ were not included in the treaty with the
“ Paishwa, which was concluded through
“ the government of Bengal, with the advice
“ of the chief at Calcutta, are desirous of
“ breaking with the Paishwa, and support-
“ ing Roganaut-row; and that the detach-
“ ment had been sent at their requisition.
“ They alledge, that the chief of Calcutta
“ writes to them, that he is firmly resolved
“ to adhere to the treaty with the Paishwa;
“ and that the detachment he has sent to
“ Bombay, is solely to awe the French,
“ without the least design to assist Roganau-
D 3 “ row;

1778. “ row; and that since it is forbidden in the
“ treaty to dispatch troops over land, the
“ march of the troops is a breach of it:
“ That if it is necessary to send troops to
“ Bombay to awe the French, they ought to
“ be sent by sea.

“ The English on their part suspect the
“ Poonah ministers of joining the French,
“ in consequence of having received a French
“ vakeel. As the Paishwa formerly wrote
“ me, that he had no idea of failing in his
“ engagements with the English, and that
“ he had given no encouragement to the
“ French vakeel, who came for the purpose
“ of traffic, and that he had dismissed him,
“ therefore requested that I would satisfy
“ you in that respect; I, in consequence,
“ formerly wrote you all these particulars.
“ As I have a voucher in my hand from the
“ Paishwa, that he has no connection with
“ the French, and is steady to his engage-
“ ments with the English, I am able, by
“ this voucher, to give you complete satis-
“ faction on this head; but I have no
“ voucher, or intimation, from you, by
“ which

“ which I may be able to give satisfaction 1778.
“ to him.

“ As he pleads a prohibition in the treaty,
“ to the march of forces over land, and like-
“ wife complains respecting the money col-
“ lected by Colonel Leslie in his territories,
“ what answer can be made thereto ?

“ As the time requires that a reconcilia-
“ tion take place with the Poonah ministers,
“ you will consider and determine what re-
“ ply shall be given to these two points of
“ which they complain ; and by what means
“ they may be satisfied ; and communicate
“ your resolution to me, that I may write
“ conformably thereto, and remove all
“ doubts.”

The observation made, in this letter, by the Maha-Rajah, on the impolicy of our army wasting their time in the Bundelcund countries, at a time when the Poonah ministers were separately employed in their own private affairs, or in the war with Hyder-Naig, a juncture when the march

1778. of the Bengal detachment to Bombay might have been effected with the greatest ease, while it vindicates the conduct of the Supreme Council, and arraigns, in all the simple severity of common sense, that of the Presidency of Bombay, serves, in some measure, to explain the Rajah's own views, and to reconcile the readiness with which he assisted the English at one period, and the earnestness with which he vindicates the Paishwa from the charge brought against him by the Company's servants, offering his own mediation to bring about a perfect reconciliation between his own countrymen and the English, at another. For by this time Morabah-Furnese, with the other adherents of Ragobah, were under confinement in separate prisons; the intrigues and assurances of aid from France had made an impression on Hyder-Ally and the Marratta administration; and a treaty, which was afterwards concluded at Poonah, had been set on foot by the Nizam, for an alliance between himself, the Marrattas, and Moodajee Booslah.

The Maha-Rajah was not drawn into this alliance by any hatred of the English, to whom his professions of friendship, if we may judge by his actions, were sincere and cordial; but by the necessity of the times, and that of chusing a party: for in the contest that had arisen between his countrymen and the East-India Company, a perfect neutrality on the part of the Rajah was impracticable. Advanced in years, the first wish of his soul was peace; and to obtain this he offered, as has been already mentioned, and warmly pressed his mediation. The intrigues of the French with the Maratta chiefs and Hyder-Ally-Cawn, their reports of the general combination against the British empire in Europe and in America, of the misfortunes that had befallen, and the calamities that assailed and threatened to overwhelm us, joined to their assurance of powerful succours by sea and land, spread a general opinion throughout India, that all the crowns that centered in the King were now tottering on his head, and that some of them had already fallen. The latent sparks of ambition and of revenge

1778. venge which the power and prosperity of Great Britain had smothered, began now to smoke, and to threaten an eruption. For a combination was formed among all the other leading powers of Hindostan against the English.

The prince who took the lead in the formation of this confederacy was Nizam-Ally-Cawn, the Soubah of the Deccan, reputed the most subtle politician, after the death of Nundocomar, in India. The dominions of this prince are of small extent, his revenue is scanty, his military strength insignificant, nor was he ever, at any period of his life, distinguished for personal courage, or the spirit of enterprize. But he was highly respectable on account of his rank and descent; and this reverence for his person conspired with a natural insinuation and address to gain an ascendant over the minds of his countrymen. It seems to have been his constant and ruling maxim, to foment the incentives of war among his neighbours, to profit by their weakness and embarrassments, but to avoid being a party himself

himself in any of their contests, and rather 1778.
than expose himself to the dangers of the
field, to submit to humiliating sacrifices.

The Presidency of Fort St. George having concluded an alliance with his brother, Bajalet Jung, by which they acquired possession of the Guntour Circar, the Nizam was moved with a spirit of revenge, and a jealousy was awakened in his breast of the ambitious views of that and the other English governments in Asia. These sentiments he also excited without difficulty in the mind of Hyder-Ally, who felt disgust at our acquisition of that Circar, and considered the present juncture as a fit opportunity of revenging the attacks that had been made on his country by the English in the preceding war, at the instigation of the Nabob of Arcott. The Rajah of Berar, solicited to join this confederacy, and apprehensive of the dangers which threatened him, if, in the general combination against our countrymen in the East, he alone should stand forth in the character of their avowed friend, adopted that plan of conduct which was naturally suggested

1778. suggested to his imagination by his love of peace, his apprehension of danger, his unwillingness to break with the English, and the natural subtlety and simulation of Asiatic climates and forms of government. He formally, and to appearance, acceded to this grand alliance against the influence and authority of the English nation in the East, while, at the same time, he determined secretly to befriend them. Had the Presidency of Bombay, with that decision of counsel and promptitude of action which are for the most part necessary to the execution of great designs, seized the proper time for raising Roganaut-row to the regency of Poonah, by an armed force, their design would in all probability have succeeded.— While the friends of that chief were in possession of the supreme authority of the Marhatta state, Moraba having been vested with the dignity of Paishwa, in the stead of Nana-Furnese; while the Marratta chiefs were either taken up with their own private concerns, or entangled in a war with Hyder-Ally; and a strong detachment from Bengal had crossed the Jumna, with orders to
march

march directly to Bombay by the shortest 1772.
route that was practicable; had a vigorous
effort been made for the restoration of Ra-
gobah, as it might have been, and the Go-
vernor-general intended, by a co-operation
and coincidence of movements between the
forces from Bombay and the detachment
under Colonel Leslie; Moodajee-Booslah
would not even have made a shew of join-
ing the quadruple alliance above mentioned,
but have openly espoused the cause of the
English. But “ the arrow was shot, and
“ could not be recalled.” While Colonel
Leslie loitered away his time in Bundelcund,
the country of diamonds, and the Presidency
of Bombay seemed to hesitate concerning
the expediency of measures on which they
had appeared, before the march of the Ben-
gal army, to be bent and determined, a se-
cond and unexpected revolution was, on the
16th of June, effected at Poonah, by which
Morabah-Furnese, with his principal ad-
herents, was imprisoned; the intrigues of
St. Lubin at Poonah, Choul, and Manga-
lore, had prepared the minds of the Mar-
rattas and Hyder-Ally to join in a project
for

1773 for expelling the English from India; and a confederacy had been formed by the Soubah of the Deccan for that purpose. To make a shew of joining the confederacy, for these reasons, appeared to Moodajee Booslah the safest course for himself; and he determined to unite, if possible, as already mentioned, his own security with that of the British in India. Whether we ought to ascribe this resolution in favour of our countrymen to a natural partiality or predilection, to a regard to the political balance in India, or, as the issue of the war was doubtful, to the advantage of having some degree of merit to plead with whatever party should prove victorious; or, in whatever manner and proportion these sentiments and views were blended together, certain it is, that this Marratta was drawn into the confederacy against the East-India Company with infinite reluctance, and that, although the circumstances of the times deterred him from taking part with the English, and even constrained him to assume the mask of hostility, it was his purpose to communicate friendly intelligence to the English, and to abstain

abstain from all hostile actions, as long as 1773, he might do the former with secrecy, and the latter with safety.

In this situation of affairs, which appeared so little favourable to the cause of Ragobah and of the English, the Presidency of Bombay resolved to urge his pretensions to the throne of Poonah by force of arms.— This chief, like other men of rank among the Hindoos, as well as the Persians, Tartars, and other adjoining nations, who have inhabited Hindostan since it was conquered by Timurbeg or Tamerlane, possessed in an eminent degree the qualities of politeness and address, as well as the virtues of affability, hospitality, and liberality of disposition. His engaging manners, with the remains of his wealth, it is said, which he found means to save when he fled from Poonah, and which he distributed with a liberal hand, procured him not a little favour among the strangers with whom he sojourned as a refugee and exile. Ragobah, on field days, and at reviews, used to walk in the front of the lines, on which occasions he received,
and

1778. and with inexpressible grace returned, the common military compliments. His person was tall and slender; his countenance manly and expressive. His turban and his arms were always loaded with jewels.— When he resided, under the protection of the Company, in the island of Bombay, he had an adopted son with him, a young man about fourteen years of age, distinguished even among the noble youth of the East by the comeliness of his countenance and gracefulness of his person. He was fond of this lad, even to excess; for he has frequently been heard to say, that “if his eyes could behold his son in the possession of the regency to which he himself made pretensions, he would die in peace.” Ragobah, besides troops of his own, Sepoys, raised when he was at Bombay a company of Armenians, Portuguese, Germans, Danes, Dutch, English, and other nations. These he called his Christian company. He boasted much of their valour and discipline, and placed, or pretended to place, great confidence in their attachment to his person.— He had an infinite number of attendants,
lived

lived in a magnificent style, and was very munificent to the officers of his Christian company.

To place this prince at the head of the administration of Poonah, an army amounting to three thousand nine hundred and ten men, officers included, moved from Bombay on the 22d of November, with a great quantity of baggage, and a train of nineteen thousand cattle. Here it may be necessary to inform the European reader, that in India draughts and carriages are performed, for the most part, by bullocks: the number of which creatures that is necessary to an army is incredible. The conduct of this expedition was entrusted to a committee, consisting of Colonel Egerton, Mr. Carnac, and Mr. Mostyn. The army marched in three divisions. In Ragobah's division, which formed the van, were a number of huge elephants, with their castles mounted on their backs, for the use of his wives and his officers: and on one of the largest rode Ragobah himself. The castles, which are fixed on the backs of the elephants by a

E

kind

1778. kind of harness under their belly like the girth of a saddle, resemble tents. Each of these will contain eight or ten persons. In the time of battle they are thrown open, by pulling aside the curtains, at four different places, whence the people within throw darts, shoot arrows, or use musquetry. In the mean time, the creature that supports them rages with the fury of war, and is impatient to advance into the midst of the enemy. If by chance the contending armies should close together, which seldom happens, the elephant, by means of a chain which he wields with his trunk, makes dreadful havoc among his enemies with that weapon. The elephants walk seemingly with a slow pace; but nevertheless they make great progress, making very long steps. This circumstance of the length of their steps, accounts for that rolling motion of which persons mounted on their backs are sensible, and which they compare to the motion of a ship. These animals, for the most part, outwalked the infantry, and were generally advanced to a considerable distance before the rest of the army. Their enormous

mous weight imprinted their footsteps so 1778.
deeply in the wet and soft soil, that our soldiers were incommoded by them in a distressing manner; for the holes that were made by their feet being presently filled up with water or mire, could not be readily distinguished from the surrounding surface. Into these pits our men frequently plunged, to the great entertainment of their companions, who soon afforded similar amusement in their turn; insomuch that, during the whole march, while one half of our infantry was kept in a roar of laughter, the other poured forth a never-ceasing volley of curses on Ragobah's elephants.

The report of this expedition excited such an alarm among the ministers of Poonah, that, by their agent, they offered fresh terms to the Governor before the army had moved far from Bombay. These terms being rejected, our troops proceeding on their destination, on the 23d of December ascended the Gauts, and pursued their march to Poonah. But, on the 9th of January it 1779.
was determined by the Field-deputies that

1779. the army should retreat, on account, as they alledged, of a scarcity of provisions, although they had a supply for eighteen days, and that after a march of about fifty days, without any hostile obstruction in their progress, they had advanced within one day's march of Poonah. The commanding officer, Colonel Cockburn, when consulted in this matter, said, that he had not a doubt of being able to conduct the expedition to the place of its destination, but that our troops had not been used to retreat, and that there was greater danger in returning, in the present circumstances, to Bombay, than in advancing to Poonah. The Poonah Committee, however, (so the Field-deputies were called) persevered in their resolution to retreat. The army, encumbered with baggage, moved off by night. They were attacked by numerous bodies of Marrattas, and defended themselves not only with the utmost bravery, but, for the length and heat of the skirmishes in which they had been engaged, and the numbers of the assailants, with inconsiderable loss. In the evening of the 16th of January, 1779, application was
made

made to Nana-Furnese and Madajee Schindiah for an undisturbed retreat to Bombay : 1779.
 which was granted at Wargaum, on the humiliating condition that Salsette, and every other acquisition of the Bombay government, since the time of Madah-row, should be given up, and that orders should be sent to Colonel Goddard, to return with his army to Bengal. It must not be omitted, that while the Poonah Committee submitted to these humiliating terms, they gave an express declaration in writing, that the terms to which they had acceded were not obligatory on the Supreme Council.

This mortifying intelligence was received at Calcutta in the month of February, in a literal translation of a letter to the Nabob of Arcot from Row-Gee, his vakeel at the court of Poonah, dated the 18th of January, 1779, of which the following is a copy.

“ 1. I have addressed to your Highness
 “ several letters of late, some of which I
 “ hope are arrived : I have accounts of
 “ others having been intercepted on the
 E 3 “ road,

1779. “ road, and shall therefore recapitulate
 “ some of the most important transactions
 “ here.

“ 2. The English Surdars *, as I have
 “ already wrort to your Highness, marched
 “ from Bombay to the passes, and fortified
 “ that of Koddichully. Roganaut-row took
 “ possession of two forts which were in the
 “ road, and joined the English army, which
 “ I hear consisted of seven hundred Euro-
 “ peans, eight battalions of Sepoys, forty
 “ pieces of cannon, mortars, and a quantity
 “ of powder and military stores; they had
 “ besides four lacks of rupees in money.

“ 3. Siccaram Pundit and Nana-Furnese,
 “ two Marratta Surdars, joined their forces,
 “ and satisfied the discontented chiefs Schin-
 “ diah and Holkar, by giving them money,
 “ jaghires, and other presents.

“ 4. All the chiefs having met to con-
 “ sult what was to be done in the present
 “ state of affairs, they all with one voice
 “ agreed, that if Roganaut-row came with
 “ his

* Or chiefs.

“ his own forces alone, they should receive 1779.
 “ him, and give him a share of the power
 “ as formerly ; but since he came with an
 “ army of English, who were of a different
 “ nation from them, and whose conduct in
 “ Sujah Dowla’s country, the Rohilla coun-
 “ try, Bengal, and the Carnatic, they were
 “ well acquainted with, they unanimously
 “ determined not to receive Roganaut-row ;
 “ as otherwise, in the end, they would be
 “ obliged to forsake their religion, and be-
 “ come the slaves of Europeans. Upon this
 “ they exchanged oaths ; and Nehum-row,
 “ Apagee Pundit, and Schindiah, were sent
 “ with an army of 15,000 horse, besides
 “ foot, to the Gaut of Tulicanoon, and were
 “ followed immediately after by Siccaram
 “ Pundit and Nana-Furnese, with 40,000
 “ horse.

“ 5. It has been for some time the fixed
 “ determination of the English Surdars to
 “ give their assistance to Roganaut-row, in
 “ replacing him at the head of the govern-
 “ ment ; an army was sent from Calcutta,
 “ who made an alliance with Booflah (Ra-

1779. “jah of Berar), and they were greatly encouraged by the news of the surrender of Pondicherry.

“ 6. Mr. Mostyn, who went from Poonah, made them believe, that many of the Marratta Surdars were in their interest, and that as soon as their army should arrive at the Gaut, Holkar would join them with all his forces.

“ 7. The English, trusting to this, marched their army to the Gaut, and waited impatiently for a whole month, but no one appeared to join their standard. The English army marched forward from the Gaut, and were so much harrassed by the Marrattas, as not to be able to proceed more than two cofs * a day, during which time they lost a great many of their men by the fire kept upon them by the Marrattas. When they came to Chockly, which is about fourteen cofs from the pass, they were obliged to halt; Captain Stewart, one of their Surdars, was killed at this place.

“ 8. On

* A cof is five English miles.

“ 8. On the 21st of January, the Euro- 1779.
“ pean army arrived at Tulicanoon (seven-
“ teen cofs from the pass); Mr. Carnac, se-
“ cond of Bombay, was with them. Sic-
“ caram sent a body of horse to Tulicanoon
“ to harrafs them; twenty-five Europeans,
“ amongst whom was an officer, and one
“ hundred Sepoys, were killed on the first
“ day; the Marrattas had two hundred men
“ killed.

“ 9. On the second day the English were
“ furrounded on all sides by the Marrattas,
“ and all supplies of provisions cut off from
“ them. Seeing themselves in this situa-
“ tion, they determined, if possible, to re-
“ turn by the Gaut, and consulted upon the
“ means to effect their retreat. Roganaut-
“ row hearing this, sent privately to the Mar-
“ rattachief, Schendiah, telling him, that if
“ he would attack the English, he would
“ join him with his two battalions of Sepoys,
“ and six hundred horse. The English, it
“ would appear, had intelligence of this;
“ for, on the 13th of January, they sudden-
“ ly marched secretly from Tulicanoon,
“ taking

1779. “ taking Roganaut-row with them, and
“ leaving their baggage and tents standing,
“ under the protection of two hundred Eu-
“ ropeans and one battalian of Sepoys, with
“ eight pieces of cannon, to make the Mar-
“ rattas believe that their whole force was
“ at Tulicanoon—Siccaram, however, got
“ private intelligence of their retreat ; and,
“ with Nana-Furnese, Schindiah, and Hol-
“ kar, went to cut off their march. At
“ the same time he sent a body of horse to
“ Tulicanoon, where the rest of the English
“ were encamped. The Marrattas as usual
“ fell upon the plunder, and a smart en-
“ gagement ensued between them and the
“ English. The detachment, who had
“ marched with Roganaut-row, but had not
“ proceeded far, returned to the assistance
“ of those in their camp. A heavy can-
“ nonade was kept up by the Marrattas
“ from midnight till four o’clock the next
“ day ; the English were not able to march
“ one foot of way, and all their firing took no
“ effect ; one hundred and fifty Europeans,
“ with many of their officers, and eight hun-
“ dred Sepoys, were killed. The Marrattas
“ fur-

“surrounded them, and kept patrols going 1779.
“all night, to prevent any from escaping.
“On the 14th, the Marrattas commenced
“their cannonading again: fifty Europeans
“and four hundred Sepoys were killed. The
“English ceased firing, seeing that it had
“no effect. In the evening of that day,
“the servant of Roganaut-row, and that of
“Mr. Carnac, brought a letter to Madah-
“row, acquainting him, that they would
“send a trusty person to confer with him
“upon some matters, if leave was given.
“The Surdars read the letter, and sent an
“answer by the same person, that they were
“willing to cease hostilities, until a person
“was sent. They, however, took care to
“keep a strict patrol round the English
“camp all night. On the 15th, the Mar-
“ratta Surdars went to the trenches, and
“began firing again; but it was not an-
“swered from the English camp. Soon
“after, Mr. Farmer (a gentleman who was
“some time ago at your Highness’s court)
“came from the English camp, and the
“fire of the Marrattas immediately ceased.
“The Marrattas sent for him into the pre-
“fence,

1779. “fence, and Mr. Farmer said to them,
 “We are only merchants.—When disputes
 “prevailed with you, Roganaut-row came
 “to us, and demanded our protection. We
 “thought he had a right to the govern-
 “ment, and gave him our assistance. No-
 “thing but ill fortune attends him, and we
 “have been brought to this miserable state
 “by keeping him with us. You are masters
 “to keep him from us. We shall hence-
 “forth adhere to the treaties that have for-
 “merly taken place between us. Be plea-
 “sed to forgive what has happened.’

“The minister answered, ‘Roganaut-
 “row is one of us. What right could you
 “have to interfere in our concerns with him?
 “We now desire you to give up Salfette and
 “Basseen, and what other countries you
 “have possessed yourselves of; as also the Cir-
 “cars, those of the Pergunnahs of Baroch,
 “&c. which you have taken in Guzzarat :
 “adhere to the treaty made in the time of
 “Bajalee-row, and ask nothing else.’—
 “Mr. Farmer heard this answer, and re-
 “turned to his camp. While this negoci-
 “ation

“ ation was carrying on, 15,000 Marratta 1779.
“ horse were sent against some out-posts
“ where the English had entrenched them-
“ selves, and set fire to them, putting every
“ one they met with to death. They did
“ the same at the fort of Choul, where the
“ English had fortified themselves. I heard
“ all this from Nana-Furnese; whether it
“ be true or false, I am not certain.

“ On the 6th, at noon, Mr. Farmer re-
“ turned, and told Schindiah that he had
“ brought a blank paper, signed and sealed,
“ which the Marratta chiefs might fill up
“ as they pleased. Schindiah told the mi-
“ nisters, that although they had it in their
“ power to make any demands they pleased,
“ it would not be advisable to do it at this
“ time. ‘ For our making large demands
“ would only sow resentment in their hearts,
“ and we had better demand only what is
“ necessary. Let Roganaut-row be with us,
“ and the treaty between us and the English
“ will be adhered to. Let Salfette and the
“ Pergunnah in Guzzarat, &c. be given
“ back to us. Let the Bengal army return
“ back.

1779. “ back. For the rest, let us act with them
“ as is stipulated in the treaty with Bajalee-
“ row; let the jewels mortgaged by Roga-
“ naut-row be restored, and nothing de-
“ manded for them. Let all these articles
“ be wrote out on the paper which they
“ have sent.’ Which was accordingly done.
“ It is likewise conditioned, that till this
“ treaty is returned, signed and sealed by
“ the Governor of the Council and Select
“ Committee, under the Company’s Seal,
“ and till Salfette and the other countries be
“ given up, the nephew of Captain Stewart,
“ and Mr. Farmer shall remain in the Mar-
“ ratta camp, as hostages for the due perfor-
“ mance of the articles of this treaty.’

“ The English soldiers who have escaped
“ with their lives, fasted for three days, and
“ are now in a miserable condition. The
“ Europeans and Sepoys have all grounded
“ their arms.—On the 17th the treaty was
“ sent to the Marratta camp. The articles
“ were written in Persian, Marratta, and
“ English, sealed with the Company’s Seal,
“ and signed by Mr. Carnac and seven offi-
“ cers.

“ cers. After this the Marratta Surdars sent 1779.
“ them victuals, which they needed much.
“ The English marched out, *escorted by two*
“ *thousand Marratta horse* ; but Roganaut-
“ row, not finding a lucky hour, did not
“ go to the Marratta camp, but will go af-
“ ter twelve o’clock to-morrow.”

Whether the act of perfidy imputed in this letter to Roganaut-row was real or fictitious, may admit of some doubt. It is perfectly consonant to the subtlety and artifices of eastern policy, to suppose that this charge was artfully insinuated to the Nabob of Arcot’s vakeel with a view of undermining Ragobah in the favour of the English. But the following particulars relating to this Marratta have been admitted on authority that is unquestionable. While our army lay encamped on the fields of Tulicannon, Roganaut-row, who had a camp of his own separate from ours, sent notice to Mr. Carnac, the grand field-deputy, who controlled all matters in this expedition, that he had discovered three men in his camp, who, he had reason to believe, had a design

1779. design on his life, and desired to know how he might be permitted to dispose of them. Mr. Carnac returned for answer, that he was at liberty to dispose of them as he should think proper. Whereupon Ragobah punished one of these miserable creatures with the loss of his eyes; another, with that of his tongue; and the third he deprived of both his legs by amputation. The last unhappy sufferer soon died through loss of blood. Ragobah assigned some fanciful reasons why one of these victims should be deprived of the power of speech; another, of that of walking; and a third, of the sense of sight.

The failure of this expedition may be ascribed in general to that fluctuation and indecision which usually characterise those counsels and measures, which are directed not by the energy of one presiding mind, but by the jarring opinions and views of different and unconnected individuals. Had the Bombay army marched towards Poonah either sooner or later, had they either advanced to that seat of government in the
favourable

favourable circumstances already described, 1779.
or waited for the junction of the army from
Bengal, success would have been certain.—
Even under all the disadvantages which
opposed themselves to the expedition from
Bombay in November 1778, there is reason
to believe that the end for which it was
moved would have been completely answered,
had not the Commander in chief been
circumscribed in his designs and operations
by the appointment of Field-deputies: a
measure, the bad effects of which have
been constantly shewn by experience.—
Debate and execution are in their nature in-
compatible. The success of military operations
depends very much upon unity of
command, without which there can neither
be decision, nor prompt and timely execution.

Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, for
Mr. Mostyn, the other member of the Poo-
nah Committee, died on the march, having
resolved that our forces should be recon-
ducted to Bombay, sent a letter, bearing date
the 11th of January, 1779, to Colonel
F Goddard,

1779. Goddard, ordering him not to continue his march to Poonah, but to return to Bengal, or to remain on the borders of Berar. In this letter the intended retreat to Bombay was not mentioned. The Colonel, after mature reflection, notwithstanding this order, and that a vakeel from the Marratta ministers had arrived in his camp with a copy of the humiliating convention of Wor-gaum, determined to pursue his destination. He denied that the Poonah Committee had any authority over him, and declared his resolution to execute his orders, from the Supreme Council, to march to Bombay for the security of the Company's possessions against the designs of the French.

When Colonel Goddard succeeded to the chief command of the Bengal detachment, he received a charge to renew the negotiation with Moodajee-Booslah, on the principles of Mr. Elliot's instructions, with full power to conclude a treaty. And the Governor-general, in prosecution of the same views, wrote the following letter to the
Maha-

Maha-Rajah's prime minister, dated at Calcutta the 23d of November, 1778.

“ In the whole of my conduct I have
 “ departed from the common line of
 “ policy, and have made advances when
 “ others in my situation would have waited
 “ for solicitations; as the greatest advan-
 “ tages to which I can look, cannot in
 “ their nature equal those to which the
 “ prosperous issue of our measures may
 “ conduct the state of the Maha-Rajah's
 “ government. But I know the charac-
 “ ters to which I address myself. I trust
 “ to the approved bravery and spirit of your
 “ chief, that he will ardently catch at the
 “ objects presented to his ambition; and to
 “ your wisdom, of which, if fame reports
 “ truly, no minister ever possessed a larger
 “ portion, that you will view their impor-
 “ tance in too clear a light to hazard a
 “ loss of them, by attempting to take an
 “ advantage of the desire which I have ex-
 “ pressed for their accomplishment. This
 “ intimation is not so much intended for a
 “ caution to you, as for an explanation of

1779. “ my conduct to those who may be less able
“ to penetrate the grounds of it.”

Agreably to the designs of the Governor-general, Colonel Goddard, with the detachment under his command, in the beginning of January 1779, crossed the Nerbuddah and encamped on the southern banks of that river within the territory of Berar, where he was furnished with cash, provisions, and draft-cattle for his artillery, and where he waited to be informed of the final resolution of Moodajee-Booslah. He deputed Lieutenant Weatherstone to Naigpore, in order to press the Rajah to conclude the proposed treaty and immediately to enter on its execution. But that prince, influenced by the considerations above-mentioned, remained inflexible : for which reason, Colonel Goddard, finding all his attempts to draw the Rajah into an alliance ineffectual, advanced by quick marches towards Poonah. But, on receiving the letter above-mentioned from Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, he moved with his detachment from Brahampore on the 6th of February,

bruary, and, about the 20th of that month, 1779. he arrived at Surat, without having met with any opposition, or so much as ever seeing an enemy. For the Marrattas had called in all their troops to oppose the army from Bombay, and the convention with Mr. Carnac at Worgaum, until it was disavowed in Bombay, had lulled them into an opinion that they were now in the possession of secure prosperity.

An extreme fluctuation in the councils of Bombay had induced Mr. Hastings to consider the cause of Roganaut-row as almost desperate. That some chief should be placed at the head of the Marratta regency, who should conduct the government on the ground of alliance and friendship with the English, was a measure which the present juncture of affairs rendered highly expedient; but that a military force should be sent from Bengal to support the government of Bombay, at all adventures, in opposition to the power and machinations of our enemies both in Europe and Asia, seemed necessary to the preservation of the

1779. British settlements in India. An embassy was therefore sent to incline the Rajah of Berar to unite his forces with ours, and to become a candidate for the sovereignty of the Marratta Empire. But, whether he should accede to this proposal, or chuse to remain inactive, the English commander was ordered in general to march across the peninsula of Hindostan, for the support of our friends on its western shores, in all events, against all their enemies. While the issue of the negociation entered into with the Mahah-Rajah was uncertain, to have intrusted the design in his favour to the Presidency of Bombay, could not have produced any good effects, but might have been attended with bad ones. The personal friends of Ragobah would have been alarmed and disgusted, and new occasions of doubt and delay would have been presented to men who had already shewn but too many symptoms of irresolution. If the Rajah of Berar should grasp at the objects presented to his ambition, there was nothing at Poonah to oppose plausible and just pretensions, supported by the united power of the Rajah and the English:

lish: if he should not, the efforts of the gentlemen of Bombay in favour of Rago-
 1779.
 bah, however-desultory they might be, ill
 timed, or unsuccessful, would yet, in pro-
 portion to their extent, occasion a diversion
 of the Marratta forces, and facilitate the ex-
 pedition under the command of Colonel
 Goddard. It is in this manner that supe-
 rior acquire and maintain an ascendancy
 over inferior natures, and without even be-
 stowing their confidence which might be
 abused, convert them into instruments of
 their designs, merely by a sagacious antici-
 pation of the course of conduct they will be
 most likely to pursue in given situations.—
 The views of Mr. Hastings, in this com-
 plicated affair were not more judicious and
 manly than fortunate. If the expedition
 from Bombay to Poonah tarnished, in some
 measure, the honour of the British name,
 the safe arrival of Colonel Goddard at Surat,
 served to retrieve it.

The Governor-general, and Supreme
 Council, which the arrival of Sir Eyre
 Coote in Bengal on the 27th of March had

1779. made complete, at the first assembly of the Board, resolved, if possible, to conclude a lasting peace with the Marrattas upon the ground of the Poorunder treaty in 1776.— The person who was judged the fittest minister on our part, in a negociation for this purpose, was Colonel Goddard, now raised to the rank as well as the command of a General. Having received instructions to use his utmost endeavours to effect a reconciliation, and communicated the powers with which he had been invested to the ministers of Poonah, they deputed a vakeel to Surat with plenipotentiary powers for the negociation of peace. In the mean time, Ragobah, making his escape from the officers of Scindiah, who had charge of his person, and were conveying him to a place of confinement, fled to Surat, where he arrived before the vakeel from the Marrattas. General Goddard, at the same time that he informed the Marratta government of this unexpected event, agreed to afford this fugitive prince personal protection. The Marratta messenger returned from Surat to Poonah, and promised to send back a categorical

1779.

gorical answer to our proposals within the space of three weeks. This period being elapsed, the return of the vakeel to Surat made known the only terms on which the Marratta chiefs would consent to conclude a peace, namely, “ That the English should
“ deliver the person of Roganaut-row into
“ the hands of their vakeel, and make
“ immediate restitution of the Island of
“ Salfette.”

The negotiation for peace was now at an end: and General Goddard immediately prepared for the prosecution of war.

The ancient kingdom of Guzzarat is bounded on the north by the river Paddar, which divides it from the the dominions of Persia. It extends from the ocean on the west, and where the land is indented by the Gulphs of Cambait and Scindy, eastward to the confines of Malva and Chandeish. It is watered by three large rivers which receive many tributary streams, the Mahi, the Narbuddah and the Tapti. On the first of these, where it falls into the Sea, stands the city of
Cambait,

1779. Cambait, on the second Baroach, and on the third Surat: but the two last, at the distance of a few leagues from the ocean.— This fertile province, so admirably fitted for commerce, and especially the town of Surat, has, from the earliest times, carried on a most advantageous as well as extensive trade in cotton, indigo, wheat and other grain, and also various manufactures.

Guzzarat had been governed for ages by a succession of native princes, when, in the reign of Acbar, it was reduced into the form of a province of the Mogul Empire. The Mahommedan capital of Guzzarat is Ammedabad, the work of Achmed and his successors, who enlarged, beautified, and raised it to splendour out of the ruins of the antient Hindoo cities, Chappaneer and Narvalla. In Ammedabad we see, at this day, the Mosque and tomb of Achmed its founder, built entirely of stone and marble, and of such exquisite workmanship as to remain uninjured by the hand of time, although it has stood for four centuries. Ammedabad is situated upon the east bank of a stream, though

though small, yet pleasant, wholesome, and 1779.
constant. The walls, which still remain,
are about six miles in circumference, and
there is a very wide and deep ditch carried
all around them. Besides this ditch, new
works have been since constructed, where
the original defences, either from decay or
situation, were judged insufficient. There
are twelve gateways, by which you pass in
and out of the city. These gateways, and
other parts of the walls, appear to have been
adorned, at regular distances, with towers
and cupolas, which in the days of its splen-
dour must have equally contributed to
strength and magnificent appearance.—
Within the city, and upon the banks of the
river, which is called the Sabremetty Nuddy,
there is an extensive enclosure distinguished
by the name of the Budder, which was
formerly the royal residence. This place
has in former times been strongly fortified:
and its situation was such as to command
the principal Buzars or market places, courts
of Justice, and the streets including the pa-
laces of the chief nobles. But at this day,
so greatly has Ammedabad declined from
its

1779. its original splendour, that not more than a quarter of the space within the walls is inhabited. Without the walls, the suburbs, as is evident from infallible vestiges, must have extended to the distance of three miles round. Such was the flourishing condition of the capital and whole province of Guzzarat under Mahommedan princes, so late as the reign of the great Aurengzebe, who, towards the end of the last century, extended his dominion over the whole peninsula of India within the Ganges.

The influence of climate and soil, with other physical causes, have a more steady and fixed influence on the characters of nations, than forms of government, laws, religion, or any thing that depends for its efficacy on a mere appeal to our moral nature. In two or three generations, it is observed, the progeny of the Tartarian and Persian conquerors of the plains of Hindostan, are subdued by an enervating climate, and sink down with the effeminate aborigines of the country into sloth and sensuality. The
vigour

vigour of Aurengzebe suspended for a space 1779.
of thirty years, the fatal effects of luxury
on the name and power of the Mahomme-
dan conquerors of Hindostan. But the
imbecillity of his successors, conspiracies and
civil wars in the centre of the empire, and
a total relaxation of government in all its
remote and extended provinces, universally
encouraged the subordinate and tributary
princes to assert their independence on the
Emperor; nor was the Soubah of Guzzarat
found more loyally attached to the Sove-
reign Lord of India within the Ganges than
the other chiefs, who in the time of Aureng-
zebe had exercised only delegated power.

The strength of the Mogul Empire being
broken by dismemberment and separation,
and habits of indolence having taken place
of that vigour of character which had esta-
blished the power and domination of different
Mahommedan leaders, the Marrattas, under
the conduct of Rajah Sahoo-row, issuing from
the mountains of the Deccan, and spreading
slaughter and desolation wherever they di-
rected their destructive steps, revenged on
the

1779. the effeminate sons the calamities inflicted by their warlike fathers. Some, unable to stem the torrent, abandoned all to its resistless fury. Others sought to purchase present relief, and a precarious respite from utter ruin, by pecuniary tribute and territorial concession. In the province of Guzzarat, which fell at this time under the power of the Marrattas, we find, accordingly, some vestiges of the Mahommedan dominion at Surat and Cambait. These places are still under the government of Mahommedan princes, who style themselves Nawabs ; but their authority is confined within the walls of the cities, and even the scanty revenue of this limited domain, they are obliged to share liberally with the Marrattas. The loss of the capital Ammedabad, which, after a vigorous resistance was betrayed into the hands of the Marrattas, was followed by an instant and complete dissolution of the Mogul authority.

The descendants of the Nawab Cum-maul-ul-dien, the family which was then dispossessed of the government, now reside in
obscurity,

obscurity, upon a small estate allowed them 1779.
in the neighbourhood of Pattan, under the
protection and vigilant jealousy of Futtu
Sing, representative of the family of Gui-
cowar, to whom the greater part of Guzzarat
was transmitted by hereditary succession from
Pillajee their original founder. This chief,
the grandfather of Futtu Sing Guicowar,
the present reigning Prince, was eminently
distinguished by his political as well as
by his military talents. His important
services in the field to Sahoo-row, Rajah
of Setterah, were rewarded with the rich
and extensive kingdom of Guzzarat, the
greatest part of which he had himself con-
quered from the Mahommedan princes who
at that time governed it in the name of the
Mogul Emperors or Kings of Delhi. But
after the death of Pillajee, his son and suc-
cessor Damajee, having repaired, for the
purpose of accommodating certain dif-
ferences with the Marratta government, to
Poonah, was treacherously confined, com-
pelled to make a partition of his province
with the reigning Paishwa, and to enter into
such other engagements as that Prince
chose

1779. chose to prescribe, before he could obtain his freedom.

General Goddard, who was happily entrusted with the whole conduct of the war, in the formation of plans as well as in their execution, resolved to commence the campaign by the settlement of such an order of affairs in Guzzarat, as should secure on our side its importance to the general issue of the contest. Such an arrangement it was particularly necessary to make, previously to the approach of the Marratta forces, lest their presence should intimidate and draw over to the side of the Paishwa, the Prince Futty Sing Row Guicowar, whose inclination at the best could only be supposed to be wavering between the two parties, in the cause of one or other of which he must, of necessity, be involved. This object was to be accomplished only by one or other of the following modes: Either to make an union of interests with Futty Sing, or to reduce him under our power by the force of arms. To have adopted the last
of

of these measures would have combined 1779.
the prince in a common cause with the
Marratta government, and their united
strength, presenting full scope to all our
exertions, would have so confined our
operations, and exhausted our resources, as
to render all hopes of any acquisition of
revenue, or other public advantages, abortive.
No present provision could have been made for the future prosecution of the war : the Province of Guzzarat must have been laid waste and destroyed ; or, if we should have been able to protect any part of it from utter desolation, it must have been exposed to the constant inroads of a predatory enemy. On the eve of engaging in a war with the most powerful state in Hindostan, unsupported by any friend or ally, and uncertain of the real designs of those powers that then professed themselves neutral, to conciliate and attach to our cause so powerful a chief as Futty Sing, was an object of the first importance, and absolutely necessary for enabling us to commence hostilities with any probable prospect of success.

1779. The General, influenced and actuated by these views, determined, if possible, to adjust the settlement of Guzzarat with Futtý Sing in an amicable manner, although certain unpromising circumstances naturally excited in his mind an apprehension that but little confidence was to be placed in any promises or declarations that the Rajah, in the present juncture, might be induced to make, however friendly and specious in appearance. That Prince was represented, by some individuals at Bombay, as a character naturally insincere and perfidious: and he, on his part, had but too just cause of retorting the charge of perfidy on the English. In the year 1775, when the forces from Bombay were in the field in support of the pretensions of Roganautrow, the Rajah, after a long negociation, carried on through the mediation of the English commander, and under the faith of the Company, was prevailed upon to risque an interview, when he was forcibly made prisoner by Ragobah, compelled to agree to the payment of a large sum of money, and not suffered to return to his capital

capital until he had sent for his daughter, a child of six or seven years of age, and delivered her up as a security for the performance of his engagement. The fear of meeting with a treatment similar to what he had before experienced, might well excite a doubt on the part of Futtý Sing of our proffered friendship. These considerations, joined to that dread which the Rajah must naturally be supposed to entertain of the power and vengeance of the Marrattas, presented such difficulties as would have diverted a spirit less vigorous and ardent than General Goddard, from the pursuit of his object. To this, however, the General continued to bend all his efforts with an address, as well as an assiduous zeal, which fully proved the disinterested views which governed his conduct.

The exclusive conquest of Guzzarat, and the ruin of Futtý Sing, were tempting objects to private rapacity and ambition: General Goddard preferred to both, the satisfaction of procuring a solid and per-

1779. manent advantage to the patriotic. The General, to patriotic virtue, added great political address as well as military skill and prowess. Sensible of the good effects which the rapid movements and approach of the army would produce on the counsels of Futtý Sing, he carried on the negotiation with that prince, without interrupting the progress of the march. Vakeels constantly passed between the English army and Barodah, the capital of Futtý Sing, a city recently founded upon the banks of the Biswamuntry Nuddy, and situated betwixt the Mahi and the Narbuddah, about twelve miles south of the former. The Rajah was at length gained over to our views, and agreed to an alliance with the Company on the terms proposed to him. It was stipulated, that Futtý Sing should be put in possession of a country to be conquered from the Marrattas, northward of the river Mahi, in exchange for an equal portion of lands to the southward: an arrangement by which the territories of the Rajah, as well as our own, would be rendered compact, and united in one regular chain

chain of contiguous tracts of land, towns, 1780.
and garrisons. This treaty was finally
concluded on the 26th of January 1780,
at a village called Condeala, about four
miles from Barodah, and half way between
that capital and our encampment. By
this compact the peace of Guzzarat was
secured on the most solid foundations; an
immediate resource of revenue was pro-
vided, and leisure was afforded to turn our
arms to new and more necessary, though,
perhaps, to less beneficial conquests. The
General, then, who had been strengthened
by a small detachment of troops from
Bombay, and taken the field in December
1779, having in his route to Guzzarat
concluded a treaty with Futty Sing-row
Guicowar, by which that extensive pro-
vince was equally divided between him
and the East India Company, in conformity
to his engagements to put that prince in
possession of the Marratta territories to the
north of the Mahi, marched from the
neighbourhood of Barodah, and advanced
towards Ammedabad, the capital of that
part of Guzzarat which was in the pos-
session.

1780. session of the Marrattas. This place, which was garrisoned by six thousand Arab and Sindia foot, and two thousand horse, was carried by a storm after a gallant and desperate resistance, in the morning of the 15th day of February. Four hundred of the besieged were killed in the assault. The greatest part of these lost their lives in the ditch and one of the gateways. The pressure and confusion of the distracted multitude shut the gate against themselves, and drove them in heaps upon one another. In that helpless situation, their amunition being blown up in their cartouche boxes, all of them perished. No act of mercy which disciplined humanity could extend to the unarmed and unresisting was omitted. The prisoners, among whom were some Arab officers, were treated with the utmost clemency and indulgence. The wounded were received into our hospitals, used with all possible tenderness and care, and, afterwards in due time released. The sound policy, as well as humanity of this indulgence to the conquered in war, was exemplified, soon after this, by the active gratitude of an Arabian Jemadar

inadar in the service of the Marrattas. An 1780.
officer of the Bombay establishment, belonging to a small party of Sepoys employed in the Concan, having fallen into the hands of the enemy, was set at liberty through the intercession of this Arab, who declared that he had no other motive of mediation than a grateful sense of the humane treatment his countrymen had met with from the English commander at the siege of Ammedabad.

On the 26th of February, Ammedabad, with its dependencies, was formally transferred to Futty Sing. That this place might appear as important an acquisition in the eyes of the Rajah as possible, every precaution was used to prevent a general pillage; although the valour, and indeed the disciplined moderation of our men, was rewarded by a prize that fell into their hands without the knowledge of the General. But indeed the greatest part of the property belonging to the inhabitants had been conveyed to places of security previously to the siege: and almost the whole of what remain-

1780. ed was the property of people connected with the new sovereign.

The General, leaving a garrison for the support of Futtu Sing, advanced on the 2d of March to meet the forces of the Marrattas, assembled to the number of forty thousand, for the most part horsemen, who, being ignorant of what had happened, were on their march to the relief of Ammedabad under the conduct of Scindiah and Holkar. The English army crossed the Mahi on the 6th of March, and on the 8th encamped on the Biswamuntry Neddy, about two miles from Barodah. The Marrattas, who had descended from the Gauts and were advancing to that capital, moved off to the eastward, about fourteen miles from this place, and nearly the same distance from Powan-Ghurr, a very strong fortress belonging to the Maha Rajah Scindiah, the most powerful of the Marratta chiefs, situated upon a lofty and almost inaccessible mountain, which separates the province of Guzzarat from that of Malva. While the opposite armies were encamped at these different

ferent stations, Messrs. Farmer and Stewart, 1780, who had been left with Madajee Sciandiah, as hostages for the faithful performance of the convention of Worgaum, arrived on the 9th of March in our camp with letters from that chief and Holkar, containing general expressions of their friendly sentiments, and of their inclination to live on terms of amity with the English. As a proof of the sincerity of their professions they had liberated the English hostages, and conjoined those gentlemen in a commission with Abajee Shabajee, to make such a representation of affairs to General Goddard as might prepare the way for the re-establishment of peace. The General, on his part, endeavoured by every assurance and argument in his power, to impress the mind of Scindiah with a just conviction of the sincere desire of the English for peace, representing at the same time the sentiments of particular and personal regard which his nation entertained for Scindiah himself, of which they were ready to give him the strongest and most convincing testimonies. He suggested some conditions of mutual advantage,
on

1780. on which the English were desirous of uniting with that chief in settling the administration of the Marratta empire on a basis that should be solid and permanent. But should his attempts to establish an union between his nation and Scindiah, which seemed to him not more desirable to both parties than natural and easy, prove abortive, he also expressed an inclination to enter into alliance with the present government upon such terms as the English had a right to expect, and to which they were ready to accede.

While the General indulged the hopes that naturally arose out of these friendly and promising appearances, Abajee Shabajee returned with proposals from his master, more humiliating to the English than those that had been made before by the minister himself Nana-Furneze. He required not only that Ragobah's person should be delivered into his hands but also that of Badje-row his adopted son. Ragobah was to reside at Jancy, on the allowance which Scindiah had before settled for his subsistence, in a private station. The administration was in future to be conducted by Scindiah in the name of Badje-row, who
was

was to be vested with the dignity of Dewan 1782.
to Madah-row the Paishwa an infant. There
was not, in return for these concessions,
any mention made of the smallest advantage
to the English. On the contrary, the inten-
tions of Scindiah were, that we should ad-
here to the convention of Worgaum.

Terms that were judged dishonourable
previously to the campaign, in the midst of
our present successes would have been justly
deemed disgraceful. Pacific measures were
of course interrupted, and military opera-
tions renewed. These, on the part of the
Marratta chief, consisted in endeavours to
avoid, and on that of the English in exer-
tions to bring on an engagement. General
Goddard, having twice advanced with the
whole army, and encamped on the ground
from which the enemy had precipitately re-
treated, on the 2d of April, left his main
army in camp, and, at the head of two hun-
dred European infantry, ten companies of
grenadier Sepoys, three battalions of Sepoys,
two twelve and ten six-pounder pieces of
artillery, and the first regiment of cavalry,
with

1780. with the Candahar horse, amounting together to about seven or eight hundred, formed and attempted a plan to storm the Marratta camp. With this small force he advanced with great rapidity, yet in good order, and having passed their principal guard, which consisted of six thousand men, he immediately fell on their main army, drawn up to receive him in order of battle. The effect of our artillery amongst their numerous cavalry was prodigious. Within an hour after the commencement of the action they retreated with considerable loss : and so completely were they routed, and so great the consternation that had seized them, that not a single horseman appeared to molest our little detachment in their return to the camp.

The success of this party, so greatly inferior in numbers to the troops that retreated before the Marratta army the preceeding year, proved how much discipline and mutual confidence excel the desultory and ill directed force of the most numerous battalions of untrained barbarians, and how much
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the fate of armies and nations sometimes 1780.
depends on a single mind. The calm and
well-directed courage of General Goddard
was diffused throughout the whole of the
officers and soldiers under his command,
and every action of this campaign was glo-
rious to the British arms. It is impossible,
without swelling these memoirs beyond the
limits proposed, to do justice to the gallan-
try of every individual who signalized his
valour in this expedition. Many and va-
rious are the brave actions that might be re-
corded, but a selection is necessarily to be made
of such as are not only meritorious in respect
of the spirit from which they flowed, but im-
portant in the effects which they produ-
ced. Captain John Campbell, of the Ben-
gal establishment, who had been detached
with a foraging party to a considerable dis-
tance from our camp, on his return with a
large convoy of provisions, was attacked by
Madajee Scindiah, at the head of twenty
thousand men, the flower of the Marratta
army. This officer immediately drew up
his small force, which consisted of two bat-
tallions of Sepoys, and four field pieces, in
the

1780. the best form that the time, the place, and disposition of the enemy would admit. The Marrattas were repulsed with the loss of near six hundred men, a great part of whom were killed by the fire of the companies which flanked our line. Captain Campbell, after this remarkable action, joined General Goddard, with his convoy perfectly entire, and without the loss of a single man.

Lieutenant Welsh, of the Bengal establishment, at the head of the first regiment of cavalry and a battalion of Sepoys, was detached, on the 3d of May, to surprize a body of Marrattas six thousand strong.—The Lieutenant, when he had performed half his march, found, by calculating the time, that if he waited for the arrival of his infantry, he would not be able to reach the enemies camp before break of day. He therefore adopted the spirited resolution of advancing with the cavalry only. With this force he entered the Marratta camp, seized the enemies cannon, which he turned upon them in their flight, and put them to a
complete

complete and general route. In this 1780. encounter the commanding officer and a great number of the Marrattas were slain. The conquerors became masters of the flying army's artillery, ammunition, and provisions. The victory was decisive : and the reduction of two forts by the same party, soon after, with the defeat of seven thousand Marrattas by Major Forbes at the head of two battalions of Sepoys, completed the conquest of Guzzarat. The two armies continued on the confines of Guzzarat and Malva until the month of May, when they separated, on account of the approaching monsoon. The Marrattas marched off to Ugein, the capital of the territories of Scindiah, situated in the high lands of Malva on the river Zepara, which falls, about two leagues from Mandoo, into the Narbuddah. The English army returned to Surat, where they arrived in the beginning of June. Thus terminated the first campaign of what has been called the second Marratta war, in which General Goddard, having succeeded in every attempt, reduced under the power of the East India Company a territory

1780. territory yielding an annual revenue of thirty lacks of rupees.

The brilliant successes of this campaign displayed, in the most striking manner, the superiority of our arms over those of our enemies in the east, and effectually effaced the stain they had contracted from the late disaster at Worgaum. These, indeed, were the only advantages that could possibly be gained over an enemy that would not hazard an engagement, and who, there is reason to believe, had nothing more in view than to draw our force from the defence of our new conquests, and to exhaust our strength in an unprofitable pursuit of the Marratta army in the hilly regions of Malva. This system of military operations, an instance of that prudence and sagacity which, in the affairs of both war and peace, mark the character of Madajee Scindiah among the Marratta chiefs and the other princes of India, and which, expanded and directed according to circumstances, is one day to subvert the domination of Europeans in Asia, would not only have laid open our
late

late acquisitions in Guzzarat to hostile invasion, but even endangered the safety of the presidency of Bombay itself, which, at this time, was threatened with an attack from France. And, even on a supposition that our arms had penetrated to the very centre of Malva, and reduced under our power Scindiah's capital, Ugein, they could not have obtained any advantage that might compensate the risque incurred by so bold an attempt, nor have produced any event that might decide the general issue of the war. 1780.

The defence of Guzzarat was committed to a detachment of our own troops, and a proportionable number of cavalry to be furnished by our ally Futtu-Sing. The rainy season being over, hostilities with the Marattas were renewed. And the reduction of the island and fort of Bassien, with that of Tarrapore, Danow, and other places of strength, situated on the shores of the Concan, secured to the English, at the close of 1780, an extent of sea-coast from Cambait to the mouth of the river Pen, which dis-

1780. charges itself into the harbour of Bombay, a space upwards of three hundred miles.

The spirited exertions of General Goddard, were, in the mean time, seconded with alacrity and with vigour, by the Governor-general of Bengal, who, finding it impracticable to reconcile the Marrattas, on proper terms, to peace, continued to pursue their humiliation by policy and by arms. The principal revenues of the Marrattas arise from the annual tribute paid by the Rajahs of Oudepore, Joudpore, Zeynagur, Bopaul, Narva, Bundelcund, and other Hindoo princes interspersed through the province of Ajmeer, and to the northward of Malva. These chiefs, who embrace every opportunity of evading their payments, had now a favourable opportunity of asserting their independence. And, accordingly, the Governor-general endeavoured to unite them, under the auspices of England, into a combination against their oppressors. This plan, which was founded on common sense, and seemed the more solid that it had nothing in it complicated or refined,

refined, nevertheless failed of success. Had 1780.
this failure been confined to one or two of
these chiefs, the disappointment of the Governor-general's hopes might be ascribed to
some of those secret motives which influence the minds and hearts of men, and
which are not so much objects of conclusive reasoning, as of speculation and conjecture. The extent of the effect prompts
an inquiry into an adequate cause.

Unity and consistency, in almost any system of operation, whether military or political, are preferable to the most artful stratagems and profound views, now adopted and now abandoned. On this ground it will readily be admitted, that in the fluctuation of the British councils, in the separate views of our different presidencies in India, in the discordant interests and passions of the individuals of which these were composed, and that want of due subordination and system which might be expected in a political corporation so new in its origin as the East-India Company, and formed into its present complexion and appearance by so

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many

1780. many singular accidents and wonderful events; the man to whose lot it fell to take the lead in the conduct of affairs in Asia, while his nation was engaged in a general and complicated war, had to contend with difficulties of unusual magnitude. The measures of the Governor-general were embarrassed by the ministry at home, and by his colleagues in office abroad. Exaggerated reports of our distresses in America and Europe, dissensions in our councils in Asia, which lost the season of action by official contests, and an opinion, industriously spread over all India *, of the instability of the British administration in the east, while they prepared a train for every spark of ambition and discontent, had a direct tendency to damp every attempt to secure the public interest, by alliances as well as

* Ever since the establishment of the Supreme Council in 1774, at Calcutta, the native princes of India pay the utmost attention to the political changes in great Britain, so far as these may be supposed to affect the politics of that country: and their Vakeels at the different Presidencies have orders to send them all the news, from time to time, on that subject.

by arms. It is in these circumstances that 1780.
we are to search for a solution of the problem here stated. Under an immediate expectation of a change of men and measures in our councils, and of fortune in our affairs, the Rajahs dependent on the Marrattas declined the opportunity which was so well fitted to operate on a sense of injury, as well as on ambition: and the military and political operations of our countrymen, in this part of the country, were confined to an alliance with the Ranah of Cohud, and the recovery of his territories from the domination of the Marrattas.

The first of these objects being easily effected, Major Popham, in order to accomplish the last, was sent to the assistance of the Ranah at the head of two thousand Sepoys, forty European artillery, a body of one hundred and twenty horse, and four field-pieces. With this small force, the Major, in the space of a few months, drove the enemy, to the number of fifteen thousand, out of the Ranah's country, pursued this advantage, and completed, by the re-

H 3

duction

1780. duction of several forts, the conquest of one of their provinces, producing an annual revenue of six lacks of rupees. Nor was this the only, or the chief service, performed on this occasion, by this enterprising and brave officer.

The fortrefs of Gualior, in the dominions of Gohud, had been for ages deemed impregnable, and here, as in a secure and inaccessible afylum, the Mahommedan conquerors of Hindoftan, in the days of their magnificence and power, had confined, as prisoners of ftate, the vanquifhed rivals of their greatness. In a country where the authority of Great Britain depends upon the opinion entertained by the natives, not only of the fuperior genius of our countrymen for war, but alfo of their good fortune, the conquest of Gualior, it was evident, would be equal to the moft decifive victory in the field. This place, which was fo ftrong both by nature and by art, could not be taken but by regular approaches: but the profound fecurity derived from this circumftance, might expofe the garrifon to furprize.

prize. It was thus that Gibraltar fell into 1780.
the hands of our nation; and thus, too, it
is possible to be taken out of them. Never
was there a conjuncture in which the re-
duction of such a fortress as Gualior could
be of more advantage to the conquerors,
nor any in which a fitter instrument was
presented to a mind that could make a dis-
tinction between difficulties and impossibi-
lities, of attempting it.

Major Popham, after his detachment
had gone into cantonments on account of
the rain, in compliance with the repeated
solicitations of Mr. Hastings, prepared for
an attack on Gualior with equal judgement
and secrecy; two persons only being privy
to his design. Having received some im-
portant information from a small party
who found means to enter the place, one
by one, at different times, by night, he
wrote to the Governor-general, informing
him that the attack was to be made early
the next morning, and expressing his hopes
that, in case of failure, Mr. Hastings would
do him the justice to declare, that it was

1780. at his desire he had undertaken an enterprise, which, if it should miscarry, would be denominated rash and impracticable; but which, if it should be crowned with success, would redound as much to the honour of the Governor-general, by whose advice it was undertaken, as of those by whom it was carried into execution. Gualior was taken by surprise on the 4th of August, 1780, with the inconsiderable loss of twenty Sepoys wounded. The British colours planted on the walls of this fortress, signalized the prudence and the spirit of Major Popham, and rendered the English name an object of respect and of dread throughout Hindostan. The whole country adjoining to Gualior was immediately evacuated by the Mahrattas. Had a detachment been turned in Gohud, previously to the reduction of this fortress, as General Goddard had repeatedly advised, and Mr. Hastings had proposed in the Supreme Council, a diversion of the troops under Scindiah from Guzzarat might have been effected by an invasion of the province of Malva; and the chiefs with whom we contended, reduced to
the

the necessity of accepting terms of accom- 1780.
modation. But, this opportunity of hum-
bling the Marrattas being lost, their hosti-
lity to our countrymen was confirmed by
the successes of Hyder-Ally's arms in the
Carnatic; and the exertions of Mr. Haf-
tings were called from successes which he
had not been permitted to improve, to the
reparation of misfortunes which he had not
occasioned.

Hyder-Ally-Cawn was regent of the
kingdom of Mysore, a dignity to which he
had raised himself by abilities and by crimes:
by valour and policy in arms, by intrigue,
by treachery, and by blood. He was the
son of a Mahommedan soldier of fortune,
who commanded a fort on the confines of
Mysore, and followed, of course, the pro-
fession of arms. When he first entered in-
to the Rajah of Mysore's service he was
distinguished by the name of *Hyder Naig*,
or *Corporal Hyder*. He rose by degrees to
the command of the Rajah's army; and, on
the death of that Prince, he seized the reins
of government, under the title of Guardian
to

1780. to the young prince, whom he confined in Seringapatam, together with the whole royal family; exhibiting them only at certain stated seasons, in order to soothe and please the people. He possessed great vigour of body and mind: but his manners were savage and cruel; and he frequently inflamed the natural ferocity of his temper by intoxication. Like many other chiefs in India, with whom it is not accounted any disgrace to be ignorant of letters, he could not either read or write; so that he was obliged to make use of interpreters and secretaries. The method he contrived for ascertaining whether his interpreters made faithful reports of the letters they read, and if his secretaries expressed in writing the full and the precise meaning of what he communicated, displays, at once, that suspicion which was natural to his situation, and that subtlety which belonged to his nature. He confined three different interpreters in separate apartments, who made their respective reports in their turns. If all the three should make different reports, then he would punish them by a cruel death. If

two should coincide in their report, and 1780.
one differ from these two, then that one
would suffer death. But the interpreters,
knowing their fate if they should depart in
one single instance from the truth, explain-
ed, as might be expected, the letters com-
mitted to their inspection with the utmost
fidelity. As to the method by which he
discovered whether his amanuenses were
faithful or no, he placed three of them, in
like manner, in three separate places of con-
finement, and to each of them apart he dic-
tated his orders. Their manuscripts he put
into the hands of any of those that were
about him who could read, from whom he
learned whether his clerks had faithfully
expressed his meaning. When he passed
sentence of death, he was on some occa-
sions, like the Dey of Algiers and other
barbarian despots, himself the executioner :
for though he affected to consider his army
as his guards, he well knew that he reigned
in their hearts not from love, but fear,
mixed indeed with an admiration of his
singular address and intrepidity. The force
of this man's mind, such is the advantage of
(Vol. I.) nature

1780. nature over art! burst through the prejudices of education and the restraints of habit, and extended his views to whatever European improvements he deemed the most fitted to secure his government, to extend his empire, and to render his name immortal. He invited and encouraged every useful and ingenious manufacturer and artisan to settle in his dominions, he introduced the European discipline in his army, and laboured, not altogether without success, for the formation of dock-yards, and the establishment of a navy.

At the same time that he was sublime in his views, he was capable of all that minute attention which was necessary for their accomplishment. His ends were great; his means prudent. A regular œconomy supplied a source of liberality, which he never failed to exercise, whenever an object, which he could render in any shape subservient to his ambition, solicited his bounty. He rewarded merit of every kind, but he was particularly munificent to all who could bring important intelligence. He had his
eyes

eyes open on the movements of his neighbours, as well as on every part, and almost on every person within his dominions.— 1780.
Hence he knew where to anticipate hostile designs, and where to take advantages; where to impose contributions without drying up the springs of industry; and where to find the most proper instruments for his purposes, whether of policy or war. He inspected, in person, every horseman or Sepoy that offered himself to his service: but with every officer of any note, he was intimately acquainted. He made a regular distribution of his time: and, although he sacrificed to the pleasures of life, as well as to the pomp of state, in business he was equally decisive and persevering.

With regard to the person of Hyder-Ally, for every circumstance relating to so distinguished a character becomes interesting, he was of a middling stature, inclining to corpulency, his visage quite black, the traits of his countenance manly, bold, and expressive: and, as he looked himself with a keen and piercing eye into every human face

1780. face that approached him, so he judged of men very much from their physiognomy, connecting in his imagination a bashful, timid, and wandering eye, with internal consciousness of guilty actions, or pravity of intention ; but a bold and undaunted look, on the other hand, with conscious innocence and integrity.

With such qualities, and by such arts as these, Hyder-Ally-Cawn raised a small state into a powerful empire ; and converted into a race of warriors, an obscure, peaceable, and timid people. By alluring to his standard military adventurers, of all nations and tribes, but chiefly Europeans, whenever it was in his power, and by training through their means his Myforean subjects to the use of arms, he extended his dominions, which were bounded on the east and the south by the Carnatic, and the plains of Combitore, and on the west and north, by the Malabar regions, and the country of Ghutta and Bednore, across the peninsula to the territories of Palnaud and Ganjam,

on

on the coast of Coromandel, and, on the 1780. Malabar sea, as far north as Goa.

The population of Hyder's dominions has not been calculated on any principles, by which it could be ascertained with any tolerable precision. It is computed, that he could raise an army of three hundred thousand men, and that his annual revenue was not less than five millions of British pounds. Emboldened by internal prosperity, as well as continued successes in the field, Hyder ventured to encounter not only the Marrattas, but the English. His wars with whom, though not so productive of advantage and triumph as his contests with other Indian powers of inferior consequence, yet improved him in the art of war, and nourished in his breast a passion for conquest.

The court of France very naturally considering the year 1778 as a fit crisis for recovering their influence, and extending their commerce in India, dispatched M. St. Lubin, as has been already mentioned, on an embassy to Hyder-Ally, with an offer of
the

1780. the alliance of the French nation, and their co-operation with him against the English. This St. Lubin was a person without any visible fortune, who, by a long unsettled residence in India, had acquired an uncommon knowledge of the customs, manners, policy, trade, languages, situations, and dispositions of the several powers of that country, both native and European. From the station of a private soldier in the island of Mauritius, by genius, activity, address, fluency of speech, and a necessary share of assurance, he rose to the confidence and favour of the French minister, M. de Sartine, through whose influence he was dignified with a military order, and invested with the sole direction of two large trading ships on the coast of Malabar: a station which afforded a plausible pretext for intercourse with Hyder; the ostensible object of which was commerce.

The Chevalier carried out some merchandize with him, as well to serve for a blind, as to supply immediate necessities.— But the bulk of his lading consisted in
arms

arms and ammunition of all kinds, proper 1730.
both for the field and fortifications. In
one of his vessels, named the *Sartine*, of
eight hundred tons, mounting thirty guns,
and which was more elegant, and had more
accommodations than any ship, perhaps,
that was ever built, the *Chevalier St. Lu-*
bin frequently entertained *Hyder-Ally*,
some of the principal *Marratta* Chiefs, and
certain *Malabar* Princes, in state; exhi-
biting, on those occasions, the colours of
the *Marrattas*, and other powerful nations in
India, provided for this purpose in the city
of *Bourdeaux*.

The masters of the ships under the di-
rection of *St. Lubin* had orders to pay im-
plicit obedience to all his commands.—
And so much was this adventurer in the good
graces of *Hyder*, that this prince sometimes
displayed the French flag, in return to the
compliment of *St. Lubin*, on the walls of
Mangalore, his principal fortress. *Hyder*,
influenced by the representations, and en-
couraged by the hopes of military succours
from the French, was not unwilling to avail

1780. himself of the scattered state of the Company's troops, the reduction of the Nabob of Arcot's army, and the impoverished state of his finances and country, in order to gratify his inveterate resentment against the nabob, revenge former hostilities and infractions of treaties, and recent injuries as well as acts of contempt on the part of the Presidency of Madras *. But still there was room for hesitation.

The English government in India, instead of shrinking from the dangers of war, had attacked the French among their other enemies in that quarter, even before hostilities, though announced, had actually commenced in Europe. Chandernagore had yielded to the English arms in Bengal; and Mahee on the coast of Malabar; Pondicherry, notwithstanding the exertions

* In addition to the seizure of the Guntoor Circar, already mentioned, and the detaching of a force towards Adoni, the capital of Bajalet Jung, for the defence of that chief against the resentment of his brother, the Nizam, and Hyder-Ally, that force was directed to march through a territory belonging to Hyder, although by a small circuit his country might have been entirely avoided.

of Mr. Bellecombe in the Carnatic. The 1780.
ships of the French were seized, and their
fleet, under Monsieur de Tronjolly, put to
flight by the British squadron commanded
by Sir Edward Vernon *. The disgrace at
Worgaum

* On the 8th of August, 1778, the Madras army, under General Munro, encamped on the red hills, a league distant from the back of Pondicherry. On the morning of the 9th General Munro summoned General Bellecombe to surrender the town and fortress of Pondicherry to the troops which he commanded. Upon this, Monsieur Bellecombe immediately sent orders to Monsf. Tronjolly to 'weigh, and attack the British squadron, an order which was forthwith obeyed with great alacrity. The English squadron, consisting of five sail, including the Cormorant Sloop of War, appeared working up from the northward: that of the French, consisting of an equal number of ships, but larger, having a superiority of thirty-six guns, and seven hundred men, stood to the southward in order to preserve the weather-gage, and anchored at the distance of two leagues from the shore. An action commenced on the 10th, which was continued, with great heat, for seventy-four minutes. Three of the French squadron, hawling their wind, ran to the southward, full fifteen minutes before the action ceased between the capital ships. After the whole French squadron had, with all their sails set, quitted the field, Sir Edward Vernon's squadron remained fifteen minutes on the spot where they had engaged, as if deliberating whether to pursue the enemy, or bear away in order to refit. They chose the latter alternative, having first spliced their cordage and

1780. Worgaum had been effaced by subsequent successes, and the English name was yet an object of dread to most nations in India.

In such circumstances as these, Hyder Ally, whose characteristical caution, it may reasonably be presumed, was not diminished

mended their sails. In this action there happened a very remarkable incident: one broadside from the Rippon, pierced the hull of the Briffon in thirteen places with heavy metal.

It is a commonly received opinion, that the English mode of firing at the hull is the best principle of conducting a naval engagement. It is in order that this opinion may be examined without prejudice, by our naval officers, that this intelligence respecting the engagement between Vernon and Tronjolly, and particularly what follows, is inserted. The French squadron, flying to the windward, carried every sail and rope with which they entered into action. The English kept the sea as victors, but so mauled in their sails and rigging, that for a considerable time, they were unable to pursue, or even to sail before the wind. Had only the quarter-deck, and some of the upper guns been levelled against the rigging of the enemy's ships in the action, they could not have escaped. This intelligence was communicated, and observation made, by an English gentleman who happened to be a passenger on board the Briffon, a French ship bound from Point L'Orient to Pondicherry, which had cast anchor in the road of Pondicherry when the action above described commenced.

by

by his advancement in years, was divided be- 1780.
 tween doubt and inclination. But in this state
 of mind he listened with fond partiality and
 pride to the constant suggestions of his eldest
 son Tippoo, into whose breast Hyder had
 inspired an early love of glory, and hatred
 of the English. The ardour of this youth,
 who had assumed the title of Warrior *,
 re-acted with energy and with success on
 the soil from whence it originally sprung,
 and restored the vigour of fading nature.—
 Prudence was quickened by courage, and
 courage was tempered with prudence.—
 Whether the quadruple alliance, mentioned
 above, was first proposed by Nizam-Ally-
 Cawn, Soubah of the Deccan, as has been here
 stated, on that prince's own authority, or
 that it originated, as has been affirmed by
 others, in the court of Hyder-Ally; certain
 it is, that a negotiation for that purpose be-
 gan to be carried on so early as the siege of
 Pondicherry. At this time it was general-
 ly believed throughout India, that Hyder
 meditated an attack on the Carnatic. But
 that political warrior suspended the execu-

* BAHAUDER.

1780. tion of his design until a treaty was framed and ratified, by which, at the same time that he should invade the Carnatic, the Nizam should attack the northern Circars; Moodajee Booslah, Bengal; and the Marhattas, commanded by Madajee Scindiah and Tukajee Holkar, continue the war against the English.

In the month of May, 1779, an invasion of the Carnatic was determined, and, at Hyder's Durbar, became the subject of common conversation. An army was assembled in June, 1780, horse and foot, to the number, as has been computed, of an hundred thousand. Hyder now made no secret of their destination, but endeavouring to inspire into his officers and soldiers the same vengeance which fired his own breast, he talked of the pride and the perfidy of the English, expatiated on the dissensions by which they were torn, and the dangers with which they were threatened, and vowed that against the next monsoon there should not be a white face in the Carnatic. Breathing such sentiments, and using such expressions

sions as these, he moved onward, with his 1780.
troops, to the Ghauts, or Passes*, that

* It is, perhaps, a singular appearance, in the natural history of the world, that the vast ridge of mountains, which, extending from Cape Comorin to the East-India Company's Northern Circars, separate the Coromandel coast from that of Malabar, do not gradually culminate, as they recede from the level of the ocean, but rise on either coast abruptly to their greatest height, and form a stupendous basis to a vast plain stretching along their top.— They do not, like most other ranges of hills, resemble the roof of one of our houses, but rather that of an eastern palace; and form a natural terrace, undoubtedly the noblest in the world. It is not here intended to speak with geometrical exactness. In that immense plain supported by the chain of mountains which divide Hindostan, beautiful eminences every where arise, covered with Mango and other trees, which are green all the year round: but still these bear no proportion to the level space which they diversify. On this plain, the Marrattas, the Mysoreans, and other nations, that may be, not improperly, termed the Highlanders of Hindostan, breed and train up their horses. In the northern countries of Europe, the soil is commonly the more fertile the lower its situation; because, in elevated situations, the air becomes too cold for vegetation. But in this climate, elevated situation is rather favourable to vegetation, at least to most vegetable productions: and the plains here described are for the most part as fruitful and verdant as any in the kingdom of Bengal. It is in these high lands that we meet with the most warlike tribes in India. Here, as in other countries, if we confine our observations to the native powers, the Gods of the hills have generally prevailed, in all contests, over the Gods of the plains.

1780. open a communication, on either hand, between the high lands that divide the peninsula of Hindostan, and the Low Countries, here and there indenting the hills on the courses of great rivers, and expanded and united in vast plains towards the ocean.— The boundary by which nature had marked the land, recalled to the mind of Hyder all the dangers attending an expedition into the country of such an enemy as the English. He halted for several days, and held frequent councils with his chiefs, or cawns, in which he deliberated whether he should enter the Carnatic now, or wait till another season, when he should be strengthened by additional forces from France. The chiefs attempted to dissuade him from war at that time, mixing with the conclusions of reason many sentiments of superstition. But Tippoo Saib constantly urged, in this military senate, the spirit of the troops, the courage that animates offensive operations, the advantages of surprize, the defenceless state of the Carnatic, the difficulties which the English would find in assembling their army, the power of the Marrattas and their
other

other allies, and the obligation of a sacred 1780.
treaty. With regard to the succours promised and expected from France, that advantage would, in all probability, be balanced by succours sent from Great Britain to the English. That there was difficulty and danger in the paths they were about to tread he readily allowed; "But when," he asked, "were they to wage war with their enemies if they avoided danger?" At this sentiment, expressed by Tippoo with a noble and fascinating air, which touched every heart, and transfused his ardent zeal into the minds of all who saw and heard him, Hyder embraced his son with tears of joy, in the presence of the whole assembly. He now ordered the last letters which he had received from his Vakeel at Madras to be read aloud in the hearing of his chiefs and principal officers, in which he confirmed, with many additional circumstances, what he had before reported: the discordant sentiments that prevailed among the English, the rapacity of their dispositions, the selfishness of their views, their unconcern about the public welfare, their disregard to military

1780. tary preparation, and their boasts that Hyder-Ally durst not so much as meditate an invasion of the Carnatic. All were unanimous that the troops should proceed ; and, accordingly, this vast body poured down into the Carnatic about the middle of July, 1780. After laying waste the open country, plundering several towns, among which were Conjeveram and Porto Novo, and reducing several forts without resistance, he laid siege to the town and fortress of Arcot.

The British subjects in Madras, as well as the rest of their countrymen in India, had long waited in anxious suspense for the approach of that storm which had broken on the heads of their countrymen in America and in Europe; and the man whom they had destined in their imaginations to direct the first efforts of its fury, was Hyder-Ally. But week having elapsed after week, and month after month, without any appearance of hostilities, a supine listlessness and unconcern appeared to have fallen on all orders of men, even those not excepted whose office it was to be vigilant for the public safety :
when,

when, on Sunday the 24th of July, 1780, 1780. late in the evening, an alarm was given throughout Choultry Plain, that Hyder-Ally's horse were at the Mount*. Almost all the families in the suburbs and neighbourhood of Madras moved that night into the fort; and, in the course of a few days, not an house was inhabited beyond the Island, except the Government Garden-house, which the Governor gave up to the General, who had it guarded by two field-pieces, with artillery, and a company of Sepoys. Fresh alarms were received every day, and although the Governor, as well as others, endeavoured to conceal the intelligence by which these had been occasioned, the public had good ground of apprehension; which was not a little heightened by the supineness of the Governor, and the indifference and contempt which was entertained by those in power, of Hyder, and all his army. The burning of all the villages between the Mount and Madras, and the

* An hill, on the summit of which stands a Portuguese church, about nine miles from Madras.

1780. depredations committed at St. Thomas, did not excite those public exertions which men, anxious for the preservation of all that is dear to them naturally expected.—It was the fashion to treat the name of Hyder with scorn; and many affected to look on those parties of horse as mere banditti.

In the mean time, Hyder-Ally-Cawn, at the head of about one hundred thousand men, having entered the Carnatic and reduced several inferior forts, had begun to lay siege to that which was not only the capital of the province just mentioned, but one of the most convenient posts that could be imagined for carrying on various military operations against the English.

The troops which the Presidency of Madras had to oppose to this force, which did not amount to six thousand, happened, at this critical juncture, to be distributed in the following manner:—At Fort St. George, one regiment of Europeans, two battalions of Sepoys, and one company of marksmen;

marksmen ; at the Mount, the artillery, 1780. commanded by Colonel James, consisting of three hundred and fifty men with officers, forty-two field-pieces, five cohorns, and four battering cannon: in the fort of Poonah-Mallee, his Majesty's 73d regiment of foot, nearly seven hundred strong, under the command of Lord Macleod: at Pondicherry, under the command of Colonel Braithwaite, one regiment of Europeans, and one of native cavalry, four battalions of Sepoys, and ten field pieces: under Colonel Baillie to the northward at Ellore, two companies of European infantry, three battalions and six companies of Sepoys, with ten field-pieces ; and a detachment commanded by Colonel Cosby towards the south, consisting of five hundred cavalry, and fifteen hundred Sepoys with four field-pieces.

The artillery, with a detachment from Madras of one company of European grenadiers, and one battalion of Sepoys, one company of marksmen, were ordered to join the troops at Poonah-Mallee, and an encampment

1780. ment to be formed there, under the command of Lord Macleod. These troops were then ordered to march to St. Thomas's Mount, and there to be joined by the detachment under Colonel Braithwaite.—The forces drawn together at the Mount, and composing the main army, were to be put under the command of General Sir Hector Monro, and to march to Conjeveram, where they were to be joined by the detachments under the orders of Colonels Baillie and Cosby.

In pursuance of this plan, Sir Hector Monro, being informed that Lord Macleod had reached the Mount with the troops under his command, and that Colonel Braithwaite had arrived with his detachment from Pondicherry, sent an express to Colonel Baillie, at this time at Gumeroponda, about twenty-eight miles N. N. W. of Madras, to proceed from thence directly to Conjeveram, and not to the Mount as was at first intended; and, on the 25th of August, in the afternoon, accompanied by Mr. Whitehill, the Governor, Mr. Davidson,

son, a member of the Council of Madras, 1780, and the second son of the Nabob of Arcot, joined the army, which was ordered to march towards Conjeveram at two the next morning.

But when the troops were under marching orders, the first regiment of cavalry peremptorily refused to move without money. On this, Captain Dugald Campbell received, for the payment of this regiment, two bonds from the Select Committee, one payable in one month, and the other in two. But these written obligations did not satisfy a body of men, who, at the time they were about to risk their lives in the public service, had, many of them, large families, which they must leave behind them unprovided with the necessaries of life, and who were not less than fourteen months in arrear. They demanded some ready money, with intimation that they would not march without it. The first regiment of cavalry, therefore, with the exception of the commissioned and non-commissioned native

1780. tive officers, were made prisoners, and sent under a guard to Madras.

The main army, then, consisting of fifteen hundred Europeans, and four thousand two hundred Sepoys, with the train of artillery already specified, proceeded from the Mount towards Conjeveram, early in the morning of the 26th of August.

In this march, two hundred men belonging to his Majesty's seventy-third regiment of foot, overcome by fatigue and the heat of the day, were left lying on the road. On the arrival of our men at Conjeveram, on the 29th, we found the whole town in flames, which had been raised before our arrival by the enemy's cavalry, great bodies of which, advancing towards the town still appeared on both their flanks. It was a severe mortification to the whole of our little army, to find no appearance, at this place, of Colonel Baillie's detachment from the northward, which, as afterwards appeared, had been detained on the northern banks

banks of a small river, by an accidental fall 1780.
of heavy rains. In this incident we have a
most remarkable proof and example of the
danger of procrastination, and on what minute
circumstances and sudden springs of
the mind, the fortune and the general issue
of war may depend. Had Colonel Baillie
passed over the Tripassore, without halting,
as some advised, and encamped on its
southern, instead of its northern banks, the
disaster that soon followed would have been
prevented, and an order of affairs, wholly
different from that which in fact took place,
would have succeeded.

Hyder-Ally, informed of the movements
of the English army, raised the siege of Arcot,
marched towards Conjeveram, in the
neighbourhood of which he encamped, and,
in the course of several days, at different
times offered battle.

On the 6th of September, he detached
the flower of his army under the command
of his son Tippoo, a manœuvre that did not
escape the observation of the English army,

1780. to cut off the detachment under Colonel Baillie, who was now encamped at Perambaukum, a small village, distant from the main army about fifteen miles, remaining himself in the neighbourhood of Conjeveram, in order to watch the motions of Sir Hector Munro. The detachment under Tippoo consisted of thirty thousand horse, eight thousand foot, and twelve pieces of artillery.

About ten in the morning a general cannonade was heard from the quarter of Colonel Baillie's encampment, which left not a doubt that the Colonel's detachment was attacked by Tippoo Saib. Upon this, the General instantly ordered the troops under arms, and marched them on the Perambaukum road, about two miles to the northward of the Conjeveram Pagodas. In the mean time, Colonel Baillie, with his usual bravery, repulsed the numerous body that had been sent against him for several times, in an action that lasted for several hours, with very great slaughter. They still, however, hung upon his party, with an evident intention

intention to renew their attacks whenever 1780.
they should find a favourable opportunity :
so that he judged it necessary to advise the
General of his situation, and to inform him
that he had been so harrassed, and was still
so closely pressed by the enemy, and so much
in want of provisions and ammunition, as
to have doubts of his being able to effect a
junction.

Sir Hector Munro, having received this
intelligence on the 6th instant, ordered, on
the 8th, the following detachment to the
relief of Colonel Baillie, under the com-
mand of Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher: One
grenadier company, commanded by Lieute-
nant Lindsey ; one company of light infan-
try, by Captain Baird of the 73d regiment ;
two European companies of grenadiers, the
one commanded by Captain Phillips, the
other by Captain Ferrier ; the native markf-
men, amounting to the number of sixty,
under Lieutenant Muat ; five companies of
Sepoy grenadiers, under Captain Rumley ;
and five under Captain Gowdie ; and nine ca-
mels laden with ammunition, together with

1780. the doolies of the army. At half past eight in the afternoon, this detachment, leaving the grand army, proceeded on their destination. On the 9th, at one o'clock in the morning, they halted for half an hour in order to refresh the men with a dram and biscuit.

At this time they were informed by the Hircarrah, or messenger, who had come from Colonel Baillie, that some of Tippoo Saib's parties were not at a greater distance from them than from two to three miles. The gallant Colonel Fletcher, who, to the utmost personal intrepidity added the soundest judgment, and quick as well as profound discernment and penetration, could not help expressing a desire of making a diversion in favour of Colonel Baillie on that quarter : but his orders were so pointed, that he could not deviate from them.

And here it is natural to reflect on the inconveniences that frequently attend precise and peremptory orders, in the complicated and fluctuating scenes of military operation.

Con-

Conjunctures may arise in which the transgression of orders may lead to certain success and victory, and in which a rigid adherence to them, on the other hand, would involve certain defeat and ruin. Hence the great advantage of perfect concord and confidence among the principal officers of an army, and the propriety of allowing to the leaders of parties a latitude of acting according to circumstances*.

* In the Introduction to Cunningham's History of Great Britain lately published, which abounds with new and curious anecdotes, we meet with the following. In the battle of Malplaquet, Colonel James Campbell, Lieutenant to the Earl of Stair, signalized his valour in fight of both the armies; for while the victory was yet doubtful, he rushed with great fury against the enemy with a party of his men, and cutting all before him, opened a way through the midst of the enemy, and returned by the same way to his friends. The successful bravery of this youth, encouraged the confederates, disheartened the enemy, and contributed not a little to turn the whole fortune of the day. Whether through envy, or from whatever cause, the bravery of Campbell was, by some of our officers, made an object of censure. Prince Eugene, who greatly admired so gallant an action, and who conceived that a juncture might exist in which transgression of rules might be justified by emergencies, thought it not sufficient that Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell should pass uncensured, but returned him his thanks for exceeding his orders, on the day after the battle in the face of the army. This was General Sir James Campbell, who lost his life, in an advanced age, commanding the British horse at Fontenoy.

1780. After the action of the 6th instant, in which the loss sustained fell principally on Hyder's best troops, most of his officers advised him to retreat, as they feared the advance of the main body of the English.— But Hyder, who had exact and constant intelligence of every thing that was done in the English camp, determined to pursue offensive measures. He knew the hour that Colonel Fletcher was to march, for the reinforcement of Colonel Baillie, the strength of his forces, and that he had no cannon.— He made a most masterly movement, and must inevitably have intercepted Colonel Fletcher's detachment, had not Fletcher, suspecting his hircarrah, changed his route, and taken a sweep to the right, by which he joined Colonel Baillie without opposition.

On the news of this junction, Count Lally, who commanded Hyder's artillery, went to him, and strenuously advised him to retreat, and cross the Polaar, representing the inevitable destruction in which his army must be involved by a contrary conduct.—

Hyder

Hyder listened to the arguments of the Count, and appeared to approve of the measure he had proposed, when two hircarrahs came in from Conjeveram, and assured him not only that our army was still there, but that they were not making any preparations to move. This appeared so extraordinary to Lally that he suspected they were betrayed by their hircarrahs, and still urged the necessity of retreating with the infantry, and carrying off his guns. But Hyder, who depended on his information, ordering a body of irregular cavalry to amuse our army at Conjeveram, determined to advance and attack Colonel Baillie.

Colonel Fletcher's detachment joined Colonel Baillie on the 9th of September, at half an hour past six in the morning. The junction of these forces inspired the whole with fresh spirits. After the parade in the evening, Colonel Baillie, having previously directed that all orders given by Colonel Fletcher should be obeyed without hesitation, gave orders for the whole troops under his command to be in readiness to march. Accordingly, be-

1780. tween eight and nine o'clock in the evening, our men marched off toward the left, by the way of Subdeverim, the baggage being disposed on the left flank. Colonel Fletcher's detachment was dispersed in different parts of the line. From the moment they began to march, the enemy played off their rockets, which, from the vigilance of our flanking parties, did but little execution.

Nothing of any consequence happened until a little after ten o'clock at night, when several guns were observed opening on our rear. Captain Powell, who commanded the rear-guard, immediately unlimbered his guns, and informed Colonel Baillie of what had happened. The line was instantly ordered to countermarch, the baggage and doolies passing through the intervals. After countermarching a few hundred yards, the line was formed with its front towards Perambaukum. The enemy kept up an incessant fire, though without any great effect; and, and as they did not discover an inclination to advance, Colonel Baillie ordered the troops to face to the right, and
march

march into an avenue, the same road they 1780.
had passed but a few minutes before. The
whole line being now formed in this avenue,
a general halt took place. In the mean time,
the enemy kept up an incessant cannonade,
which did great execution. This obliged
Colonel Baillie to detach Captain Rumley
with five companies of Sepoy grenadiers to
storm their guns. There is not a doubt
but this party would have accomplished the
important service on which they were sent,
had not a water-course which happened at
that time to be unfordable, obliged them,
about half past eleven o'clock, to return to
the line. By the time that Captain Rum-
ley returned, the enemy's guns were heard
drawing off towards our front, and a gene-
ral alarm throughout their camp, owing, as
was supposed, to their having received intel-
ligence of the party that had been sent to
storm their guns. From their noise, con-
fusion, and irregular firing, one would have
imagined that a detachment of our men had
fallen upon them with fixed bayonets. At
that critical moment, had a party of grena-
diers been sent against them, they would
have

1780. have routed without difficulty the whole of Tippoo's army. Having, about ten o'clock in the evening, advanced a few hundred yards in the avenue, the detachment remained there in perfect silence until the morning.

Colonel Fletcher, being asked by some officers why Colonel Baillie halted, modestly answered, that Colonel Baillie was an officer of established reputation, and that he no doubt had reasons for his conduct. It cannot however be concealed, that this halt afforded an opportunity to Tippoo Saib of drawing off his cannon to a very strong post, by which the English were obliged to pass, and at the same time of informing Hyder of their situation, and suggesting to him the expediency of advancing for the improvement of so favourable a conjuncture.

On the 10th of September, at five o'clock in the morning, our little army marched off by the right, in subdivisions, having their baggage on their right flank, and the enemy on their left. A few minutes after six, two guns opened on their rear, on which the line
halted

halted a few minutes. Large bodies of the 1780.
enemy's cavalry now appeared on their right flank, and just at the moment when the pagoda at Conjeveram appeared in view, and our men had begun to indulge the pleasing hope of a respite from their toils and dangers, and a social refreshment in the company of their friends, a rocket-boy was taken prisoner, who informed them that Hyder's whole army was marching to the assistance of Tippoo. Four guns now opened on their left flank with great effect. So hot was the fire they sustained, and so heavy the loss, that Colonel Baillie ordered the whole line to quit the avenue, and present a front to the enemy, and at the same time dispatched Captain Rumley with ten companies of Sepoy grenadiers to storm the enemy's guns. Colonel Fletcher being made acquainted with this order, judged it necessary to have a party to support Captain Rumley, and immediately desired Captain Lucas, with his battalion, to go on that service; but this order, being thought improper, was countermanded by Colonel Baillie.

Within

1780. Within a few minutes after Captain Rumley had left the line, Tippoo's guns, by his appearance, not less than by the firing of our artillery, were silenced. Rumley's little detachment immediately took possession of four of the enemy's guns, and compleatly routed the party attached to them. Captain Rumley, overcome with the exertions he had made, and unable, from bodily fatigue, to carry into effect the ardent resolution of his mind, ordered Captain Gowdie, the officer next in command, to lead on the party, and take possession of some more guns, placed a few hundred yards in their front. But as they were advancing for this end, not many minutes after Captain Gowdie had been invested with the command, a sudden cry was overheard among the Sepoys, of Horse, Horse! The camp followers, whose numbers were nearly five to one of the troops under arms, were driven on a part of our line, by the numerous and surrounding forces of Hyder-Ally, who, being informed of the embarrassing situation of Colonel Baillie, had left his camp without striking his tents, with a view to conceal

ceal his march from the English. A great 1780. confusion among our troops was the unavoidable consequence of this unexpected onset. The Europeans were suddenly left on the field of action alone: and, at that critical moment, a detachment from the advanced guard of Hyder's army pressed on with great celerity, between our line and Captain Rumley's party. The commanding officer, apprehensive of being cut off from our little army, judged it most prudent to retreat.

Colonel Baillie, when he was informed that an immense body of horse and infantry was marching towards him, and that this was supposed to be Hyder's main army, said, "Very well! we shall be prepared to receive them." Hyder's whole forces now appeared incontestibly in view; and this barbarian chief, who, as was observed by the Roman General, of Pyrrhus, had nothing barbarous in his discipline, after dividing his guns agreeably to a preconcerted plan, opened from sixty to seventy pieces of cannon, with an innumerable quantity of rockets.

Hyder's

1780. Hyder's numerous cavalry, supported by his regular infantry and European corps, driven on by threats, encouraged by promises, and led on by his most distinguished officers, bore on our little army on different quarters without making the least impression. Our men, both Europeans and Sepoys, repeatedly presented and recovered their fire arms, as if they had been manœuvring on a parade. The enemy was repulsed in every attack. Numbers of their best cavalry were killed, and many more were wounded. Even their infantry were forced to give way; and Hyder began to think of a retreat. A movement which Colonel Baillie made to the right, evidently shewing that he meant to attack the enemy's artillery, rendered Hyder still more apprehensive of the issue of the battle. He consulted Lally, who told him that a retreat was then too late, that the English army from Conjeveram was probably advancing in his rear, and that nothing remained but to endeavour, by their artillery and cavalry, to break the detachment.

Tippoo

Tippoo Saib had by this time collected 1780. his party together, and renewed the cannonade. And, at the same time that our men were under the necessity of sustaining the pressure of both the father and the son, two of their tumbrils were blown up by Hyder's guns, and made a large opening in both lines: they had now no other ammunition than grape: their guns discontinued firing, and, in this dreadful situation, under a terrible fire, not only of guns but rockets, losing great numbers of officers and men, they remained from half past seven till nine o'clock.

Hyder, perceiving that their guns were entirely silenced, came with his whole army round their right flank. The cavalry charged them in distinct columns, and, in the intervals between these, the infantry poured in volleys of musketry, with dreadful effect. Mhiar Saib with the Mogul and Sanoor cavarly made the first impression. These were followed by the elephants and the Myforean cavalry, which completed the overthrow of the detachment. Colonel
Baillie,

1780. Baillie, though grievously wounded, rallied the Europeans, and once more formed them into a square. With this handful of men, he gained an eminence, a small rising ground on the plain, where, without ammunition, and most of his people wounded, he resisted and repulsed thirteen separate attacks; but fresh bodies of cavalry continually pouring in, they were broken, without giving way. Many of our men, desperately wounded, raising themselves from the ground, received the enemy on their bayonets.

Captain Lucas's battalion of Sepoys, at the time when our men moved up to a rising ground, was stationed to the right of the European grenadiers, but that corps, seeing the Europeans in motion, and misunderstanding, perhaps, this evolution for a retreat, broke in the greatest confusion.—The Europeans, bravely sustaining their reputation for intrepid valour, remained in this extremity of distress, steady and undaunted, although surrounded by the French troops, and by Hyder's cavalry, to
the

the number of forty thousand. They even 1780.
expressed a desire, although their numbers did
not exceed four hundred, of being led on to
the attack. A party of Topasses, who lay
at the distance of about thirty yards in our
front, kept up an incessant fire of small arms,
with great effect. Many attempts were
made by the enemy's cavalry to break this
small body of men, but, by the steady con-
duct of both our officers and men, they
were repulsed.

Colonel Baillie, finding now that there
was no prospect of being relieved by Gene-
ral Monro, held up a flag of truce to one
of the chiefs of Hyder's army. But this
was treated with contempt, and the Surdar
at the same time endeavoured to cut off the
Colonel. The reason the enemy assigned
for this, was, that the Sepoys had fired
after the signal was hoisted. A few mi-
nutes after this, our men received orders to
lay down their arms, with intimation that
quarter would be given. This order was
scarcely complied with, when the enemy
rushed upon them in the most savage and
VOL. I. L brutal

1780. brutal manner, sparing neither age nor infancy, nor any condition of life ; and, but for the humane interposition of the French commanders, Lally and Pimoran, who implored and insisted with the conqueror to shew mercy, the gallant remains of our little army must have fallen a sacrifice to that savage thirst of blood with which the tyrant disgraced his victory.

Hyder, after the action, as he was apprehensive of being pursued by Sir Hector Monro, leaving many of his wounded men on the field of battle, retreated to a place called the Round Wells, where he had before encamped. Having heard, on his arrival at this place, of the retreat of our army towards Chingliput, he dispatched his cavalry in pursuit. They returned next day loaded with plunder, and with many prisoners, most of them grievously wounded. Among these was Colonel Baillie, the unfortunate commander of our gallant little army, stripped of his clothes, and wounded in three places.—Hyder, intoxicated with success, exulted over the Colonel, in terms which our countryman

tryman retorted, with such spirit and contempt, that Colonel Affan, a French officer in the service of the barbarian, who witnessed this scene, and who declared this with other particulars relative to the course and the issue of the battle to the Portuguese Governor of Goa, was apprehensive that the insolent conqueror would have been provoked to an act of fatal barbarity.—An European officer in Hyder's service, of the name of Elliot, suffered stripes, by his orders, in the Durbar, for carrying some necessaries to Colonel Baillie; and all our officers, as well as men, were treated with great cruelty.—But a very minute account of the imprisonment and sufferings of what remained of Colonel Baillie's detachment, has been communicated by the same officer, from whom the compiler of these Memoirs received the greatest part of that information which has been here detailed, concerning the action near Conjeveram.

While Colonel Baillie, reinforced by the troops sent to his aid under the command of Colonel Fletcher, struggled with the over-

1780. bearing force of superior numbers and adverse fortune, the efforts that were made for supporting him by the British commander in chief on the coast of Coromandel were as follow. On the 9th of September, at night, a smart cannonade having commenced, which was discovered from an hillock on the left of our line, the guns were ordered from the piquet, and the tents to be struck, as it was determined to march without loss of time to the relief of Colonel Baillie. But the cannonade having ceased about twelve, the troops were ordered to rest on their arms till further orders. In this posture they continued till day-light, when they began to march towards Perambaukum; a detachment of the enemy, that had lain in watch for their moving, following them on their left flank.

Our army continued their march until it was near noon, when some wounded Sepoys, brought in by our flanking parties, informed the General of the dreadful overthrow and fate of our unfortunate little army. Immediately on this intelligence, the main army, reversing the line of their march, returned

returned on their steps towards Conjeve- 1780.
ram, distress painted in every countenance ;
for all agreed in their report of the utter
destruction of the detachment, and that no
quarter was shewn. The army, during the
whole course of their march on that morn-
ing, saw no appearance by which these sad
tidings might, in any degree, be falsified.—
It was six o'clock in the evening when they
stacked their arms in the village of Conje-
veram ; and about this time, more Sepoys
and drummers came into the camp, all con-
firming the reports that had been made of
the success and the unrelenting fury of the
enemy.

The General now gave orders for de-
stroying his four cannon, being twenty-four
pounders, and a great quantity of ammuni-
tion, as there was not any conveniency for
carrying it. At two o'clock, on the 11th,
in the morning, our army moved on with-
out beat of drum, towards Chingliput,
where they grounded their arms on the
glacis, about break of day, on Tuesday the
12th of September. The enemy crouded

1780. around them, as they pursued their march, in great numbers, but without making any attack.

Colonel Cosby, just as he was about to make a forced march to Conjeveram, fortunately met with one of the fugitive Sepoys from Colonel Baillie's camp, and, after having been not a little harrassed in his route, arrived safely at Chingliput, within twenty-four hours after the General.

On Wednesday, the 13th, at six o'clock in the morning, our troops began to march from Chingliput, and after being annoyed all the way by the enemy's horse, arrived about one o'clock in the morning, on Thursday the 14th, at the Mount.

The retreat of our army to Madras, filled the whole inhabitants at once with sorrow for their wounded or slaughtered friends, and anxiety for their own safety. The more timid were eager to find opportunities of returning, with as much of their substance as possible, to Europe, while those
of

of greater courage cast their eyes to Bengal, 1780. looking with solicitude for succour from that rich and extensive province. There was not an inhabitant in the Presidency of Madras that did not wear mourning. Civilians and soldiers united in their murmurs against certain persons, to whose egregious negligence and infatuation they ascribed the calamities that had overtaken the British in India; in paying the tribute of praise to the memory of Colonel Fletcher, and the brave officers and men who fell with him in the unequal contest; in doing justice to the bravery of Colonel Baillie and his fellow prisoners; and in applauding the councils and firmness of Lord Macleod, who had advised the General to form a junction of the troops at the Mount, and afterwards solicited him in the strongest manner to move to the relief of Colonel Baillie with the whole army.

So great was the panic that had struck all orders of men in the Presidency of Madras, on this mournful occasion, that if Hyder had immediately pursued and improved his

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victory,

1780. victory, the 10th of September might have proved the most unfortunate in the annals of Britain. Nor would the calamities with which that day seemed pregnant have been long averted by the caution of Hyder-Aly at that important crisis, if the towering genius of one man had not, in this precipice of fortune, presented an intrepid front to the enemy, and nobly dared to revive the spirits of his countrymen, by attacking instead of fleeing from the conqueror.

The Presidency of Madras, as soon as they received intelligence of the disaster of our army, made a requisition to the Supreme Council in Bengal, of a reinforcement suitable to the exigency of their affairs. This requisition was accompanied by advice, that a considerable French fleet, with land-forces on board, were on their way to India. That succours should be sent to Madras to a certain amount was readily agreed on by the whole Council: but concerning the quantity of these, as well as the time of sending them, there were different opinions. Mr. Francis,
deeply

deeply impressed with the unexampled disaster which had befallen our arms, and the progress of Hyder in the Carnatic, was alarmed for the safety of Bengal itself, the centre and seat of the British government in Asia. As in an animal body, under the influence of terror, the blood naturally runs inward to fortify the heart, leaving the extremities pale and trembling; the main exertions of government, if guided by the counsels of that gentleman, would have been confined to Bengal, which would have become the seat of war, and the other possessions of the Company in India left, almost wholly, to their own resources.—The courage of the Governor-General, and other members of the Supreme Council, repelled the vital fluid from the centre to the most distant movements, and preserved and sustained the unity of the system. Mr. Hastings, kept a steady eye on every part of our eastern empire, and, with an out-stretched arm and liberal hand, carried relief to the distressed. By invading the dominions of our enemies, he drove the battle from our gates, deprived them of their resources for carrying

1780. carrying on the war, and infused fresh spirits into the whole of the troops, Sepoys as well as Europeans, in our service. It was determined in the Supreme Council to attack our combined foes in every quarter : in the east, in the west, in the north ; on the coast of Coromandel, on that of Malabar, and in the province of Malva.

The Governor-General, in the first council that was held after the disaster near Conjeveram, proposed that Sir Eyre Coote should be requested to take the command of the southern army at Madras ; that a reinforcement of Europeans should be sent thither by sea, with a supply of fifteen lacks of rupees ; that a large detachment of Sepoys should be formed in order to march, as soon as the season should permit, into the Carnatic ; that an offer of peace, on reasonable terms, should be made to the Marrattas, but if this should be rejected, that the war against them should be prosecuted with vigour. The advanced season of the year rendered an embarkation of troops both difficult and dangerous ; and the expences to be incurred

incurred by Bengal, for the safety of Ma- 1780.
dras, were uncommonly great. But there
are conjunctures in which extraordinary ex-
pences are absolutely necessary, and when
great dangers must be hazarded. The Su-
preme Council, therefore, notwithstanding
the opposition of Mr. Francis to the embar-
cation of the troops, and to any supply be-
yond the amount of seven lacks of rupees,
supported the motion that had been made
by the Governor-General. And Sir Eyre
Coote, with six hundred and forty Europe-
ans, fifteen lacks of rupees, and a large sup-
ply of provisions, arrived at Madras on the
5th of November.

Hyder-Ally, on the retreat of our army
to Madras, resumed the siege of Arcot,
which yielded to his arms on the last day of
October. Many other posts of strength fell
into his hands without resistance. He
was now proclaimed Nabob of the Carna-
tic *, and exercised in fact all the preroga-
tives of sovereign power. From policy,

* Others affirm, that it was Tippoo Saib who was pro-
claimed.

1780. not less than the natural insolence of prosperity, he was at pains to cherish among his officers the pride of victory. He boasted that he would prevent the English army from moving from the Mount, and that, in the course of a month, when he would be joined by three thousand French troops, from the islands of Mauritius and Bourbon, he would commence the siege of Fort St. George. Mean-while, his numerous cavalry over-ran and ravaged the country.—Numbers of inoffensive and unresisting people were sacrificed to a savage thirst of blood: some were cruelly tortured that they might be induced to give up treasures they were supposed to conceal; others were wantonly mutilated, and at this day, many wretched men, without their hands, or ears, or noses, record the inhumanity of a barbarous conqueror. Women were subjected to the brutality of lust, or forced to save their honour by the forfeit of their lives; a ransom which some had the fortitude to pay. The mother of two beautiful young ladies of Arcot, rather than consent to their degradation in the Haram of the Sultan, emanci-

emancipated them, with their own consent, 1780. as well as herself, from the insults of the enemy, by means of poison. Thousands of boys and girls of different castes and different religions, were carried into captivity, in order to people the Myforean dominions of the conqueror. A new village was built on this occasion, for their reception; they were placed on an equal footing, and enjoyed equal privileges with the natives; and were instructed by masters, many of whom were themselves captives, in divers manufactures. For amidst the ravages of war, Hyder did not lose sight of the arts of peace, by which, in the present refined period, the resources of war are most effectually supplied. And it must be allowed, that although the inhuman custom of the victors enslaving the vanquished in battle, in Europe at least, be happily abolished, it is in most cases, wiser policy, in the eye of ambition, to strengthen the conquering state by the introduction of foreigners, than to weaken it by sending forth a part of its own population for maintaining distant conquests.

The

1730. The first fury of invasion having spent its force, and the ferocity of animal nature yielding to the return of reason and humanity, multitudes of people who had fled from those legions of barbarian cavalry that overspread the land, to the hills and woods, were invited back to the settlements which they had abandoned, by assurances of protection from Hyder-Ally-Cawn, who declared himself a friend to the natives, but the inveterate enemy of the English. He restored that discipline in his army which the licentiousness of war had unavoidably relaxed. He restrained his soldiers from rapine; and encouraged the country people to sow their land, telling them, that if they were in want of seed he would furnish it, and that thenceforth they should enjoy the fruits of their industry. Never, indeed, was the fostering hand of government more necessary than on the present occasion. The calamities that overwhelmed the Carnatic were followed by want and famine. Under the walls of Madras, men, women, and children perished in crowds, and some were seen swooning in the streets.

Hyder

Hyder, having exhausted all that could minister fuel either to fury or to rapine in this country, determined to lead his victorious army to the regions southward of the Coleroon. These also had by this time experienced the ravages of predatory war, and every where bore marks of desolation.—Multitudes of needy adventurers, who were drawn to his standard by the hope of plunder, pouring down from the mountains of Myfore, overran the countries of Kavalore, Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and Madura. A luxuriant crop was instantly swept off the ground, and every water-dyke and encampment totally destroyed. The inhabitants who escaped the sword sought shelter in the forts, where through want they miserably perished.

The country of Tanjore was in the possession of the invaders, who secured its crops and cattle, repulsed the Company's troops at different places, and confined them within a single fortress in the capital; where the granaries were empty, the Rajah's subjects ripe for innovation and revolt, and he himself accused of clandestinely introducing arms

1780. arms into his palace, and carrying on intrigues with Hyder. That nominal king, bearing royalty in fetters, and mortified by the humiliating condition to which he had been reduced, though he had not dared to avow a wish for his emancipation, began now from policy to favour the cause that seemed to prevail, and from inclination to listen to the suggestions of a confederacy formed for the expulsion of strangers. While he secretly endeavoured to convert his palace into an arsenal, he suffered the whole crops of the country to be collected by the enemy, at the same time that he resisted every solicitation to fill his magazines, and to provide for events neither evitable nor distant.

In the provinces to the southward of Tanjore and Trichinopoly, the aspect of affairs appeared equally alarming to the English. The great Marawa was infested by a numerous body of rebels, under the conduct of a chief nearly related to the family on the throne: the little Marawa, by the murderer of the late Rajah, who, after the perpetration of that crime, had fled, in 1773, for protection to Hyder, but

but returning, at the present crisis, seized 1780.
the reins of government by the authority of
that prince, kept the infant Rajah in con-
finement, and carried the desolation of war
into the adjacent territories of the Company,
held under the name of the Nabob of Ar-
cot. The flames of disaffection and war
were spread in their progress to Cape Como-
rin. An hundred thousand Colleries and
Polygars harrassed the southern provinces ;
and the subjects of Great Britain were often
attacked within the range of their forts.

Such, then, was the state of our affairs,
on the coast of Coromandel, towards the
conclusion of 1780, and the commence-
ment of 1781. The native powers were
united among themselves, and with other
states and princes of India, in desire and
design to emancipate themselves from foreign
controul ; French auxiliaries were incorpo-
rated with their armies, in order to invigo-
rate their attacks and direct their move-
ments, and more were promised and confi-
dently expected ; a political and warlike
prince, who united the military discipline

1780. and skill of Europe with the subtilty and craft of Asia, freely ranged over the whole land at the head of an army flushed with success, and daily increasing in numbers as well as courage. To this force and those difficulties, the fortune of Great Britain opposed the army at Madras, to be reinforced by the succours which have been already stated from Bengal, and whatever could be spared from Guzzarat by General Goddard, the military talents of Sir Eyre Coote, and the genius of Mr. Hastings, whose eyes were open on every part of India, who supplied the resources of war, and united the power of Great Britain in the east, not more scattered in place than disunited by civil dissension, in one vigorous system of military operation.

The respectable veteran, now invested with the command of our troops in the Carnatic, was in the sixty-third year of his age. Though his constitution had suffered the debilitation of an enervating climate, he chearfully underwent, at this advanced period of life, as much fatigue as any soldier, and as readily encountered danger

ger as any officer in his army. He was an 1780.
handsome man with a serious military air.
He united spirit with caution, and the general course of his military conduct had been fortunate. There was in his character and example something that engaged the affections of men, at the same time that it commanded their confidence and esteem : objects which the General well knew how to value, and which he endeavoured on all occasions to acquire.— It was on this principle, that although he possessed the sole command of the army, he communicated his plan of operations, before he took the field, to a council of war, composed of Brigadier-General Stuart, Sir Hector Monro, and Lord Macleod, and also to the Select Committee at Madras.

In every point of view, it was expedient for the English to bring Hyder to a decisive action; but how to accomplish this object was the question. Experience had sufficiently proved that this was not to be effected by rapid marches. In a former war, Hyder, after leading an English General who pur-

led him up and down through the whole kingdom of Mysore, and thus weakening his force by fatigue, by climate, and bad nourishment, marched past him to Madras, and intimidated the government into a dishonourable treaty of peace. Nor was the experiment made by General Smith, necessary to evince, that an army formed like ours, of infantry, could not possibly out-march such a force as Hyder's, which derived rapidity of motion from bullocks, camels, elephants, and cavalry.

On the other hand, to have acted on the principles of a besieging army would have protracted time, diminished our force by garrisons, and multiplied all those advantages which the enemy had over us in numbers, supplies, and the possession of the country. In these circumstances, the English General determined, if possible, to bring Hyder to a close engagement, by a plan of conduct that seemed to hold a middle place between field-operations, on the one hand, and sieges on the other; inclining to either, according

according to contingent events and circum- 1780.
stances. And as Hyder's numerous cavalry
enabled him to drive the country, it became
a part of the English General's plan, to se-
cure, in all cases, a communication with the
sea, by which he was to receive from time
to time the necessary supplies for carrying
on the war. Hyder, on the contrary, was
careful, in all his movements, to secure a
passage into the interior part of the penin-
sula through the mountains.

The English army, which had been dis- 1781.
persed in cantonements for the rainy season,
again took the field on the 17th of January,
1781. This, in point of discipline and
numbers, was the finest body of men that
ever took the field in India. It consisted of
eight thousand infantry, eight hundred ca-
valry, and sixty-two pieces of cannon, with
a suitable proportion of gunners, and a due
provision of military stores. The confi-
dence which the army reposed in their
commander, was expressed by a loud
huzza.

1781. At this period, the places of strength that now remained to the English in the Carnatic, were Vandiwash, Vellore, Parmacoil, Amboor, Chingliput, Cuddalore, and Tiagar: of which the four first-mentioned were besieged or invested by the enemy.— On the 19th the army passed Chingliput, and encamped on the south side of the river Polaar. On the 21st, the fort of Charangooly was surprized by a detachment under the command of Captain Davis, who very deservedly received the thanks of the General for his steady gallantry on that occasion. Our troops, leaving a garrison at Charangooly, resumed their march, and, on the 25th, carried relief to the long-invested garrison of Vandiwash. The enemy, at the approach of our men, fled with precipitation: but this advantage was counter-balanced by the fall of the strong fortress of Amboor, one of the inlets to the Carnatic. The English army, leaving Vandiwash, directed the line of their march towards Parmacoil, when intelligence being received by two expresses, which arrived at the same time, that a French fleet had passed Madras, they faced about, and returning on their steps,

steps, encamped along the eminences above 1781.
Charangooly. On the 2d of February they
marched from the left towards Parmacoil,
where they encamped on the 3d; and, on
the 5th, they sat down on the red hills of
Pondicherry, with their front towards Ar-
cot; the chief strength of the enemy in the
Carnatic.

The town and fortress of Pondicherry,
after a brave resistance by an handful of
men under the command of General Bel-
combe, though defended in many places
only by new mud walls, was reduced, as
already mentioned, by a detachment of
the Company's troops under the conduct of
General Sir Hector Monro, and garrisoned
by a military force commanded by Colonel
Braithwaite. The Colonel, having first de-
manded and obtained the solemn allegiance
of the inhabitants, evacuated the town and
fortress, in order to join the general rendez-
vous of our army, on the irruption of Hy-
der Ally, at Conjeveram. The moment
our troops were withdrawn, the inhabitants
of Pondicherry, in direct violation of their

1781. recent engagements, flew to arms, plundered the solitary English resident who had been left as a spy on their conduct, and with fixed bayonets pointed to his breast, forced him to sign a written instrument, of the contents of which he was wholly ignorant. They armed a number of Sepoys, and collected prodigious quantities of provisions, which they deposited at Charangoloy, a maritime town not far distant. Sir Eyre Coote disarmed the inhabitants of Pondicherry, removed their stores, and destroyed a number of boats belonging to the French squadron.

Large bodies of horse, in the mean time, took post in sight of our camp, and obliged our advanced parties to observe the greatest vigilance. Here the General intended to make a halt, both for the relaxation of the troops, and in order to learn the intentions and movements of the enemy. The French fleet, consisting of seven large ships of war and four frigates, lay at anchor off Pondicherry. Certain intelligence, however, was received, that the French Admiral was himself

self too much distressed for want of men to spare any for the assistance of Hyder. 1781.

But this commander, though unassisted by his European ally, did not remain inactive. He was observed, on the 8th of February, nearly within cannon-shot of the front of our encampment, passing, with his eye fixed, as was supposed, on Cuddalore, at the head of his army. The drums instantly beat to arms. At four in the afternoon the army began to move, filing off by the left into the lower road towards Cuddalore. The enemy kept, what is called the Porto Novo road; so that the marches of both armies were parallel. Night was no sooner set in, than the enemy began to throw rockets on our rear-guard, but at too great a distance for them to do any execution. On the 9th, the army encamped with its right to the ruins of Fort St. Davids, and its left to Cuddalore: a position which shewed our apprehensions of the farther designs of the enemy. This minute description will, perhaps, be excused, when it is considered that this is the first instance of an English army

1781. army being placed in such a situation with regard to any of the native powers of India: an army, too, the best appointed that had ever taken the field in that country.

The English army, on the 10th, leaving their tents standing, moved out from the cover of the guns of Cuddalore, and was formed in order of battle. A river ran along their front, and covered their right flank. Their left extended towards a range of strong ground where cavalry could not act, and the bound hedge of Cuddalore, with three redoubts, secured their rear.—The army being thus arranged, the General rode along the line, and encouraged the soldiers to do their duty, with assurances that this day their labours would be at an end. “What I have all along wished for,” said he, “has now come to pass, and in a few hours you join battle with the enemy.” Other officers addressed the soldiers in words to the same purpose. In this situation, without tents, and the comforts which these afford, our men for three complete days offered battle to the enemy: who, it must not
be

be omitted, were at this time not less than 1781. ten miles distant. The General, upon the fourth day, finding that Hyder would not accept of battle, returned to his camp, with a great increase in the number of his sick. It was no wonder that the General was thus eager for battle. He was reduced to a few days provisions ; and delay to engage might be equal to defeat in an engagement.

Here let us pause for a moment to contemplate the alarming situation of our army, and the means by which they were extricated from impending ruin. Their provisions were nearly exhausted ; an enemy's fleet was on the coast ; Hyder-Ally was in possession of the country round ; and their cattle, on which they depended for the ability of moving from one place to another, dying in numbers for want of forage. The sudden and unexpected departure of Monsieur D'Orves, the French Admiral, from the coast of Coromandel, brightened up the gloom that hung over the minds of our general officers, although they were careful to conceal

1781. conceal their anxiety from the troops under their command, by opening a channel for the reception of those supplies which the unremitting vigilance and foresight of the Supreme Council of Bengal constantly furnished. It is to the same vigilance and foresight in our councils, that we are to ascribe the seasonable departure of the French Admiral. Sir Edward Hughes, after reducing the French fort of Maheé, and ruining Hyder's fleet in his own ports of Callicut and Mangalore, returned with a reinforcement of troops on board his fleet, from Bombay to the Coast of Coromandel. The certain information received by Monsieur D'Orves concerning the destination of the English, together with the loss of the boats at Pondicherry, determined him to set sail, which he did on the 15th of February, for the island of Mauritius. But had the French Admiral left only two frigates to block up the road of Cuddalore, consequences might have happened as fatal to the interests of Great Britain in the East Indies, as flowed in North America, from the convention of Saratoga.

There

There is no reason, either of entertainment 1781.
or instruction, to detail the particulars which fill the space between the departure of the French fleet, and the arrival of Sir Edward Hughes with the English squadron and transports on the 14th of June. It may be mentioned, however, in general, that during this time Hyder-Ally was not idle. He plundered the country of Tanjore, he reduced the fortress of Tiagar, and cut off some of our flying parties : by which successes he supported the spirits of his troops and raised their courage; and, what was of equal importance, maintained and heightened the glory of his name among the native powers of India.

Sir Eyre Coote, having encamped near Porto Novo on the 17th of June, marched, in person, a strong detachment on the 18th to attack the fortified Pagoda of Chillumbrum, making the same desperate assault that succeeded at Charangooly. He was repulsed, with the loss of eight officers, and from two to three hundred men killed and wounded. A twelve-pounder, which
was

1781. was used in blowing open the gates, added a field-piece to the train of the enemy.— When it is said that a commander in chief heads an assault, or any desperate enterprize in person, nothing more is commonly meant than that he is a spectator of what passes. Here the General's person was exposed to great danger. Lieutenant Young, who commanded the European troops in this expedition, had his leg broken by the shot of a cannon, as he stood talking with him close by his side.

It is but a short way that the utmost human sagacity can penetrate into the mazes of future events. The repulse at Chillumbrum, which seemed pregnant with danger, extricated the English army from a most perilous situation, and happily changed the whole face of our affairs in the Carnatic. Even a return to Madras, if it could have been effected without a further loss of men, would have been followed by effects little less disastrous than what usually accompany or flow from a defeat. It would have discovered to the native powers of India that
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our want of magazines would always oblige us to keep near the sea, or to make excursions into the inland country: circumstances which might be improved by a prudent adversary for our disadvantage and ruin. 1781.

The repulse of our arms from Chillumbrum, which was greatly exaggerated to Hyder, with the pressing entreaties of his auxiliary chiefs, and the French officer Lally, prevailed on the wavering mind of Hyder, notwithstanding the remonstrances of his eldest son, to offer the English battle.—Hyder, having remained for some weeks within random shot of Tanjore, set his face against Trichinopoly, and threatened to fill up the ditch with his Moormen's flippers. Tippoo strongly advised him to pursue this object, urging, that the reduction of this place, which was equally defenceless and important, would extend his authority over the southern provinces in the peninsula that acknowledged subjection to the English.—Hyder was not ignorant of the importance of Trichinopoly; but he was flushed with success, and hoped that he would be able, by

1781. by a close engagement, to defeat the only force that could endanger either the conquest of the provinces south of the Coleroon, on the one hand, or that of the Decan on the other. He, therefore, took a position for that purpose, at a village called Mooteapollam, which commanded the common road from Porto Novo to Cuddalore, and to the natural strength of his ground added several redoubts.

Our army, consisting of eight thousand rank and file, with above sixty pieces of cannon, marched from Porto Novo, with the sea at no great distance on the right, early on the 1st of July, towards the enemy, whose number, according to the highest computation, exceeded an hundred, and according to the lowest, did not fall short of sixty thousand men, variously armed, with a field train of forty-seven pieces, of different calibres.

A detachment, consisting of two regiments of cavalry and a battalion of Sepoys, with seven pieces of light artillery, was ordered to protect the baggage from Hyder's horse.

horse. This body of our troops, with the usual guard of an hundred and fifty Sepoys, a few Polygars, and a Marratta corps, were judiciously placed between the right of the army and the sea. Our troops, formed in two lines, proceeded in order of battle.—Parties of horse paraded in every direction, and great quantities of rockets were thrown without intermission, to confound the observation, and, if possible, to throw the English army into disorder, and to impede their movements. A large body of the enemy's cavalry now appeared, drawn up in great force on an extensive plain. On this body the English opened an heavy cannonade, which forced them to retire as our men advanced. Their retreat opened to the General's view a range of redoubts, which commanded the road.—Struck with this unexpected appearance, he ordered the troops to halt, and called a council of his principal officers. To proceed forward in the direct line of their march, was to rush into the very throat of danger; the sea confined their movements on the left hand, and impracticable sand-banks on the right.

1781. During the halt of the army, and while a Council of War deliberated whether they should advance or retreat, an officer, carelessly walking to the right, discovered a road cut through the sand hills. This road being examined, was found to be newly made, and calculated for the movement of troops and artillery. Hyder had made it the very night before, for the purpose of attacking the right of the English army, whilst they should be engaged in storming the batteries in front. This further disposition was intended by that artful commander, that, on the confusion of our men, the main body of his cavalry should rush from behind the batteries and complete the rout. This road, designed by Hyder-Ally for the overthrow of the English, was destined by Providence for their preservation: for by this Sir Eyre Coote marched the troops, and effected their deliverance from apparent ruin.

Hyder, disappointed in his stratagem, evacuated his works, and moved a-breast with

with our army, which, after passing through 1781.
the sand-banks and quitting the road, turned to the left, and faced the enemy, who, in the possession of a ridge of sand-banks in front, seemed to offer a decisive action.— The General, now, had not certainly any option; but, from some cause or other, a second hesitation took place. Certain unasked opinions were given in favour of a retreat, under the abject and ruinous notion of looking for more equal ground. To the honour of General Monro, it is right to mention, that when the enemy's batteries were discovered in front of our army, he gave his opinion against the madness of an attack: but that, in this second situation, he urged the necessity of an attack, by the most sensible arguments and manly eloquence. A space of time, which appeared to every individual in our army of great length, was consumed, under the enemy's fire, who had withdrawn their guns from the batteries to the line, and presented a new front, before the General determined to come to a close attack: and it was during

1781. this interval, chiefly, that we suffered the loss that was sustained in this action.

Meanwhile, the heights in the rear of the first line of our army, led on by Sir Eyre Coote, were seized by General Stuart, who commanded the second. This excellent disposition encouraged Sir Eyre Coote to advance with confidence on the enemy. He marched up, at the head of the first line, to the enemy's artillery, quickly threw them into disorder, and forced them to give way. But, previously to this attack, Hyder had detached a strong body of disciplined infantry, with a suitable train of artillery, a prodigious number of irregulars, and cavalry, to attack the English posted on the heights. Another detachment also attempted, by penetrating into the interval between our two lines, to attack Sir Eyre Coote in the rear. Thus was each wing separately, and almost equally engaged.—The fresh forces with which the enemy were incessantly relieved, rendered the battle long and obstinate. It lasted above six hours, in

in which every individual in the Company's 1781.
service fought as if the fate of the day had
depended on his single efforts. The first
line, triumphing over every obstacle, drove
the enemy, infantry, cavalry, and artillery,
promiscuously before them. The second
line, under the command of Brigadier-Ge-
neral Stuart, had by this time, not only re-
pulsed the other division of the army, but
driven them from their post and defeated
every attempt they made to attack the Ge-
neral's rear. It was also the masterly dis-
position, and spirited exertions of the second
line, that protected the baggage, disposed,
as has been mentioned, close by the sea,
from even the attempts of the enemy.

The rout was complete and general.—
The tumult and confusion in the retreat of
such a multitude of people tempted an eager
pursuit, which, could it have been made,
must have effected an unexampled carnage
among men and cattle. But our guns
were dragged slowly through deep and sandy
soil ; while the numbers and the spirit of

1781. Hyder's cattle gave a celerity to his motion which ours could not equal. The greatest loss sustained by the enemy happened before our second line, where, ignorant of its force and strong position, and mistaking it for a common baggage guard, they made the only spirited attempt on their part; although, it must be allowed, that their artillery was served with great promptitude and address, during the whole course of the action.— What loss of men is sustained in an engagement by an Indian army, cannot be ascertained with any degree of exactness, as it is a religious maxim with all the Hindoos, to carry off as many of their wounded and slain as they can. This they think of great importance, being persuaded, that after the body is burned, neither the evil principle or being, nor the dæmons of wrath who are subservient to his will, have any power over the emancipated spirit: a notion that is in exact conformity to an ancient and very general doctrine, that matter is the grand principle of evil, and that the souls of those who have departed from life, hover around, and
are

are attracted to their bodies, as long as they 1781.
are entire ; either the whole corporeal frame,
or any of the organized parts or members.
The Marrattas, the Myforeans, the Poly-
gars, and in general all the Gentoo warri-
ors, have their loins begirt with girdles or
belts. The horsemen have an hook which
they dart with great dexterity between those
belts and the dead bodies of their friends,
and therewith carry them off from the field
of battle. As nearly as could be conjectur-
ed, the number of the slain, on the side of
Hyder, amounted to three thousand : but
what appeared in his fight a greater loss,
was the mortal wounds of Meer Saib, his
favourite General and son-in-law, who, at
the head of the Mogul and Canara cavalry,
made the first impression on the British
lines, in the unfortunate action near Conje-
veram. The English General halted near the
field of action, from inability to pursue the
enemy. Our loss did not exceed four hun-
dred, nor was there an officer of rank or
distinction among either killed or wounded.

1781. Although no trophies were gained, or prisoners made, the first of July, 1781, will ever be accounted an important day to the eastern branch of the British empire. It broke that spell which was formed by the defeat of Colonel Baillie, and destroyed that respect which the name of Hyder-Ally-Cawn had obtained, from that disastrous to this prosperous event, among superstitious observers, whose opinions are formed by the impression of striking events, more than by the deductions of reason.

The General, on the 3d of July, returned his thanks to the troops, gave orders for a *feu de joie*, and dispatched expresses to every quarter with the news of the victory. His Majesty's 73d regiment, on account of their distinguished steadiness in the field, as well as their exemplary deportment in quarters, were presented by the General with fifty pounds to buy a pair of bag-pipes.

While these things were transacted near Porto Novo, a detachment under Tippoo Saib had invested Vandiwash, and begun to construct

construct batteries, and to make other necessary preparations for a siege. The General therefore determined to march to the northward, in order to relieve this place, and afterwards to form a junction with the Bengal detachment. Tippoo, on the approach of our army, precipitately raised the siege of Vandiwash, and joined the main army under Hyder, in the neighbourhood of Arcot.

Sir Eyre Coote, reinforced by ten battalions of Sepoys and twenty pieces of cannon, sent from Bengal under the command of Colonel Pearse, laid siege to Tripassore, which surrendered on the 22d of August, on terms of capitulation. A very seasonable supply of paddy being found in the fort, the troops were provided with subsistence for several days, and the General, hearing that Hyder was, in full force, at the distance of about sixteen miles, marched towards him, in order if possible to bring him to an engagement: the only measure that seemed to promise enlargement from surrounding difficulties. Hyder, on the approach

1781. proach of the English army, fell back a few miles, to the ground on which he had defeated the detachment under Colonel Bailie, where he took a very strong position; and where, under the notion of its being a fortunate spot, he determined to try his fortune in a second battle.

These things being faithfully reported to the British commander, he marched towards the enemy on the 27th, in the morning, when, about eight o'clock, he discovered his army drawn up in order of battle, in full force, to receive him, and in possession of many strong and advantageous posts, rendered still more formidable by the nature of the interjacent country, which was intersected by very deep courses of water.—Some cannon-shot being fired at our advanced guard, the army was immediately ordered to halt, till the baggage could be drawn to a station allotted for it in the rear. This being done, the second line, consisting of two brigades, turned to a situation of some strength on the left. The first line, consisting of three brigades, filed off to the place

place where the advanced guard had been 1781:
fired on and formed in the face of a fire of six
or eight pieces of cannon. This brought the
front of the first line to a right angle with
that of the second, or, in military language,
it gave the army a double front with a large
interval. The General then ordered the
first line to push through a space of ground
covered with bushes and underwood, and to
storm the enemy's guns. When they clear-
ed these obstructions, nothing was to be seen
except a line of horsemen at some distance:
but suddenly the same guns that had been
firing on our front, opened an enfilade on
both our flanks.

When Hyder had thus completely entan-
gled the first line, and not before, he opened
a most tremendous cannonade on the second.
Sir Hector Monro, who commanded the first
line, was of his own accord bringing round
his front to the left, when he received orders
from the General to join the second line, as
the left brigade under Colonel Owen were
scarcely able to maintain their ground.—
The division of the army commanded by Mon-

1781. 10, after making the circuit that has been described, found themselves, now, on the very spot where Colonel Baillie made his last stand. The fragments of bodies, the legs, arms and skulls, the manœuvres that were made, and the noise of the cannon, brought the bloody tragedy of September, 1780, full in their view, and made an impression on their imaginations, which was to be surmounted only by military discipline, and a sense of honour.

The first line now closing, and presenting the same front with the second, the whole army, in one connected line, was ordered to advance on the enemy's artillery. On this order, Sir Hector Monro submitted to the Commander in Chief, what was murmured throughout the whole line, whether it would not be improper to abandon the shelter they derived from a long avenue and other trees, since the ground between the two armies was such as could not be passed, and that an attempt to move close up with the enemy, in that direction, would only expose them to the weight of their cannon,

non, without the possibility of their effect- 1781.
ing any object that might compensate so
great a disadvantage. The General, in an
hurry of spirits, which at such a crisis might
be well excused, and not perhaps attending
to what Sir Hector Monro had said, replied
to his second in command, " Sir, you talk
" to me when you should be doing your
" duty*." In obedience, therefore, to the
General's orders, the troops advanced more
and more within reach of the enemy's can-
non. The men dropped fast, disliked their
situation, and became impatient. One tum-
bril had blown up at the instant when the
two lines of the army were closing in one :
a second blew up now together with some
limber boxes. Orders for some manœuvre
were now expected from the General, by
the first line, with great anxiety, but none
arrived. Sir Hector Monro, sitting by the
only tree that was in the plain, in a fullen
mood, refused to give any orders whatever.

* This circumstance is mentiond here, on account of Sir
Hector Monro's having quitted the army, as soon as he could,
and never again serving under Sir Eyre Coote.

1781. The second line was in the utmost confusion. The battalions, in opening for the purpose of giving way to the enemy's shot, had fallen into clusters and become noisy. Had the enemy charged our men with his numerous cavalry, from the left, at any period of the two hours during which our affairs were in this perilous situation, it is not improbable that we would have suffered discomfiture and defeat: and that the plains of Ticoallum, a second time strewed with the mangled bodies of the English, would have rivetted the superstition, and inflamed the cruelty of the barbarian conqueror. Our cavalry, indeed, might have made good their retreat, as they were at some distance with the baggage; but the foot soldiers would never have been able to escape from the field: no! not perhaps even in the character of prisoners.

Happily, the disorder of our line could not be easily perceived by the enemy: and there is reason to suppose that he neither knew of that confusion, nor formed the plan of his operations, on the supposition that
any

any confusion was to happen. His chief 1781.
design, was to revive the spirits of his troops,
and to convince the princes of the country,
that he could yet engage, and make head
against the greatest European army that had
ever taken the field in India.

The evening was now far advanced, when
Hyder drew off his guns, and all was si-
lence. It was thought advisable, at the
same time, that our army should march
back to the strong ground from which they
had advanced. When the circumstances
that rendered it expedient to retire, were
urged in a conference among the principal
officers, one of the gentlemen happened un-
fortunately to make use of the word *retreat*.
The General swore that he had never re-
treated in his life, but that he would *permit*
the army to fall back. This happy expression
was followed by immediate orders for the
troops to turn to the right about.

Our loss, on this day, was heavier than
on the 1st of July, and that of the enemy
less, which was owing to their having
sheltered

1781. sheltered themselves under the cover of tanks; and other grounds which they possessed; favourable for that purpose. Of our privates six hundred either perished in the field or were desperately wounded. General Stuart lost his leg by a cannon-shot, whilst bravely conducting the second line to the support of a post which the Commander in Chief had occupied at the commencement of the engagement, and on which the enemy had kept up a severe fire. The same shot also carried away the leg of Colonel Brown, and by his death, which soon followed, deprived the East-India Company of a very old and faithful servant, and the army, of an able and very experienced officer. Captain Hislop, also, a very active and spirited officer, and one of the General's aid-de-camps, fell in this obstinate and indecisive, not to say undecided, engagement.

The hircarrahs, or spies, sent out by the General to discover Hyder's further plans, brought intelligence that the enemy had determined to attack the English army, some hour between midnight and break of day.

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In consequence of this, orders were issued 1781. for the whole line to lie all night under arms, in the front of the encampment. While our army guarded against an imaginary attack, the report of which had been industriously circulated by Hyder, that cautious commander, who judged it imprudent to leave his unconnected, in the vicinity of our disciplined army, under the cloud of night, was retreating to a distance that might secure him against a surprize.

On the 28th of August, our dead were buried, and the wounded collected and dressed. The next day, our troops being masters of the field of battle, and Hyder at some distance, the General ordered the men under arms, when our guns and small arms announced a victory. The tents and baggage were then packed, and the troops put in motion for Tripassore, where they encamped on the 30th. Hyder called this march a retreat, and claiming a victory, proclaimed one, in all the pomp of war, to the nations of Hindostan.

1781. There was not any thing memorable that occurred before the 27th of September, when the English army, having pitched their camp, the day before, within four miles of Hyder, who waited for them at the pass of Chillangur, was put in motion to try the fortune of a new battle. The baggage was thrown into a theatre which the hand of nature had formed. The second brigade, with the two flank companies of the 73d regiment, the cavalry, and a train of twenty-two pieces of cannon, broke from the main body, and moved for some high ground to the left of the enemy's line of encampment, not yet struck, while the main army continued to advance, in one line, upon the enemy's front. Hyder, who had assured himself from experience that Sir Eyre Coote would keep the whole of his troops together, and of course, had only guarded against a direct movement on his front, kept a steady eye on the left of our line and on the baggage.— A change of disposition in an army unwieldy, and without subordination, involves an immediate retreat. Such was the army headed by Hyder-Ally. That experienced General

neral, therefore, instead of resisting the de- 1781.
tachment, endeavoured only to alarm them
with a shew, and a slight attack by a body
of horse. He abandoned his design upon
the left wing of our army and baggage, and,
after a short fire from his guns, ordered them
to be carried off.

In doing this, his horse were brought
under our cannon, and suffered greatly. In
the hurry of retirement, his guns were, at
one time, huddled together in a miry place,
which encouraged our men to advance a-
gainst the enemy with greater rapidity.—
Hyder, on perceiving this, instantly charged
the assailants with a body of his best cavalry.
This force interrupted the progress of our
line : but after receiving many discharges of
grape, and in reality surmounting their dan-
gers, instead of riding against the files, they
galloped through an opening they found in
the line, and never stopped till they found
themselves without the reach of our cannon.
One field piece, being a six-pounder, was
found by our men, sunk to the axle, and

1781. discovered to be one of the eight guns belonging to Colonel Baillie.

Night having overtaken our troops in the midst of their victory, the second brigade was called in, and the army encamped. In this action, which, from the pass, is called the battle of Chillangur, Hyder-Ally lost one thousand men, and a greater number of horses. The loss, on our side, did not exceed that of one officer and sixty private soldiers.

The General, without money and without provisions, did not think it advisable to pursue the retreating enemy : but, on the day after the action, directing his march to the interior Pollams, he came over eight miles of fatiguing ground, and encamped. What he had now in view, was, to offer the Polygars the same terms which, in the day of our prosperity we had violated, if they would espouse our cause, and give up the interests of Hyder-Ally.

These

The Polygars enjoy a degree of freedom 1781.
unknown in the plains of India, the strength
of their situation, amidst hills, woods, and
deep ravines, producing the same effects
with the like situations in other countries.
There never was a power, among all the
conquerors in India, to whom they so soon
became tributary as that formidable invader,
Hyder-ALLY. The chief of the Polygars,
in this part of the country, Bom Razee,
had promised to furnish Sir Eyre Coote
both with money and rice, after Hyder
should be defeated, when he might do it
with safety. The General now called upon
him to fulfil his promises. The promises
were continued, but the rice and money
were not produced. The General, there-
fore, having served out his last measure of
rice, broke through the barrier, and pene-
trated into the interior Pollams, by a forced
march, on the 1st of October, determined
to compel Bom Razee to fulfil his engage-
ments. On the 5th, he sent out detach-
ments from his camp at the village of At-
tamancherry, to bring in cattle and rice
wherever they could be found. These Bom

1781. Razee industriously threw in the way of our parties; a policy by which he hoped to avert the immediate vengeance of the English, whom he essentially served, and to obtain from Hyder, in case of a reverse of fortune, not only indulgence and excuse on the score of compulsion, but indemnification for his heavy losses.

On the 7th of October, a detachment of six battalions, two hundred horse, and twelve field-pieces, under the command of Colonel Owen, marched out of the camp in the night, with the design of intercepting a large convoy from the Myforean country on its way to Hyder's encampment at Lalpet. But Hyder, as usual, receiving early intelligence of this attempt, ordered the convoy to return to one of his posts.— In the mean time, as our affairs had now begun to wear a pleasing aspect, the army, without departing from that vigilance and military discipline which became their situation, enjoyed a grateful and salutary relaxation after their toils, in the delightful vale in which they were encamped, and Sir Eyre Coote

Coote liberally entertained his officers at a plentiful and festive board. But, on the 23d, having received the news of Colonel Owen's disappointment and retreat, as soon as matters could be arranged after being so long in a fixed camp, they descended from the Polygar country, crossed the plain of Paliput, and joined the detachment under Colonel Owen at the village of Mydowad-dee.

A few days previous to the 23d, a company of European grenadiers commanded by Captain Moore, together with two twelve-pounders and some petards, joined Colonel Owen for the declared purpose of storming the fort of Chittore. Hyder, not waiting for Owen's march to Chittore, formed the design of cutting him off, by coming between his camp and the pass to which it was near. For this end, soon after it was dark, in the night of the 22d, he began his march from Lalpet, and, notwithstanding the delays that usually attend a nocturnal movement, he had gained in his progress four hours of day-light before Colonel Owen

1731. received any intelligence of his secret expedition. The Colonel, who had encamped only two miles westward of the pass, fortunately arrived, by a rapid march, before the enemy. As the detachment began to defile, Hyder's cannon-shot fell among them with great execution. The confusion into which this threw the battalion in the rear, encouraged a body of horse to rush upon them at full gallop. The battalion was quickly dispersed, and Captain Walker, who commanded it, was killed. The fall of this excellent officer and amiable man, on whom the according voice of all who knew him had bestowed the epithet of *honest*, was exceedingly lamented, and drew not a little odium and reproach upon his battalion, to whose irresolution it was generally ascribed. The Sepoys seeing this battalion, which had hitherto been esteemed one of the best in the service, thus driven before the enemy, lost all regard to the word of command, and fell into disorder and consternation.—What saved the detachment from entire destruction, was, Captain's Moore's company of Europeans, who at this critical moment wheeled

wheeled rapidly to the rear, and poured a 1781.
volley of shot among the enemy, pressing
in crowds round a field-piece which our
Sepoys had deserted. By this spirited action
the gun was recovered, the party that crouched
around it dispersed, the rapidity of the
pursuit checked, and the Sepoys, recovered
from their panic, reunited to the effective
force of our little army. Captain
Moore still kept in the rear, which enabled
Colonel Owen to make good his retreat with
discipline, and without further risk of destruction.
Intelligence being received of the approach
of the army, the detachment halted, and
Hyder, rightly conjecturing, if not particularly
informed of what had happened, withdrew the
pursuit, and returned to his camp at Lalpet.
In this expedition seven officers, and about
three hundred men, were killed or wounded.
Colonel Owen, with all his camp equipage,
lost his private baggage: but this was paid
for by government, at the particular desire
of the Commander in Chief.

The

1781. The General, on the 26th October, removed his camp to Paliput, whither a detachment returned on the 30th, that had carried the sick and wounded to Tripaffore. This party fell in by accident with seven hundred bullocks laden with salt, which afforded a seasonable supply to our troops. These bullocks were the rear of a convoy of five thousand destined for Hyder's camp: a due degree of information would have enabled our men to make an easy acquisition of the whole.

These immaterial circumstances are introduced here as prefatory to an important observation made by every gentleman in the army that served in the war against Hyder-Ally-Cawn, and Tippoo Saib, whether on the coast of Malabar or the Carnatic.—A battalion was never detached from our army but Hyder had the earliest notice of it: of Hyder's most capital movements we had not the smallest intelligence.—Hyder, it is well known, paid liberally for information; and it is as well known, that a most sparing hand dealt out the money that was paid for ours.

ours. The natives of the Carnatic, though 1781.
by nature pusillanimous, will undergo great
hazards for the sake of gain : but the mean-
est hireling will not incur the risk of tor-
ments and death for *five pagodas* : yet secret-
service money was charged to government
to a large amount.—Surmises fell on some
agents ; but none on the General.

About the 1st of November, at some dis-
tance from the English camp near the village
of Paliput, a valuable quantity of rice was
found, and sufficient for the supply of the garri-
son of Vellore, which from the want of that
necessary article was at this time in the great-
est distress. In conveying the rice to that
place, our army met not with the least mo-
lestation : not that our movements escaped
the usual vigilance of Hyder, but because
he was not able, at this juncture, to bring
his numerous and ill-regulated body, go-
verned not by discipline, but in a great mea-
sure by circumstances of superstition and
currents of passion, to meet our men in the
field of battle. This supply, therefore,
notwithstanding the reports industriously
spread

1781. spread by the enemy, of stations occupied for cutting it off, was safely conveyed to Vellore: and, on the 7th, the army sat down before Chittore, which, after a siege of two days, when our troops were in readiness to storm it, proposed, on the 10th, terms of capitulation. The Keeladar, having fortified himself with bang, came out, with a few attendants, carrying a flag of truce, and boldly declared, that he would defend Chittore to the last extremity, unless the garrison should be permitted to go where they pleased, and to carry off all their private property. His conditions were granted, and the fort was given up. The senior engineer of our army, Captain Tippet, was killed by a random ball from a match-lock piece; but the firing from two very bad guns did not the smallest hurt to any of our officers or soldiers. From the forts of Charangooly, Tripassore, and Chittore, being without artillery, we may suppose that Hyder never considered them as tenable. The garrisons held on the frontier were in a far different state of defence.

At this time the heavens threatened every instant the fall of the Monsoon floods : yet still the army continued to lie before Chittore, from the reduction of which they had not derived one advantage. They became straitened for want of rice to feed the Sepoys, and began to feel the distresses of forces checked in their views, and cut off from their supplies. The General, who no doubt had his reasons for continuing before Chittore, was disappointed in some expectation, not publicly revealed, and manifested unequivocal symptoms of chagrin and discontent.

But, upon the 15th of November, Sir Eyre Coote was called from this scene of inaction, and apparent suspense, by a letter received from Captain Temple, the officer left at Paliput, informing him that Hyder in person had fallen on his post unexpectedly, that he himself and his Sepoys had found protection in the hills, but that the baggage and guns had become the property of the enemy. Orders were now given for the army to march next morning from Chittore,

1781. Chittore, in which Captain Lamotte was left with two field-pieces and a battalion of Sepoys. When the General began to move from this place, on the 16th, Mahommed Ally, one of Hyder's auxiliary chiefs, made a shew of cavalry, as if he meant to dispute the passage of the English over the river Ponce, but retreated before a few cannon balls. The army soon after this encamped at the pass of Delamampetta, through which they descended on the 17th of November, and halted at Paliput. Here they were joined by Captain Temple's battalion, and the General was informed that it had been determined by Hyder, that Tippoo should march through the Pollams, stop at Pollore, and, with the guns he should take there added to those of which he had become master at Paliput, advance to the siege of Tripasfore.

A heavy cannonade, heard in the English camp, within a few hours, confirmed this intelligence, and summoned, in all the terrific pomp of war, the English army, to the relief of their friends in distress.

On

On the 19th, they had no sooner set out 1781.
in their march to Tripassore, than the
clouds broke, and those rains descended,
which, in the fall of the year, pouring from
the perpendicular sides of extensive moun-
tains, render the rivers impassable in the
short space of two days. The General, ur-
ged by the gathering floods, with the beds
of three rivers on the rout that lay before
him, continued his march without interrup-
tion till ten o'clock at night, when the
van was ordered to halt: but the rear did
not come up till one o'clock on the next
day. The roads were already so much
deepened by the rains, that an elephant,
three camels, and a number of horses, with
many carriages and bullocks, stuck fast in
the mud, and were left behind our men on
their march. The last branch of the Polaar
was found just fordable when they crossed it
on the 21st. On the evening of that day
the army encamped near Tripassore, with
no more than two days provisions. Tippoo
Saib, although he had made a breach in one
of the sides of the forts, had withdrawn his
forces: a circumstance which seemed to jus-
tify

1781. tify the opinion of the commanding officer, that Tippoo did not act with a view to obtain possession of Tripassore, and that the attack on this place was a plan of Hyder's for drawing the English from the Pollams. It happened fortunately for our army, whatever were the stratagems of the enemy, that the cannonade against Tripassore hastened their steps as they returned from those hilly regions.

Sir Eyre Coote, November 23d, altered the position of the troops by encamping on the Coccalore plain above Tripassore. The army, having lost one third of the strength it possessed when it marched, in August, from the Mount, occupied, on the 3d of December, the cantonments from which it had been drawn together on the same month of the preceding year. This campaign abounds with incidents more interesting in their nature, as they lead to general conclusions, than important in their immediate and particular effects. It was not marked by any event that promised to decide the general issue of the war, but it shewed
Europeans

Europeans the means by which they may 1781.
be successfully opposed by Asiatic enemies.

While our army lay encamped on the plain of Coccalore, a royal salute was fired on account of the reduction of the Dutch garrison of Negapatnam, by the combined forces of the navy under Sir Edward Hughes, and the army stationed in Tanjore, the command of which had been given to Major-General Sir Hector Monro. The garrison, in this place, had been reinforced by a large detachment of Hyder-Ally's troops, and new works had been added, by French engineers, to the fortifications.—The garrison consisted of eight thousand men, but of these only five hundred were Europeans. On the 21st of October, the Company's troops appeared at Nagore.—The same day, the whole corps of marines, amounting to four hundred and forty-three, officers included, landed, and joined the Company's troops; and, on the 22d, a battalion of seamen from the squadron, consisting of eight hundred and twenty-seven, including officers, was also landed: the whole

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1781. under the command of the Captains Mackenzie, Mackay, and Reynolds, with orders to co-operate with Sir Hector Monro to the utmost, in all measures for the reduction of Negapatnam. In the mean time, battering cannon for the attack, consisting of four eighteen-pounders, and two twelve-pounders, iron guns from the transports, with twelve eighteen-pounders from the ships of the squadron, two mortars with their carriages, and a suitable quantity of amunition of all kinds, were landed through a great surf by the boats of the squadron, and on rafts, or catamarans, made for that purpose, with incredible fatigue to the men, but at the same time with incredible speed and alacrity.

The strong lines which the enemy had thrown up, flanked by redoubts, to cover and defend the approach to the town, being stormed, and carried by our troops, the General opened ground against the north face of the fort on the 3d of November, and the approaches were carried on with great rapidity. On the 5th Sir Edward Hughes moved

moved with a part of the squadron nearer 1781. to the fort, on the flank of the British lines, and on the 6th, early in the morning, he came on shore, to concert with the General the best means of carrying on the siege with vigour. A battery of ten eighteen-pounders, within three hundred paces of the walls of the place being ready to open, a joint summons was sent from the General and Admiral to the Dutch Governor, requiring him to capitulate, which he refused to do in positive terms. But a most formidable breach-battery having played on a bastion with great effect, the Dutch Governor, who, during the course of the siege had made two desperate sallies, with the greater part of the garrison, early in the morning of the 11th demanded a parley, and sent out two commissioners to the General in camp, with terms of honourable capitulation, which were granted.

The Admiral, after experiencing all the vicissitudes of a monsoon, and receiving on board his squadron a detachment of the Company's land forces, consisting of an

1781. officer and thirty European and native artillery, and about five hundred volunteer Sepoys, under a captain and five subalterns, sailed from the road of Negapatnam, on the
1782. 2d of January, and arrived in Trincomalè Bay, in the island of Ceylon, on the 4th, where he found an English ship of war, under the command of Captain Montague, that had been stationed, by the foresight and activity of Government, ever since the month of August, 1781, for the purpose of blocking up the Dutch ships in the harbour. Our troops were landed on the 5th, and, on the night of that day, Trincomalè fort was taken without resistance. The grenadier company of marines, with the guns, rushed into it through the gateway, while the Governor was drawing up terms of capitulation. In this fortress, which commanded the only place where provisions and stores could be landed from the ships, ten iron guns were found of different calibres : and three officers with forty men were made prisoners.

The Admiral now directed his force against Fort Ostenburgh, situated on the top of an high hill which commanded the harbour, and containing all that remained of the strength of the enemy. After an interchange of several polite and friendly letters, between Sir Edward Hughes and Van Albert Homoed the Governor, who had lived on the footing of intimate acquaintance and personal attachment, Ostenburgh was taken by assault, about day-light, in the morning of January 11th. The assailants had the misfortune of losing Lieutenant George Long, second lieutenant to the Admiral, who was killed as he bravely advanced to the assault at the head of his company, and also twenty non-commissioned and private seamen and marines. Lieutenant Wolfely, who commanded a company of seamen, Lieutenant Samuel Orr, who commanded the grenadier company of marines, and did duty as a Brigade-Major, and forty non-commissioned and private seamen and marines were wounded. The enemy lost but few men, as they soon, for the most part, threw down their arms; and their lives,

1782. though forfeited by the laws of war, were spared by the clemency of the conqueror.— The Governor with the garrison, consisting of about four hundred Europeans, including officers, were taken prisoners.

By these successes, easily obtained, the Dutch were driven entirely from the coast of Coromandel, an avenue was opened to the reduction of their settlements in Ceylon, and a door was opened into the heart of Tanjore, which spread the terror of the English name throughout that and the adjacent countries. Hyder-Ally's troops evacuated all the forts and strong-ports they held in Manjore; and the Polygars in the Marawa and Tinavelly provinces, who, at the instigation of Hyder, had rebelled against the Nabob of the Carnatic, and taken part against us, returned to their obedience.

The reduction of the Dutch forts was a measure that originated with Lord Macartney, who succeeded to the inglorious Mr. Whitehill in the government of Madras, and

and who first brought the news of a Dutch 1782.
war, in June 1781, to India.

While the English fleet was employed in making and securing the easy acquisitions above described, the movements of our land armies in the Carnatic and in Tanjore were as follow.—Sir Eyre Coote, informed of the distress, marched to the relief of the garrison of Vellore: but, on the 5th, indisposition, arising not more from bodily fatigue and the cares of war, than from the vexatious disputes in which he found himself involved with the new Governor of Madras, was obliged to halt at Tripassore. The General's declining frame, on this anxious day, was threatened with instant dissolution, and his life was despaired of for several hours. On the 6th, however, his strength was so far restored, as to admit of being borne in his palanquin. The army rejoiced at his ^{re}covery, resumed their march, and encamped at a village called Edinburg, which, from its sameness with the name of the capital of Scotland, affected the 73d

1782. regiment with a lively and tender recollection of their native country.

Nothing material passed till the 10th, when the army, now in the sight of Vellore, with the convoy to the right under the hills, dragging their artillery through a deep morass, which Hyder had thrown in their way by breaking down the banks of a tank, were struck with the appearance of the enemy's line, which to the eye appeared to be regular, shooting towards their rear and baggage. But happily our army had crossed the morass before they came up. A distant cannonade now commenced, which lasted above six hours, and by which we had three subaltern officers and sixty-nine soldiers killed, or lost to the service by heavy cannon-shot wounds. The convoy was safely lodged in Vellore on the 11th, and on the 13th, the army coming up to the same morass, in their return, found Hyder prepared on the other side to dispute their passage. A distant cannonade took place between the two armies, by which the English lost Captain Lucas of the artillery, and
nearly

nearly the same number of men that fell by 1782. the firing of the 10th. Hyder fell back, and our men pursued their march.

Upon the 15th, the army, after a long march, encamped near Tritani Pagoda, from whence the enemy's camp was seen at a distance, fronting ours. On the 16th, the General moved the army about two miles nearer the enemy, who also, on their part, drew somewhat nearer to our troops. Various manœuvres were practised on both sides. Sir Eyre Coote challenged Hyder-Ally to try the fortune of a battle on ground approved by the English; and Hyder, in his turn, challenged Sir Eyre Coote to come on and measure the strength of the English with his, on ground which he had chosen. After a mutual discharge of artillery, the armies parted, and pitched their tents.

The English General, having returned to the Mount, applied himself to the construction of magazines, one at Chingliput and one at Tripassore; a measure which, could it have been carried into execution sooner, would

1782. would have softened the inconveniencies, given system to the marches, and advantage and effect to the victories gained by the army. The continuance of our troops in this station was prolonged by the unhappy differences between Sir Eyre Coote and Lord Macartney, which made it necessary for the General to solicit from the Supreme Council of Bengal the restoration of his authority over the southern army, that he might be able to direct the co-operation of the whole force under his command, in such a manner as might facilitate his own, and counteract the movements of the enemy.

With the inaction of our main army at this time, however necessary in some respects, we are to connect, perhaps, in the relation of cause and effect, the overthrow of our southern army in Tanjore, under Colonel Braithwaite, and the re-capture of conquests made from Hyder-Ally on the coast of Malabar.

The troops under the command of Colonel Braithwaite, destined for the protection

tion of Tanjore and the neighbouring provinces, consisted of twenty-five European and one hundred and thirteen native artillery, ten field-pieces, one howitzer, one hundred and forty-two native cavalry mounted, and the same number dismounted, one hundred and nineteen light infantry, with twenty-three artillery attached to the cavalry, the tenth battalion, and eight companies of the thirteenth battalion of Sepoys, two grenadier companies of the sixteenth battalion, and six grenadier companies of Sepoys.— This force, amounting to about two thousand and thirteen men, infantry and cavalry, lay in camp on the banks of the Coleroon, at the distance of forty miles from Tanjore. Colonel Braithwaite, situated in an open plain, was evidently exposed to the enemy's cavalry ; though apparently secured from any sudden attack, by several large and deep rivers which lay between him and Hyder-Ally, who was at a considerable distance.— But Hyder, apprized of these circumstances, determined to cut off this detachment, as he had done that under Colonel Baillie.

Tippoo -

1782. Tippoo Saib, accompanied by Monsieur Lally with four hundred French infantry, marched on this enterprize, at the head of twenty thousand troops of his own, one half of which was cavalry. With this formidable army, and twenty pieces of cannon, he suddenly surrounded the English, unprepared and unable to resist him. Colonel Braithwaite, on the approach of Tippoo, endeavoured to march off to Tanjore, or some other place of safety. Superior numbers on the side of the enemy rendered this impossible, and brought on an action, which was continued from the 16th to the 18th day of February. For the space of twenty-six hours, an unremitted fire of cannon and small arms was supported on both sides. The English commander, attacked in every quarter, that he might present a front every way to the enemy, threw his detachment into an hollow square, with his field-pieces interspersed in its faces, and his small body of cavalry in the centre. The Colonel, though wounded and bleeding, would not withdraw from the scene of action for a moment : but encouraged the efforts of his
intrepid

intrepid little army, by looks, voice, and 1782.
action. A violent cannonade on all sides
was expected to make a breach in our lines,
in some quarter of the square in which our
troops were formed or other. Tippoo
watched every appearance that might en-
courage an irruption of his cavalry, and
wherever he judged that his fire arms had
made an impression, he led them on by ex-
amples, by promises, by threats, by stripes,
and fugitives slain with his own hands.—
They advanced repeatedly to the charge,
but were as often repelled by showers of
grape-shot, and that of musketry. The
moment they were driven back, the British
cavalry rushing forwards from the centre
of the square, through openings made by
our well-disciplined troops for that purpose,
pursued them with heavy and unresisted exe-
cution to a proper distance, and then return-
ed to their proper stations. But, at last,
when great numbers of our men had fallen,
and those who remained were worn down
with wounds and fatigue, Monsieur Lally,
at the head of his four hundred Europeans,
with fixed bayonets, supported by several
battalions

1782. battalions of infantry, and flanked by prodigious numbers of cavalry, marched with steady resolution to attack that side of the square which had been most exposed, and suffered most in the action. Our exhausted Sepoys, unable to repulse the onset of such a body of Europeans coming fresh into action, daring from the vast army that supported them, and confident of success, were instantly thrown into confusion. The enemy's cavalry rushed in amongst our disordered troops. A dreadful carnage ensued; nor would one have remained of this unfortunate body of men to report the fate of his friends, if the humanity of an European officer had not been opposed to the barbarous fury of Asiatic conquerors. Monsieur Lally lost not a moment in putting a stop to the effusion of blood. The French troops readily obeyed his orders. But it was not till the sword of the Commander was dyed with the blood of five individuals, among his native troops, that they ceased to indulge their savage fury.

It is remarkable, that notwithstanding 1782.
the length of this engagement, and the
slaughter that followed, of upwards of
twenty officers, one only was killed, and
only eleven wounded. Tippoo Saib treated
his prisoners, especially the officers and the
wounded men, with great humanity: nor
was aught omitted, within the compass of
his power, that might alleviate their dis-
tresses. But a particular account of all these
things is added in the sequel of these Military
Memoirs.

The efforts of the Governor-General
and Council, and the personal exertions
of Sir Eyre Coote, stemmed the torrent
of invasion: but, without new channels
for its reception, were unable to divert
it. Hyder-Ally, notwithstanding that in
every encounter our main army kept the
field, and marched and countermarched
whithersoever the relief of the distressed or
the hope of advantage and decisive engage-
ment called them, by the possession of
many strong holds, and the devastation of
the open country, had established himself so
firmly

1781. firmly in the Carnatic, that every exertion on our part, to drive him out from that quarter, was evidently beyond our strength and impracticable. To attack Hyder's dominions from the coast of Malabar, which had before been a collaterel, became, now, a primary object of political consideration: for this was the only measure that could deliver our possessions on the Coromandel coast from their dangerous invader.

What was now confirmed by experience, the sagacity of government had suspected. The first idea, accordingly, which occurred to the Governor-General, after sending a supply of men and treasure to Madras, was, to make a diversion in favour of our operations on the eastern, by an attack on Hyder on the western coast of the peninsula of Hindostan. But this was inseparably connected with another object: peace with the Marrattas.— For this purpose, proposals for an accommodation with that nation, were transmitted, in October, 1780, to the administration of Poonah, in which we offered to relinquish every conquest, excepting Am-medabad

medabad and Gualior, the first of which 1781.
had been guarantied to Futty Sing, and the
second to the Ranah of Gohud, upon con-
ditions that the Marrattas should unite with
us in an offensive alliance against Hyder-
Ally, of whose possessions a conquest was
to be made, and equal division. Some sti-
pulations, sufficiently favourable, were pro-
posed respecting Roganaut-Row. The Ra-
jah of Berar's offer of mediation and gua-
rantee on this occasion was accepted, him-
self permitted to become a party, and the
treaty of course transmitted to him through
the Marratta minister.

It was stipulated, among the preliminary
articles of peace, sent at this time to Poo-
nah, that the Commander in Chief of the
English army should immediately suspend
all hostilities and military operations against
the Marrattas, whenever he should receive
a requisition to that effect from the Paishwa;
and that similar orders should be given, on
his part, to the officer commanding the
Marratta armies. Copies of the proposed
treaty were sent to the Select Committee of

1781. Bombay, and to General Goddard. To the General formal orders were also sent for a cessation of arms whenever the Marratta minister should require it : but, until a suspension of hostilities should be required, he was directed to prosecute the war with the utmost vigour.

Three months having elapsed from the date of the treaty, and no notification received from the Paishwa, either of its arrival, or of any resolution to which he had come after taking it into consideration, our military operations were continued with unremitted ardour, and, in the middle of January, 1781, the whole of the army assembled at Virrabuy, a place about twenty miles inland from Bassein, which is accounted among the Hindoos a place of great sanctity, and also held in high reputation for its hot-wells, which are said to have great medicinal virtues. From this post it was determined to advance to Poonah, the seat of the Marratta Government.

There

There is a chain of high hills, rising almost perpendicularly from the plains below, which extends itself from north to south, along the Malabar coast, from Guzzarat to Cape Comorin, though indenting the land at different distances from the ocean. Between the Gauts or Passes that lead through this range of mountains into the country of the Marrattas to the east, which from its great elevation is stiled the Bala Gaut, and bounded by the sea, on the west lies a tract of country of considerable extent, called the Concan. In this country, and at the foot of the hills and Gauts that form its eastern boundary, there was a Marratta army, consisting of at least twenty thousand horse and foot, with about fifteen pieces of artillery. These were posted on the road to Bore Gaut, one of the most easy and practicable passes, and where the enemy expected that we meant to make our ascent into their country, as it had been made choice of for the same end by the government of Bombay on a former occasion, and was in fact the nearest, and most convenient route to the Marratta capital, which is not at a

Q 2

greater

1781. greater distance from this pass than five and forty miles. The Marrattas, notwithstanding their numbers, opposed not any thing to the progress of our troops, excepting a few slight skirmishes, in which they always suffered defeat and disadvantage. But when our troops reached Campoley, on the 8th of February, at the entrance of the Bore Gaut, they were informed that the enemy had previously ascended this pass, and that there was reason to apprehend that they had come to a resolution of disputing it obstinately. Certain intelligence was brought, that about forty thousand infantry, with a suitable train of artillery, had taken post at the top of it, and that the whole Marratta army, lately reinforced by fifteen thousand men under Holkar, and about half that number under another chief called Roganaut Pundit, was encamped at no great distance.

General Goddard, considering that delay would not only increase the confidence of the enemy but afford them an opportunity of constructing new works, which would render the pass every day more difficult and hazardous,

hazardous, resolved to seize it that very 1781. night by storm. The grenadiers, under the command of Colonel Parker, entered into the foot of the Pass at midnight, and by steep and rugged paths, through narrow and winding defiles, ascended to its very summit, drove them from Condolah, and thus completely subdued all that could now obstruct their progress to the place of their destination. The terroure of the enemy, at the near approach of our army to their capital, was so great, that they entirely burnt and destroyed Tullicanoon, a very considerable town, about half way, and had actually made every preparation for setting fire to Poonah, by filling the houses with straw, and removing the inhabitants with their effects to the neighbourhood of Setterah.

This circumstance being known, with many other considerations, prevented our army from advancing to the capital, and confined the remaining operations of the campaign to a defence of the conquests already made. As our whole force did not exceed six thousand men, while that of the

1781. enemy was not less than eight times that number, it was impossible to make any division of their force, or even to leave a detachment sufficiently strong to defend the post at Bore Gaut, if they should advance beyond it : unassisted by cavalry, they could not hope to command provisions, or even to procure forage, in a country desolated and ruined : and this circumstance would have obliged them to carry along with them a very ample supply of grain, which, of course, would have greatly encumbered and endangered their march.

It is further to be observed, that an invasion of the Deccan, where there was not any hope of their being joined by any party of the Marratta state, promised not any event that could materially influence the state of the war, and far less decide its termination. Without any determinate object to be attained, or the hope of a revolution to encourage their continuance, for any length of time, in the country, all that they would have acquired, would have been the empty glory of possessing for a few days, the Marratta capital,

tal, in effecting a retreat from which they 1781.
must have incurred the most imminent dangers.

It had uniformly been the decided opinion of the Governor-General and Council of Bengal, that nothing but a vigorous prosecution of the war against the Marrattas could bring either that, or the general war in which we were engaged in India, to an honourable issue. Yet, in repeated letters from the coast of Coromandel, the most pointed and urgent representations were continually made of the necessity of making a powerful diversion in favour of our army in the Carnatic. In these letters the disadvantages which that measure would relieve, and the farther losses which it would obviate, were painted in lively and alarming colours, without any consideration of the actual state of Bombay, or of the certain ruin with which that Presidency, if the force necessary for its security should be detached on a remote and seperate service, would be menaced by the Marrattas.

1781. In these embarrassing circumstances, the Government of Bombay, in concert with General Goddard, strained every nerve to afford relief to that of Madras, without leaving themselves entirely defenceless.— But the utmost exertion that could be made on the western side of India, at a time when they were engaged in a war with the whole Marratta empire, was, to relieve the Madras troops at Tellicherry, by an equal proportion from Bombay, and to send the former round to the coast of Coromandel. General Goddard, in order to carry this expedient into execution, descended the Bore Gaut, and marched towards the sea coast. This movement was concerted with such secrecy and skill, that the whole of the artillery and heavy stores reached the foot of the pass in safety, and without the smallest interruption from the enemy, who were astonished, on the morning of the 18th April, to find, that our post at Condolah had been deserted during the preceding night.

The country through which the army was to pass, in their march to the sea-coast, was

was well calculated to resist any impression 1781.
from horse, being exceedingly full of thick
bushes and jungles, with broken ground and
narrow defiles, where it would be impossi-
ble, except in a very few places, for cavalry
to act in a body. Yet was not this strong
ground the less dangerous to our troops.—
They were secured by discipline, valour,
and confidence arising from invariable suc-
cess against the most furious charge that
could be made by Marratta horse: but they
were exposed to the attacks of infantry, that
might be lodged, in separate parties, in hol-
low ways, behind rocks and bushes, and in
other places of concealment.

It was accordingly this very mode of at-
tack that was adopted by the enemy, who,
to the number of fifty thousand men, ten
thousand of which were infantry, and most-
ly Scindies and Arabs, the bravest troops
unacquainted with European discipline in
Hindoostan, fell down into the Concan, un-
der the command of their principal chiefs,
Hurry Punt, Furkea, Buriss Rambow, and
Tuckajee Holkar. The distance from the
sea

1781. sea to the foot of the Gauts was about twenty-four miles, and during the whole march of the English army, which lasted three days, the enemy exerted their utmost efforts to harass and annoy their line, without any other effect than killing and wounding a few of their camp-followers and private foldiers. But, while they were unable to obtain the smallest advantage over our troops, or even to seize any part of the great quantity of necessary stores that attended them, the number that fell, during a conflict that continued for three days, by the well-directed fire of our men, on their part, was very considerable.

In this action, the last of any consequence that took place between the Mar rattas and the English, Colonel Parker, the second in command, gallantly lost his life.

While the army were disposed in winter quarters, General Goddard, notwithstanding the tempestuous weather, which renders the navigation

navigation on the coast of Malabar, at that season, extremely dangerous and almost impracticable, sailed for Surat, where he arrived on the second of August. Soon after his arrival, he effected an interview with Fatty Sing and obtained from that chief a body of five thousand horse for the service of the ensuing campaign, which exceeded by two thousand the number he was obliged to furnish by treaty. This important object being accomplished, and such military arrangements being made as were not only necessary for the protection of Guzzarat, but for co-operating with the Bengal detachment stationed on the northern confines of Malva, the General returned to Bombay.

Immediately after the return of the enemy from the Gauts, the greater part of the Madras detachment, relieved by troops from Bombay, agreeably to the resolution above mentioned, was sent round from Tellicherry to the coast of Coromandel. Tellicherry is a valuable settlement upon the coast of Malabar, dependant on the

1781. the Presidency of Bombay. It has a good road for shipping; and here the coasting vessels between Bombay and the coast of Coromandel are supplied with refreshments. A brisk commerce has been carried on at this place, particularly in the pepper trade, ever since the first discovery of India by Europeans. After the capture of Maheé from the French, it was garrisoned by the Madras detachment, who defended it against the attacks of the Nairs, tributary to Hyder-Ally.

On the 9th of May 1781, Major William Abington arrived at Tellicherry, with a relief to the Garrison, consisting of a detachment of artillery, one company of infantry, and the 10th and 11th battalions of Sepoys. After landing his troops, which were immediately sent to relieve the Madras Europeans and Sepoys in various parts of the lines, his first care was to visit and inspect the fortifications. These were of great extent, reaching from Moylan to Codoley and nearly five miles in circumference. They had of late been

been much neglected, on a supposition that 1781.
the settlement was to have been withdrawn,
and, in many places, they exhibited the appearance of deformed and defenceless ruins. These circumstances, joined to the situation of the enemy, suggested to the Major the idea of making an attack, instead of pursuing defensive operations; but that design not being approved of by the Madras commander, was dropt. On the 15th, Major Cotgrave embarked with the Madras troops, and left the garrison to the charge of Major Abington.

A trust of such difficulty was not to be discharged successfully by common genius, nor confined experience in the art of war. Lines of vast extent, and ruinous condition, were to be repaired and defended by a small number of troops; while they were continually assailed by an enormous army of subtle, fierce, and obstinate barbarians. The reparation of the works became the grand object of the Major's attention, and so constantly and assiduously were the engineers employed, that in a few days a small
battery

1781. battery was opened with considerable effect. The most judicious orders were, at the same time, issued to the outposts and centinels, to prevent the danger of a sudden attack.

A hircarrah sent out in quest of intelligence, returned with an account, that the enemy's force altogether exceeded not twelve thousand; that Surdar Cawn, their leader, had lately received some letters respecting Hyder-Ally, which seemed to affect his spirits; but that, notwithstanding his visible dejection, he still continued to assure his officers and men of his fixt intention never to quit the place till he had taken Tellicherry. Two days after, accounts arrived of this formidable chief's being killed by a cannon shot, as he was reconnoitering the lines.

The fortifications still continued to be repaired, improved, and extended; not, however, without frequent interruption and annoyance from the enemy. The system of defence was not embraced by Major Abington from choice, but necessity. He
might,

might, indeed, have made sallies, and dis- 1781.
lodged the enemy from some of their posts;
but he saw the absurdity of taking posts
which he wanted troops to defend, while
he could not spare a single man from duty
to act as a reserve. For three whole months
the lines remained unbroken, the enemy
were detected and counteracted in every
stratagem, and in every attack repulsed with
loss.

Early in the morning of the 24th of Au-
gust, they made a vigorous assault upon the
lines between Wood's post and the Green
Redoubt, and, owing to the negligence of
the auxiliaries, about three hundred rushed
within our out-works. The Moplas gave
way at first, but, observing that the Sepoys
preserved their wonted spirit and bravery,
they suffered themselves to be rallied, and re-
turning to the attack, made dreadful havock
among the assailants. Twenty of them
were killed within the lines, above sixty
lay between the ditch and abattie, and great
numbers all along the field. Had the morn-
ing been clear, their loss must have been
far

1781. far more considerable. On the part of the garrison, the loss was only five wounded.

On the 6th of the following month, another attempt was made, by three parties of a thousand each, at different places. They advanced under cover of a very thick fog, got in by one of the posts defended by the irregulars, and took post at Wood's Redoubt with two stand of colours. They were very soon dislodged by the Sepoys, sixteen being killed on the platform and the rock below, and above thirty driven into the sea. Indeed their loss was not exactly known, the same fog which favoured their approach enabling them to carry off their dead unobserved.

Notwithstanding these successes, the situation of Major Abington and his garrison was very distressful. His dispatches which he had sent to Bombay, requesting supplies of men and military stores, had been lost at sea. A heavy and almost continual cannonade from the besiegers, together with excessive fatigue, daily lessened the number of his effective men, and those that remained
were

were harassed with the double duty of soldiers and labourers. For the enemy had run several mines within a yard of the works, and some even under the lines and counter-scarp of the ditch at Fort Moylan, to discover and destroy which, required unceasing toil. The engineers were indeed very successful in counteracting these subterraneous approaches, and thereby so disconcerted the besiegers, that, concluding their measures to be betrayed by their Captain of Pioneers, they cut off his nose and ears *: but such advantages were frequently rendered imperfect and abortive by the scarcity of ammunition. The report of Surdar Cawn's death, too, was discovered to be false. He had been wounded, but was recovered, and had again taken the field.

On the 13th of November, in the evening, a Niar entered at Fort Moylan, with two human heads in a basket, in such a state of putridity as not to be approached. They

* A barbarous and shocking punishment, of ancient standing in the east, as appears from the affair of Zopirus.

1782. belonged, he said, to the Zamorin and his minister; and he gave this account of the lamentable fate of that unfortunate prince. About twelve days before, he had left his brothers at Toour, to go to Manjeree, a village situated five leagues above Calicut, designing to collect his share of the harvest; a practice which, though not publicly authorized by Hyder's government, had for some years been connived at, but always disputed by the people, particularly the Moplas. The prince brought with him only an hundred of his own Niars, but, in his way to Manjeree, he was joined by several more, for the sake of plunder. A number of these had swords and targets, some had lances, and others muskets; but all were ill provided of ammunition, not having more than two or three rounds each. They arrived at Mangeree and collected some grain. In the mean time, about eight hundred Moplas secretly assembled, and in the night, surrounding the place where the Prince and his party lay, surprized them the next morning in such confusion, that few had time to make any resistance. Every one
consult-

consulting his own safety, the Prince was 1781.
soon deserted by all his people; and, thinking to conceal himself from the Moplas till an opportunity offered of making his escape, he jumped into a deep pit overgrown with bushes. Of the prince's party, twenty, with his minister were killed, and three taken prisoners, of whom this Niar was one. Those who escaped rallied, and made some attempts to rescue the prince, or carry off his body if he should be killed; but they were repulsed by the Moplas, who, after a long and fruitless search, threatened to kill their prisoners, unless they discovered the retreat of their master. One of them, hoping to save his own life, betrayed that of his prince, by pointing to the place where he was concealed.

The Moplas immediately shot him dead, dragged up his body, and having cut off his head, obliged the prisoners to carry it, together with that of his minister, to Calicut, from whence they were sent to Surdar Cawn. At this piteous spectacle, the savage chief was greatly pleased; but, to avoid

1781. the effluvia, he ordered them to be placed at a distance from him, and the prisoners to be unbound and released. The Cawn having soon after retired into his tent, and his guards being dispersed, it appeared not impossible to the faithful Niar to save his master's head from suffering greater indignities, and secure it a burial; he therefore watched his opportunity, took up the basket, and made his escape into the lines of Tellicherry.

The warm reception which the enemy had found in repeated attempts to storm the lines, had given them a disgust at that mode of attack, and they now confined themselves to distant cannonading, discharges of musketry, and running of mines in various directions. This last, by the great number of their working people, they were enabled to pursue with ease and expedition; so that, in spite of all the vigilance and assiduity of the garrison, frequent and formidable breaches were made in the lines; but to these the Sepoys of the enemy would never advance, though urged on by threats, stripes, even wounds.

In

In the midst of these efforts of gallant 1781.
perseverance, a letter arrived from the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay, declaring their utter inability to make any further provision for the maintenance of Tellicherry, and their reluctant purpose of withdrawing from the place; pointing out, likewise, what appeared to them the safest method of retreat, and the probable assistance which might be expected from the royal squadron. Instead of executing, instead even of publishing this absurd and cruel plan, Major Abington carefully concealed it, together with his own emotions of disgust and anxiety. Preserving still the appearance of security and intrepidity, he shewed the impossibility of performing their orders, without the most ruinous consequences. By arguments flowing from a benevolent heart, as well as a passion for military glory, he pointed out the miseries that must await the abandoned settlement, and the improbability of even escape to the troops. Alluding, probably, to the disasters of other places in similar situations, he declared himself unequal to the task of delivering brave men

1781. up to famine or poison ; and pathetically intreated to be released from a command, which exposed his honour to ruin, and his name to execration. He informed them, at the same time, that if he could be supplied with a small reinforcement of troops and warlike stores, he would answer for the safety of the place, and of the surrounding country.

His remonstrance had the desired effect. A packet soon arrived express from Bombay, with intelligence of the Committee's resolution of sending a force, consisting of two battalions of Sepoys and forty artillery, with four six-pounders, for the relief of the settlement. Elated by the prospect of such aid, the Major neglected no means of improving it. While he continued successfully his defensive operations, he formed an admirable plan for a grand sally and attack on Surdar Cawn's camp ; and dispatched proper instructions to the neighbouring potentates, in alliance with the Company, for regulating their co-operations. Of these, the King of Cotiote was chief, who, during the siege, had constantly signified his friendly intentions.

intentions. The Kings of Zamorin and Travancore were also addressed : but none of these took any active part in raising the siege. 1782

The reinforcements being all arrived, and every proper disposition made for the fall and attack, on the 8th of January, 1782, the army marched out of the line. The clock striking twelve in the fort, was the signal for getting under arms, and at one the march was begun in profound silence, no drum beating, nor other warning given. After passing a deep morass, and escaping the notice of two of the enemy's picquets, the army, about five o'clock, reached the new road leading to Putney Hill battery, and the grand camp. The front division had orders to attack the former, while the main body advanced to the latter : a manœuvre that divided the force of the enemy. Just at the dawn of day, the enemy's centinels challenged the advanced party. They were answered only by the bayonet. The alarm, however, very soon took place, but not before the assailants had reached the battery,

1782. where, by their rushing impetuously on, the place was carried in an instant, and the conquering colours displayed in triumph. After having formed the line, the main body rapidly advanced to the camp, and the enemy immediately fled in the utmost confusion, making several attempts to rally and form, which the impetuosity of the attack rendered ineffectual. They were pursued as far as Curchee, where Surdar Cawn, being wounded in the leg by a musquet ball, had taken shelter in a fortified house, scooped out of a solid rock, with a party of his best troops. This post he defended for near two hours, when, fire being communicated to it, the remains of his people endeavoured to escape through the flames, but were mostly killed or taken. After the flames had abated, Surdar Cawn with his family were brought out from the ruins, and sent to Tellicherry.

In the course of that day and the next following, all the enemy's posts surrendered in succession. The possessions of the victors now extended as far as Ajar to the north,

north, and Inilanda to the south. Of 1782, spoils they collected altogether one thousand two hundred French firelocks, four brass field-pieces, from fifty to sixty iron guns of various calibres, thirteen elephants, horses, &c. and a great quantity of powder, shot, shells, and other stores. Their loss exceeded not nine killed, and forty-nine wounded; while of the enemy five hundred were killed and drowned in Maheè river, a vast number wounded, and one thousand five hundred, including many of their principal officers, sent prisoners to Tellicherry.

The wound of Surdar Cawn was in his ankle. When taken, he expected immediate death, enquired why it was delayed, and regarded the humanity of the English in sparing him with astonishment. He desired to have his wives and children restored, which was done. He died soon after, of grief and agony of mind, rather than any consequence of his wound, desiring as the last favour that his family might be sent to Seringapatam. His request was punctually performed.

Major

1782. Major Abington's views were now turned towards the settlement and security of his conquests. Remaining encamped on the field of victory, his first care was to reinstate the several kings and princes, who had been forced, by the cruelties of Surdar Cawn, to conceal themselves and their families in woods and swamps, for near three years. The only prince on the Malabar coast who had escaped oppression and violence was the King of Travancore.—His means of defence were extraordinary and romantic. Around his capital, and chief province, he suffered the woods to grow for a number of years, till they formed an impenetrable belt of great depth. This, cut into labyrinths, afforded easy egress to his people, and rendered all attacks from without impracticable. Immured within this natural fortification, he encouraged the cultivation of the arts and sciences; he invited the approach of men of genius and knowledge; he cultivated the friendship of the Bramins, and was himself admitted into their society, by the ceremony of passing through a golden cow, which be-
came

came the property of the Bramins, the cow 1778. being sacred in India, as formerly in Egypt; and by preparing his own military stores, casting cannon, making gun-powder, &c. he rendered himself independent of foreign aid. The subjects of his remoter provinces, who, to avoid the ravages of war, had taken refuge within the woody circle, now returned with their families and effects, to their former habitations,

The kings of Cotiote and Cartinad, with the Nambiers of Invanard, were, on various conditions, restored to their sovereignties and possessions. To have seized on those countries, and annexed them to the other conquests of the Company, would have been partly unjust, and was in fact impossible.—The views of Major Abington, therefore, in restoring them, were solid and just; for they pointed to the establishment of peace on a permanent basis, by conciliating the minds of the princes and people, and securing their assistance on any future emergencies.

In

1782. In such transactions, and in demolishing the enemy's works, sending off their stores, and planting proper guards at the forts and passes of the mountains, the Major was employed till the 3d of February; when, having settled every thing in the best manner that circumstances would permit, he marched towards Callicut. Before that fort he arrived on the morning of the 12th, and took post within two hundred yards of the walls. Next day, he had the good fortune to blow up, by a shell, part of the grand magazine, which so totally exposed the garrison to an assault, that they immediately surrendered. Upwards of sixty iron guns, mounted, were found in the fort, with great quantities of military stores: several small and large vessels also, lying in different rivers with naval stores, fell into the hands of the conquerors.

Colonel Humberstone arriving soon after at Callicut, claimed the command of the army, as being senior officer to Major Abington.

The

The date of these transactions, with the 1782. inactivity of our army in the Carnatic, by which they were so materially affected, recalls our attention to the situation of affairs on the coast of Coromandel. Here we are presented with a more extended theatre, and with more complicated systems of military operation. The ocean, which divides the Indian nations from Britain and France, unites their arms: and while squadron after squadron from Europe brings fresh supplies of men and warlike stores to the numerous bands of Asia; fleets co-operate with armies in all the various attempts and stratagems of war, and bring forward into various and important action, the valour, the abilities, and the resources of the two greatest nations in the world.

A French armament, consisting of thirteen ships of the line, with a number of frigates and transports under the command of that great naval officer Monsieur Suffrein, appeared on the 9th of February off Pulicat. The English squadron, lying in the Road of Madras,

1782. Madras, whither they had repaired, after the reduction of Trincomaleè, for a supply of stores and provisions, consisted only of seven two deckers and one small frigate.

While Suffrein was standing off and on, for the purpose of procuring intelligence of the state of our affairs, Sir Edward Hughes was most fortunately joined by three large ships of war under the command of Commodore Almes. This critical junction took place on the 12th of February, and, on the 13th, Monsieur Suffrein hove in sight, reconnoitered Madras, and anchored a few miles to windward of Sir Edward. Upon the 14th, Suffrein passed Madras in line of battle to the southward. Towards the evening Sir Edward having received on board three hundred officers and men of the 98th regiment, weighed anchor, and stood after him. On the 15th, the fleets met, and a partial action commenced. Night parted them : and in the morning, the enemy's ships of war, to the number of twelve, of the line of battle, with a frigate, appeared
in

in view, bearing east of the English fleet, 1782. at the distance of four leagues, while sixteen sail of their frigates and transports, about the distance of three to the west, steered directly for Pondicherry. Our Admiral, on this, instantly made the signal for a general chase to the south-west, in order, if possible, to come up with the transports.—Six of the enemy's ships and vessels, accordingly, fell into our hands, five of which were English, taken to the northward of Madras: the sixth was the Lauriston, a transport, having on board many French officers, three hundred men of the regiment of Laufanne, and laden with all kinds of ammunition. This ship, which was as great an acquisition to us, as it was a loss to the enemy, was taken by Captain Lumley of the Isis. The other vessels, after the Frenchmen were taken out of them, were sent with their own crews to Negapatnam.

Monfieur Suffrein, having discovered the intention of Sir Edward Hughes to chase and take his transports, lost not a moment to

1782. to make all the sail after him that was in his power. By three o'clock in the afternoon four of his largest and best sailing ships came within a league of the sternmost of ours. The ships in chace, being scattered by the various courses of the ships they were chasing, the English Admiral made the signal for them to join him, which they all did, about seven o'clock in the evening of the 16th. Our fleet continued to stand to the south-east all that night under an easy sail. In the mean time, the enemy appeared still in sight, making many signals, and with crowded sails, bearing directly on our squadron through an hazy atmosphere, light winds, and frequent squalls.

At six in the morning of the 17th, the Admiral made the signal for our squadron to form the line of battle a head. At twenty-five minutes past eight, our line being formed with great difficulty, from frequent calms, the signal was made for the leading ship to make the same sail as the Admiral, and towards him, in the line a-head, that the fleet might, if possible weather the enemy, and engage them

might, if possible, weather the enemy, and 1782.
engage them closely. Meanwhile, the
French fleet, having the advantage of
squalls from the N. N. E. advanced on
our ships very fast: so that the Admiral
made the signal for our line to alter their
course two points to leeward, the enemy
then steering down on the rear of our line,
in an irregular double line a-breast. Sir
Edward Hughes, in order to draw the rear
of his line closer to the centre, and to pre-
vent the enemy from breaking in, and at-
tacking it when separated, at half past noon,
made the signal for our squadron to form
the line of battle a-breast. At three in the
afternoon, the enemy still pushing onward
to our rear in a double line a-breast, the
Admiral again altered his course in the line,
in order to draw his rear ships still closer to
the centre; and, at forty minutes after
three, finding it impossible to avoid the ene-
my's attack under all the disadvantages of
very little wind and a leeward station, he
made the signal to form at once into the
line of battle a-head. At four the Exeter,
the sternmost ship in our rear, when formed

1782. in line of battle a-head on the larbord tack, not being quite closed to her second a-head, three of the enemy's ships in the first line bore right down upon her, whilst four more of their second line, headed by Monsieur Suffrein himself in the *Hero*, moved along the outside of the first line to our centre. At five minutes past four, the enemy's three ships began their fire on the *Exeter*, which she and her second a-head returned.

The English Admiral now made the signal for battle. About twelve minutes past four the action became general from the rear of our fleet to the centre, which was formed by Sir Edward Hughes, on board the *Superbe*. The French Admiral, with the other ships of his second line, advanced as far as the *Superbe*, but no farther. Thus eight of the enemy's best ships were engaged in an attack on five of ours. Suffrein adopted this plan of action in consequence of the disadvantageous situation of our fleet, the van of which, consisting of the *Monmouth*, *Eagle*, *Burford*, and *Worcester*,

ter, could neither be brought into the en- 1782.
gagement without tacking on the enemy,
nor tack on the enemy for want of wind.
And, as our van was thus prevented from
closing with our centre and rear, so the five
ships of our centre and rear, then engaged
with the enemy, sorely pressed, and greatly
disabled in their masts, yards, sails, and
rigging, could not follow the other four,
without the utmost hazard of entire separa-
tion. But, at six in the afternoon, a squall
of wind from the south-east brought the van
of our line round, and a-head on the ene-
my to the north-east, when the engage-
ment was renewed by the starboard guns
of our other five ships, with great spirit and
alacrity. The approach of night parted
the two fleets: the French hauled their
wind and stood to north-east: the English
ailed with a favourable wind for Trincoma-
lè to repair the damages sustained in this
hot engagement.

In this action, Monsieur Suffrein display-
ed equal skill and gallantry, and Sir Ed-
ward Hughes sustained with singular bravery

1782. and address the disadvantages under which he laboured in a leeward position with regard to the enemy, and inferiority of force and number. The French fleet directed their fire principally against the *Superbe* and *Exeter*, both of which ships suffered greatly. Captain Reynold's of the *Exeter* was killed, and Captain Stevens of the *Superbe* died of his wounds.

The French squadron, when it left the islands, was commanded by Monsieur D'Orves: but on the death of that officer, which happened a few days after his arrival on the coast of India, the command devolved on Monsieur Suffrein. On their passage from the islands, they fell in with his Majesty's ship the *Hannibal*, which they took off the west coast of Sumatra. The *Hannibal* raised the number of their line of battle ships to twelve, against nine under the command of the English Admiral. Monsieur Suffrein came to anchor in the neighbourhood of Porto Novo, where, in consequence of the alliance between his nation and Hyder, he landed three thousand four hundred men: the

the first division of that force which, under 1782.
the command of the Marquis de Bussy, was
intended to subvert the English power in
India. The fort of Cuddalore, weakly
garrisoned, immediately became a place of
arms and of comfort to the French troops.
Sir Edward Hughes, having effected the ne-
cessary repairs, sailed from Trincomalee on
the 4th of March, and on the 12th arrived
at Madras.

Towards the end of March intelligence
arrived that Monsieur Suffrein had suddenly
slipped from Porto Novo, and put to sea.—
He had learned from a foreign vessel that
an English fleet was upon the coast, and it
became, of course, his object to intercept
it. But Sir Edward Hughes immediately
got under way, and in sight of the flag-staff
of Fort St. George fell in with the fleet of
which the French Admiral was in pursuit,
consisting of seven Indiamen, with the 78th
regiment on board, eight hundred brave
Highlanders, under convoy of two line of
battle ships, the *Magnanime* and the *Sul-*
tan. He ordered the men of war to join
S 3 him,

1782. him, recruited himself from the merchant ships, and stood directly for Trincomaleè, there to land a reinforcement, and military stores for the garrison. Sir Edward prudently studied to decline an engagement, till he should land the troops and stores he carried to Trincomaleè. It was the business of Suffrein, on the other hand, to court an action: he was upon an enemy's coast, without any harbour near, where he might shelter and repair his ships: and he was engaged in a daring enterprize, which required both ability and prompt execution.

The English and French admirals, pursuing their respective views, on the 12th of April, braced up to the wind, which blew from the land on the west. Sir Edward, by his superior seamanship, had gained the weather-gage of the enemy, and had reason to look with considerable assurance for the accomplishment of his object, when suddenly the wind changed to the east, leaving the English fleet so alarmingly close to the banks that lay near to Jaffanapatam, that one of the ships actually felt the ground.

Suffrein

Suffrein saw his advantage, bore down, and 1782.
began the battle. The number of guns, on both sides, was nearly equal: but the French fleet was full of men, while the English was short of its compliment, and sickly. Thus cruelly circumstanced, did Sir Edward Hughes maintain an action with Monsieur Suffrein until it was broken off by the darkness of the night. The nature or character of this sea-fight may be learned from this circumstance, that for seven days the fleets lay within random-shot, without attempting any attack, or giving the least molestation to each other. Monsieur Suffrein, who was enabled by the number of his hands to bring his ships first into order, after making a parade of offering battle, failed, for the purpose of compleat repairs, to Batkalo, in the island of Ceylon. Sir Edward Hughes, for the same purpose, entered the harbour of Trincomaleè.

The English army had now remained a considerable time at the Mount: but, on the 17th of April, it was put in motion for the relief of Parmacoil. But the General,

1782. on his arrival at Charangooly, was informed that Parmacoil had surrendered on terms, on May the 16th. On the 24th, the army encamped at Vandewash. The general orders of this day, for the purpose of confirming the courage of our men, looked back to the victory obtained by Sir Eyre Coote over the unfortunate French General, Lally, in 1760. The camp was pitched on the spot where that victory was obtained, and an extraordinary batta was issued out to the troops. But, on the following morning, it was found necessary, on account of water, to remove the camp to the opposite side of the fort.

Hyder Ally lay encamped in a strong post on the red hills, near Parmacoil, from which various movements of the English General aimed to draw him, in vain. But the magazines of Hyder being deposited in the strong fort of Arneè, Sir Eyre Coote conceived that a march towards that place, might induce the enemy, for the safety of his stores, to hazard an engagement. The General, therefore, turning his back on
Parmacoil,

Parmacoil, and leaving his last ground fifteen miles in the rear, encamped at Defore. 1782.
A summons was sent, on the 31st, to the fort of Chittaput, to surrender to the arms of the English: to which the Keeladar, encouraged by the nearness of Hyder, in terms of great haughtiness, bade defiance. Our army, therefore, passed this place on the 1st of June, and encamped on the west and south side of the river, with an opening of three miles between them and the fortress of Arneè. Hyder, as soon as he received intelligence that Sir Eyre Coote had struck into the road leading to Chittaput and Arneè, immediately marched after him, and coming over a space of forty-three miles in two days, took up his head quarters in Chittaput, on the evening of the same day in which our troops sat down in the encampment just described.

Although Hyder, when he has an object in view that requires expedition, observes not any order of march, and the whole country appears to be in motion, yet, his innumerable bodies of horse guard him
against

1782. against surprize, and enable him before such an army as ours can strike any blow of importance, to form his troops in order of battle. It may, perhaps, at the same time, afford some measure of gratification to European curiosity, to be informed, that the undisciplined troops of Asia, generally inflamed with bang and other intoxicating drugs, pour forth as they advance, a torrent of menacing and abusive language on their adversaries. Every expression of contempt and aversion, every threat, fitted to make an impression of terror, or to excite ideas of horror, that custom readily presents, or inventive fancy can suggest, accompanies the utmost ferocity of looks, voice, and gesture. A murmuring sound, with clouds of dust, announce their approach, while they are yet at the distance of several miles. As they advance, their accents are more and more distinctly heard, until at last, with their eyes fixed, and weapons pointed at some individual, they devote him, with many execrations, to destruction; giving his flesh, like the heroes in Homer, and the

the Philistine warriors*, to the dogs, and 1782.
the birds of the air, and the beasts of the field. The numbers of the Asiatic armies, the ferocity of their manner, and the novelty of their appearance, would unnerve and overcome the hearts of the small European bodies that are opposed to them in the field of battle, if experience had not sufficiently proved, how much the silence of discipline excels barbarian noise, and uniformity of design and action, the desultory efforts of brutal force, acting by starts, and liable to the contagion of accidental impression.

Sir Eyre Coote, on the 2d of June, with his eye fixed on the treasures and the stores of Arneè, began to move towards that important place, before break of day. But no sooner had the approach of the sun enlightened the horizon, than a heavy cannonade, of eighteen and twenty-four pounders, was opened on our rear, and fell very near it. Our army came twice to the right about, and the baggage was brought twice through the files before it was found possible to ascer-

* 1 Samuel, xvii. 44.

1782. tain the quarter from whence the enemy's fire proceeded. The General called a consultation of his officers, and encouraged them to deliver their sentiments, concerning the present situation of affairs, without reserve. Some were of opinion that the enemy's horse would charge in squadron : others agreed, in part, with this opinion, but added, that, after the baggage should be thrown into confusion, they would probably come round by a rapid wheel, and charge our troops in the rear. The reports that continued to be made from that quarter, having incontestibly proved that it was here that the enemy designed to make their principal attack, the General, without farther deliberation, brought about the line, and drew it up in order to receive them. But no sooner were our troops formed to the rear, than a division of the enemy, commanded by Tippoo Saib, moved rapidly to Arneè, carried away the treasure, gave orders to the Commandant, and reinforced the garrison. The enemy, in the mean time, occupied all the circumjacent grounds, and their cavalry, galloping to and fro in every direction, harassed

raised the English, who possessed a low situation, and galled them not a little, while they were forming to the rear in order of battle. The General made such dispositions as might best remedy the disadvantage of his ground; and advancing against the enemy, endeavoured to bring them to a close and decisive engagement. But, as he advanced, Hyder shrunk back, and left the English in possession of the scene of action. The instant our troops were ordered to relinquish the pursuit, and halt on the field of victory, a gun, with some tumbrils, was observed, opposite to the 73d regiment, sticking fast in the bed of the Arneè river, and a party of the enemy labouring to draw them out. The Honourable Captain Lindsey, against positive orders, as well as the rules of war, advanced with his grenadier company beyond the line, chased away the enemy's party, and seized the gun and tumbrils, the possession of which, converted the General's displeasure into commendation. When Captain Lindsey advanced, the other companies of his regiment followed, in order to support him, and were drawn
up

1782. up in one battalion, under that steady veteran Captain Shaw, on the opposite banks of the river. This victory, if it may be called a victory, was obtained at the inconsiderable expence of sixty Sepoys killed and wounded. The enemy, it was conjectured, did not lose above half that number.

As we were unprovided with battering cannon, scaling ladders were made of green bamboos, and a summons was sent to the Keeladar of Arneè to surrender: but, as neither the answer of that commander, nor the situation of the fort afforded any hopes that it might be attacked with any probability of success, our army, on the 6th of June, marched towards Madras. Having crossed and recrossed the course of the Arneè, they encamped, on the 7th, on the same side of the river from which they set out. While they lay in camp, on the eighth, the enemy, from a military knowledge of the ground, than which there is no circumstance that is oftner improved by a skilful commander into happy projects, drew out our grand guard, consisting of a regiment of European

European cavalry, into an ambuscade, where 1781, they were either cut off by an open and heavy fire in their front, or taken prisoners by a numerous party of horse that came suddenly between the main army and their rear. The English General returned, on the 9th of June, to Vandewash, where, after a fruitless attempt to retaliate the loss of the preceeding day, by snares similar to those through which it was occasioned, proceeded on his march, and on the 20th arrived at Madras.

In these stratagems and encounters, the last in which Sir Eyre Coote and Hyder-Ally-Cawn were destined to measure their strength in the field, we behold the conduct of the commanders, and the whole character of the war. The English General opposing to numbers, artifices, and local advantages, the disciplined valour of his little army, according to the plainest and most approved rules of war, and, "without exposing his troops to too great hazards, constantly endeavouring to reduce the various movements and feints of his antagonist

1782. nist to a point, where he could bear upon him with his whole strength at once, and bring him to a close and decisive action : the Asiatic politician and warrior, availing himself of present and vast resources, eluding regular and compacted force by stratagems the most various and profound, and declining to commit to the fortune of a single day, what would be ensured by a series of conjunctures rightly improved, by distance of space which might deprive his adversary of supplies in the moment of exigency, and by the very lapse of time, which, transferring the arts of the refined to the rude, levels in its progress the condition of nations.

Sir Eyre Coote secure, after the toils of the field, in the arsenal of Fort St. George, had the satisfaction of reflecting, that he had marched and countermarched, in spite of all opposition, whithersoever he would, carried relief to the distressed, beaten back the enemy in every battle, and done every thing but bring him to a decisive engagement. Hyder-Ally, reposing in the fortress

treasures of Arnéé, preserved by his arms, rejoiced 1782.
that he had been able to avoid a decisive
action; that he was still in a condition to
present a front to the foe; that the wounds
he had given to the English were deeper
than any they had inflicted on his army; and
that, while he thus maintained his ground
in the Carnatic, and braved with advantage
a power deemed irresistible, he might rea-
sonably hope that in proportion as the pres-
sure of terror, which alone kept the native
princes under awe and subjection to the
Europeans, should be removed, they would
gradually be united in a determined resolu-
tion to expel them, without exception, from
the coasts of India.

We must now take a short review
of the state of the war on the side of Ben-
gal.

When it was determined, on the motion
of Mr. Hastings, to afford effectual assistance
in men, money, and provisions, to Madras,
it was thought necessary, also, by the Go-
vernor-General, to break the grand and

1782. dangerous confederacy which had been formed against us, and, in order to effect this, he proposed that an offer of reconciliation, upon very reasonable terms, should be made to the Marrattas, through the Rajah of Berar. This offer was made, but rejected; the next step, therefore, was to compel that people to accept of peace, by multiplying the calamities of war.

We have already said, that Mr. Hastings had recommended an expedition into Malva, the country of Madajee Scindiah: a measure that was thwarted by the violent opposition and intrigues of Mr. Francis. But soon after the departure of that gentleman from India, which happened towards the close of 1780, and which shall by and by be explained, it was determined to prosecute the expedition to Malva with the utmost vigour. Lieutenant-Colonel, then Major Popham, remained with a garrison in Gualior: and Lieutenant-Colonel Camac was ordered to advance, at the head of five battalions of Sepoys, with the utmost rapidity to Ugein,
Madajee

Madajee Scindiah's capital. This move- 1782.
ment was attended with all those beneficial
consequences which Mr. Hastings had pre-
dicted. Scindiah, who was the General of
the Marratta army, and opposed the British
General Goddard in Guzzarat, at the head
of sixty thousand horse, suddenly quitted the
Marratta camp, for the defence of his own
country. He advanced to Seronge in the
month of February, 1781, surrounded Co-
lonel Camac with large bodies of cavalry,
interrupted his supplies, and reduced him to
the greatest distress. In this situation, the
Colonel wrote in the most pressing terms for
reinforcements to Major Popham, and also
to Colonel Muir and Colonel Morgan, who
commanded our troops on the borders of
Corah and in Oude ; recommending, at the
same time, that a diversion should be made
in his favour from Calpee. Measures were
immediately taken for the support of Colonel
Camac, but he had the good fortune to extri-
cate himself from all his difficulties, before the
reinforcements arrived to his assistance. He
called a council of war on the 23d of March,
in which it was proposed by Captain Bruce,

1782. who commanded the storming party at Gualior, to attack Scindiah's camp that night, as the only possible means of preserving the army. This advice, most strenuously seconded by Major Maclary, a gentleman now in England, was, after some debate and consideration, adopted by the Colonel. At sun-set, on the 24th, the army moved from their ground, and, after a march of thirteen hours, effectually surprized the two camps of Madajee Scindiah, made themselves masters of all his artillery, took his standard elephant, a number of camels and bullocks, and a prodigious quantity of provisions.

This action was decisive of the Marratta war. Colonel Muir, who, in consequence of Colonel Camac's letter from Seronge, had been detached across the Jumna, had advanced as far as the Ranah of Gohud's country, to his assistance, joined the army with his reinforcement the following month, and being the senior officer, succeeded to the general command. The Governor-General and Council could not remove Colonel Muir, who

who was one of the best officers in their 1782. service, from a command to which Lieutenant-Colonel Camac himself had expressly called him. In the month of August, 1781, Scindiah made overtures of peace. A negotiation was opened for that purpose, and a treaty concluded with that chief in the month of October, 1781, which, in its consequences, led to a general peace with the Marrattas. A total cessation of hostilities with the Marratta states was the immediate consequence of the separate peace with Madajee, and a general pacification was signed in May, 1782. Thus did that expedition, on the success of which Mr. Hastings, when he proposed it, had declared he would risk his life, terminate precisely as the Governor-General predicted: and, in the year 1782, of all the confederacy which had been formed against us, two members only continued hostile, Hyder-Ally-Cawn, and the French. Moodajee Booslah had been bought off by a sum of money: and the Nizam confiding, or pretending to confide in our promises, according to his usual policy, continued inactive. To the honour of the troops employed,

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1782. ployed against Scindiah, it is necessary to mention, that they were five months in arrears during all the service.

It was for this reason, and because the treasury of Bengal was totally inadequate to the continued and increasing demands of an hundred thousand men under arms, in the service of Great Britain in different parts of India, that the Governor-General determined, in the month of August, 1781, to demand from the Nabob Vizier of Oude, the balance due to the Company, and from the Rajah Cheyt Sing, a Zemindar who rented, under the English Company, the rich city and dependencies of Benaras, together with such farther contributions as the necessities of war rendered customary in the east, from vassals to lords paramount, and from a subject to his sovereign. The Princesses of Oude, the mother and grandmother of the Nabob Asoph-ul-Dowlah, together with immense treasures, possessed a considerable force, and not a small share of the authority of government.—The Rajah Cheyt Sing, from his father Bulwant Sing, who derived whatever degree of

of independency he possessed, during the latter period of his life, from the protection and intervention of our government, inherited a vast mass of wealth, which he secured in the two strong fortresses of Bidjey Gur and Lutteefpoor. But, if common fame made just reports, neither the Begums of Oude, nor the Rajah of Benaras, were friends to the English. Hostile intentions, it was every where said, were manifested by overt actions: insolent treatment of the English, correspondence with the powers who were, or might eventually become our enemies, the collection of stores, and other acts of military preparation. The general state and temper of the country, and particularly the evasions by which Cheyt Sing sought to withhold the subsidies which our government had demanded and he had promised, rendered these reports not incredible to a mind, anxious, like that of Mr. Hastings, for the public safety, which hung in suspense on his decisions. In such circumstances, as these, the Governor-General determined to seize, in good time, an engine that might be turned against himself, and to anticipate any

1782. farther instances of hostility, which must involve in their progress, either the ruin of the princes from whom they proceeded, or that of the power against which they were pointed.

But before we enter into any detail of these hostile designs and actions, it will be proper to examine the springs from whence they flowed: the chief of which undoubtedly were, internal discord, and undefined government. However the calamities that assailed or threatened us in India were excited and encouraged by the confederacy that was formed against Great-Britain between America and Europe, they would have been early suppressed, or easily quashed, by our superior advantages, had we possessed harmony in our councils. But the individual members of the Presidencies were divided among themselves; the Presidencies, by political views and the love of power, from one another: and, while a permanent jealousy was confirmed between the East-India Company and the nominal Princes in whose name they exercised the powers of government,

ment, dissensions also arose between the ci- 1782.
vil servants of the Company, and the mili-
tary officers of the Crown. While Hyder-
Ally was at the gates of Madras, the Eng-
lish, like the Greeks when the Barbarians
approached to Constantinople, distracted by
internal disputes, not only concerning mea-
sures but the power of enforcing them,
seemed almost to have forgotten that they
had any enemies to contend with but one
another. The Governor of Madras assum-
ed a controul over the troops within that
Presidency, for the direction of measures in
which he considered himself as responsible :
the Commander in Chief, acting under the au-
thority of the Governor-General and Supreme
Council of Bengal, claimed authority over
every party or detachment, that he might
be enabled to unite and direct their com-
bined force in one system of military opera-
tion. The General, restrained in his views,
made partial efforts, or remained inactive.
Detachments of our army were cut off, and
the enemy was enabled to repair his losses
where our arms were successful. The re-
venues of Arcot were seized for the purpose
of

1782. of maintaining the war, by Lord Macartney; but restored by Mr. Hastings. The order for restitution, the government of Madras determined to resist, and Sir Eyre Coote to execute, if necessary, even by force of arms.

Meanwhile, the fluctuations in our administration and councils at home, gave birth to various projects for the appointment of new men, and the establishment of new systems of government abroad. These changes and designs were conveyed in private letters and printed publications to the powers of India, who, expecting the removal of Mr. Hastings, and unaccustomed to separate in their imaginations the persons of princes from their plans of policy, were deterred from taking any part with so unsteady a government.

Diffention and intrigue find their way even into the Divans of despotic powers: but when, in jarring councils and incompatible systems of government, it was easy to find plausible theories and pretexts, as well

well as most powerful countenance and sup- 1782.
port for almost any course of conduct, faction was invited, and indeed unavoidable. In such circumstances as these, it was not unnatural for Mr. Francis, a man of great abilities, both natural and acquired, as well as great ambition, and who might be distinguished from all his cotemporaries, by an extreme irritability of temper, if he had not been as tenacious of revenge as he was prone to resentment, to apply himself, with all the assiduity of habits formed by a life of business, to counteract the designs, and to fully the glory of his immediate superior, Mr. Hastings.

From the death of General Clavering, which happened in the month of August, 1777, to that of December, 1779, Mr. Francis was, or pretended to be, in hourly expectation of succeeding to the government of Bengal. Mr. Hastings had uniformly professed the utmost indifference with regard to his own fate. In his correspondence with the Minister, and with the Directors, he never once solicited his continuance in government, though he uniformly represented, in very strong terms, the
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1782. the necessity of increasing the power of the Governor-General. The British Minister, who had used the most violent and unjustifiable methods to remove Mr. Hastings from his office, in 1776, was the first to propose his continuance, two years thereafter. Whether on account of his growing embarrassments, and the strenuous support which the Governor-General, in his last contest with government, received from the friends of the Marquis of Rockingham, or that the death of Colonel Monson, and afterwards that of General Clavering, had disarmed him of the resentment which he once entertained against Mr. Hastings, or in whatever proportions all these separate circumstances might have been combined, certain it is, that Lord North, unsolicited, proposed, in 1778, that Mr. Hastings should be continued in the government of Bengal for one year longer ; that he made a motion for a similar end in 1779 ; and that parliament, on his motion, in 1781, continued him in office for ten years. The motives that induced these successive appointments, are as honourable to Mr. Hastings, as they are disgraceful to those who then voted for his

his

his continuance in office, and have since 1782. joined in his persecution. Lord North openly averred, that he had moved the House of Commons to re-appoint Mr. Hastings, three several times, because, our situation in Europe and in India was difficult and dangerous, and Mr. Hastings possessed vigour and abilities, and the confidence of the East-India Company.

As soon as the first of these re-appointments was known in Bengal, a proposition was distantly made for a conciliation between Mr. Francis and Mr. Hastings. This proposition was attended with so many important consequences, that we shall state them from such authentic materials as we have been enabled to obtain upon the subject.

The first conversation that led to this coalition passed between Major Scott, then aid-de-camp to the Governor-General, and a gentleman in Mr. Francis's confidence, on the 24th of December, 1779. This conference was, on the Monday following, communicated by Major Scott to Mr. Hastings,

1782. Hastings, who declared his readiness to accommodate all differences with Mr. Francis; but requiring unequivocally, that he, Mr. Hastings, should have the conduct of the Marratta war; Mr. Francis, having thrown upon Mr. Hastings the responsibility of that war in so far as it was connected with the Bengal government. This arrangement was afterwards settled under the mediation of Sir John Day. Mr. Francis was accused by Mr. Hastings, in the month of July, 1780, of having violated his engagements. A duel ensued in the following month, in which Mr. Francis was wounded: and, on the 9th of December, 1780, this gentleman quitted India.

Major Scott at that time commanded a battalion of Sepoys, at Chunar, about six hundred and fifty miles from Calcutta. The moment he heard of Mr. Francis's intended departure, he wrote to Mr. Hastings, and pointed out to him the necessity of some person, acquainted with the late transactions in India, being sent in order to explain any circumstances that might be misrepresented.

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If no fitter person occurred to Mr. Hastings, 1782. for this service, Major Scott offered himself, as his battalion was at that time doing garrison duty, without a probability of being relieved or employed according to the usual course of the service, before the close of the war; and as he himself possessed, though a moderate, yet an independent fortune. Major Scott quitted Chunar on the 15th of December, 1780, and left Bengal in a neutral ship, the 9th of January following, with instructions to which he rigidly adhered. These were, to explain such parts of Mr. Hastings's conduct as might be misrepresented, and to endeavour to procure him confidence and support as long as he should be continued in office, but, by no means to solicit his continuance in the government of Bengal.

Major Scott,, in private circles, in parliament, and in printed publications, repelled the arrows of reproach, and maintained the cause of Mr. Hastings with an enthusiasm that nothing but an unaffected admiration of the man, and indignation at injured merit,

1782. merit, could have inspired. Yet his eloquence was not of that kind which storms the heart by the contagion of passion ; nor yet that which amuses the imagination by the stores of literature and fancy ; nor that, still farther, which assumes the sublimity of abstracted terms, and the pomp of logical form. What he said carried in it that clearness and conviction which were the natural result of an intimate acquaintance with his subject, and he often opposed with success a fact to a flourish. He marked the inconsistencies of his opponents both in speech and action, proclaimed aloud the eminent services of Mr. Hastings, poured light on what seemed dark and doubtful in his conduct, and glanced, by severe contrast, at the unfortunate errors, not to say misdemeanors and crimes, of men who had arranged themselves under the standard of persecution. Here the Major had indeed an ample field. Foreign nations are astonished, and posterity will not believe, that he, who, by saving India, saved the British empire, was, on the return of peace, the only object of public enquiry and accusation. Admirals had lost opportunities,
Generals

Generals had lost armies, Commanders in Chief auspicious conjunctures never to be recalled, but they threw themselves into the scale of opposition, and were loaded with offices and honours. Mr. Hastings courted not the favour of any party, but looked up with confidence to the nation for justice.

In the month of December, 1781, the British nation groaned under a load of public debt. Her commanders were generally unfortunate : her fleets were out-numbered : her armies had been captured : her ministry was distracted : and an opposition to government, powerful from the talents of its leaders, was hourly gaining strength. The most sanguine politicians, in that hour of distress, looked to the preservation of India, as the only means of saving us from a general bankruptcy. In such a situation, Lord North clearly and unequivocally supported Mr. Hastings ; and, notwithstanding the general distress of the empire, very considerable reinforcements of ships and troops were sent to India, in the winter of 1781.

1782. In the month of March, 1782, Lord North was compelled to resign his office. His successors stipulated, that not an atom of his administration should remain, the present Lord Chancellor excepted.

The confidential dependant of the Marquis of Rockingham was Mr. Edmund Burke. This celebrated person is a native of Ireland. He quitted his own country nearly at the commencement of the present reign. Amongst the various peculiarities which distinguish this reign from all others, there is none more striking, than the very extraordinary increase of that body of men who are generally termed, political adventurers. Mr. Burke, amongst this order of men, has been eminently successful. He made his first entrance into public life in the character of private secretary to the Marquis of Rockingham, in the year 1765. He continued steady in his attachment to the noble Marquis, from the year 1765, to the time of his decease, and it has been generally thought, that he governed the party, the heads of which, though men of good understanding, were more remarkable for the
affluence

affluence of their fortunes, and their private 1782.
worth, than for talents as orators and states-
men. By a prudent though not sordid œco-
nomy, he avoided the inconveniencies and
the dangers of embarrassed circumstances,
and amidst all the vicissitudes of his public
life, preserved an independent and erect mind,
with a narrow private fortune.

From the earliest years of Mr. Burke,
there was something in his sentiments, pur-
suits, and manners, that indicated to the
discerning eye sublimity of genius and deli-
cacy of taste. As he advanced in years the
presages formed concerning him were more
and more confirmed : and he grew up in
favour with all around him. An interest-
ing sweetness and sensibility of countenance
prepared the stranger for thinking justly
of the humanity of his disposition, and,
from the richness of his conversation on
every subject, he was pleased, though not
surprized, to find intellectual excellence in
conjunction with moral goodness. There
is nothing in nature that is solitary, or inde-
pendent of that universality of things which
compose one harmonious whole : nothing

1782. so insignificant that it may not be associated by a vast variety of connections, with something most interesting and sublime: and all the arts and sciences are linked together in one chain, affected by mutual influence, and sustained by mutual support. Hence the copious and disciplined fancy of Mr. Burke, whether in private conversation or public discourse, both in speaking and writing, diffused a captivating charm on every subject, and gave relief and animation to topics the most dry and barren.

The sciences have a natural tendency to produce candour and forbearance, by inducing in the minds of their votaries an habit of tracing every action and every effect to its proper cause. And polite literature and the fine arts, by exhibiting human nature in an infinite variety of interesting situations, excite a thousand social and humane emotions, which cannot spring from all the occurrences and vicissitudes of the most varied life. Thus the man of letters becomes a citizen of the world. His enlarged mind acquires an habit of sympathetic indulgence. The antipathies and prejudices which

which set men at variance with one another, 1782.
are gradually worn off. Nothing that belongs to human nature; no peculiarity in national character; no common failing or imperfection of the individual member of society, moves either the ridicule or the rage of the man, who is accustomed to contemplate nature and humanity under manifold forms, and in whose breast disgust and even indignation at the effect, is partly lost in the contemplation of the cause. The character of Mr. Burke, accordingly, was marked by nothing more than by superiority to vulgar prejudices, and unbounded philanthropy to all classes and nations of men. It was this expanded sentiment that, on different occasions, inspired him with courage to resist the popular fury, when it had broken loose with a savage ferocity against unfortunate criminals, and a proscribed religion. It was perfectly natural for such a spirit to enter by a lively sympathy, into the sufferings of the Indian nations, under European tyranny, and to indulge an honest indignation against their oppressors. He suffered his imagination to dwell with pleasure on the visionary project, of uniting the

1782. freedom of the natives of India, with their dependence on Great Britain, and of bringing to exemplary punishment, an individual who had uniformly acted, in the character of the first minister in India, on those very principles by which our possessions in that country had been acquired, by which they had been maintained, and by which alone, beyond all manner of doubt, in times of civil convulsion, they could be recovered or preserved.

The finest genius, the most generous disposition, is not unusually found in conjunction with an irritability of temper, which magnifies its object. Although it may be too much to affirm, that belief is nothing more than vivid perception, attention has undoubtedly a microscopical power, and this power we can command at pleasure.—Hence that wonderful variety of opinions that prevail, on so many subjects, among men of equal understandings: for while reason and truth are uniform and invariable, the passions and interests of individuals are various: and when once the will begins to influence the judgment; fertility of invention, instead

instead of being a lamp of light, becomes a source of error. Mr. Burke, in his eagerness to impeach the Governor-General of Bengal, lost sight of constant precedent, and political necessity: and, for what had become the predominant passion of his soul, his imagination, fertile even to excess, easily found a cover in partial views, and plausible theories and conjectures. 1782.

In the affairs of India, this gentleman and his party had for some years but little concern. To Lord North's regulating bill, of 1773, they gave a feeble and unavailing opposition; but when his Lordship endeavoured to remove Mr. Hastings, in the year 1776, on account of the Rohilla war, they exerted themselves so strenuously in opposition to that measure, that they defeated the Minister in Leadenhall-street, and prevented him from so much as bringing the subject before parliament the ensuing session. It is of little consequence to observe, that the same party which actually preserved Mr. Hastings in office, when the Rohilla war was made the ground of his

1782. removal in 1776, would have impeached him for the same measure in 1786.

In the year 1777, Mr. Burke began to appear more conspicuously as an India politician. In that year, his near relation, Mr. William Burke, quitted England, secretly, and proceeded to Madras. In the following year he returned to this country, the agent of the Rajah of Tanjore. In the year 1781, he again proceeded by land to Madras, and in the following year, 1782, Mr. Edmund Burke, now a Privy Counsellor, and Pay-Master-General of his Majesty's Forces, appointed his relation Mr. William Burke, Pay-Master of the King's forces in India, an office which he still retains.

It was early determined by the Rockingham administration, that Mr. Hastings should be removed. Mr. Dundas, who had been Chairman of the Secret Committee, the origin of his greatness, concurred with them in this point, though he has since publicly expressed his satisfaction, that his views were counteracted. At the minute
this

this resolution was taken in England, our 1782.
empire in Hindostan tottered to its foundation. We have already shewn the difficulties under which Great Britain laboured in India, and the astonishing efforts that were made by Mr. Hastings, and those who acted under him, to prevent the total subversion of our power in that quarter of the world. In such a situation, Mr. Hastings required support from England, but he received counteraction.

The King's ministers, who possessed the public confidence of the House of Commons, intoxicated with the novelty of power, determined, in defiance of law and common sense, that the Company should be laid under new restrictions in the exercise of those privileges which they enjoyed by charter.—The Directors were, in fact, ordered, by a vote of the House of Commons, to remove Mr. Hastings; and thus did Mr. Burke, who was the grand mover of this business, lay the foundation of those extraordinary events which have agitated the political world for the last six years, which occasioned the overthrow of
his

1782- his party, and involved many of his connections in ruin.

Intelligence of these extraordinary proceedings in England, circulated throughout Hindostan, in the months of August and September, 1782, produced an effect perfectly natural. The Marratta peace, signed by Madajee Scindiah, and Mr. David Anderson, in the month of May, was on the point of being ratified at Poonah, in August; but the Ministers of the Paishwa declared their determination, first to wait the arrival, and to know the sentiments of the new Governor-General. Fortunately for the existence of the East-India Company, a packet dispatched over land to Mr. Hastings, by Major Scott, arrived at Calcutta in November, with intelligence of the death of the Marquis of Rockingham, and the determination of the Court of Proprietors to resist the mandate of the House of Commons, for the recall of Mr. Hastings. This intelligence produced a very happy alteration in the state of public affairs. The [peace with the Marrattas was ratified in the

the month of December, 1782, since which 1782.
time, all the conditions of it have been scrupulously observed by both parties.

When we thus compare the actual situation of affairs in the east, with what passed in Great Britain, we shall be led to conclude, that we owe the preservation of India to the India Company. And here it is natural to reflect, on that steadiness and stability of government, which arises from common sense, and a concern for independent property, contrasted with the visionary projects of the sublimest and most cultivated geniuses. To have removed Mr. Hastings, and attempted to introduce a new order of affairs in India, during the rage of war, did not appear absurd to Mr. Burke and Mr. Fox, and to a majority in the House of Commons: but the Proprietors of India Stock were unwilling to hazard so bold an experiment; and their prudent caution has equally contributed to the preservation of private property, and the promotion of public prosperity. The East-India Company may thus be considered as an anchor, that
fixed

1782. fixed the agitated vessel of state, tossed amidst the billows of foreign war, and internal dissensions. This association of men are not to be viewed, by the political eye, so much as a set of private monopolists, as a most important member or branch of the state; which could not now be lopped off without lacerating the parent stock, and the danger of even mortal wounds. Were the trade to India thrown open to private adventurers, where is the security that these adventurers, in their exports and imports, would confine themselves to the ports of Great Britain? Nor is the loss of public revenue, and of the advantage of an extended circulation, the whole, or perhaps even the greatest part of the evil to be apprehended from such a measure. The British Government, deprived of the Company's fleet, would be deprived of a faithful and powerful associate, who has uniformly adhered to the cause of the nation, and mingled her interest with her's in every fortune. The East-India ships have ever been found of infinite service to the public security: whether by co-operating with the royal navy for the defence

defence of our foreign settlements, in transporting troops to Asia from Europe, or from one port to another in India. It were superfluous to prove so notorious a fact by multiplied examples. I shall just mention one. It was in the Kingston East-India-man, commanded by Captain Nutt, that Sir Eyre Coote, with a body of European infantry, and a large supply of provisions and money, carried salvation from Bengal to the Carnatic. 1782

Yet, at the same time that a clamour was excited against Mr. Hastings, certain wild projectors began to propagate ideas of dissolving the Company, while others proposed, what would have amounted, in the end, to the same thing, the most ruinous innovations in their shipping. Nor were the Directors of the East-India Company wanting to listen to offers of necessitous and whimsical speculators, who, playing a desperate game, endeavoured to intrude themselves into the Company's service, by holding out illusory views of a reduction in the freight of ships. —The savings proposed, which, at the utmost,

1782. utmost, it was computed, 'would not have exceeded sixty thousand pounds annually, could never have compensated for those alarming hazards which must have been incurred by any innovation in the system of the Company's navigation : a system that had stood the shock of so many accidents, and so many hostile and formidable combinations. The owners of ships, by affording a constant and sure resource of shipping, at stated and proper times, give that steadiness, constancy, and uniformity of exertion to the commerce of the East-India Company, which its particular nature requires, and which necessarily accompanies the successful management of all extensive concerns. The necessary vessels are fitted out by them, equipped, victualled, manned, and drawn together at an appointed place and fixed time, with a degree of regularity approaching to mechanical exactness ; an exactness, which a regard to protection, and the winds, called monsoons, renders indispensable. All nations that have been ambitious to extend and establish their commerce on sure grounds, in distant quarters of the world, have been
careful

careful to unite with navigation and the re- 1782.
quisites for commercial conveyance, the
means of protection from hostile invasion.
The number of ships necessary for carrying
on the commerce of the East-India Com-
pany, is not less than one hundred. Such
a quantity of shipping may be converted in-
to a most formidable navy, that shall not
only be independent of convoys, but form
a mighty addition to the maritime force of
England. The owners of ships, it is said,
have determined, and one or two excellent
citizens*, happily distinguished by an union
of fortune, capacity, and public spirit, have
of late set an example of building ships on
an enlarged plan, and constructed in such a
manner, as to admit at once a reduction of
freight, and to do as much execution as a
sixty-gun ship of the line. This example
will undoubtedly be followed, and the East-
India Company, which has the glory of
having saved the nation, by the indepen-
dent virtue of their counsels, will also have
the renown of making a most important ad-
dition to the force of its arms. It is not fit
that the constitution of such a body, should
be

* Captain Newte, Mr. Cameron, &c.

1782. be lightly tampered with. Experience has proved, that a conjuncture may happen, when they may form a necessary counterpoise to the levity of political speculators ; and there is scarcely a family of any note in Britain, that is not from personal interest, or ties of consanguinity, nearly concerned in their stability and welfare. But let us now return to the means employed by Mr. Hastings, in the hour of danger, for the salvation of India, from which we have been led to this political digression.

Bulwant, the father of Cheyt Sing, had behaved so treacherously to the English in the war with Sujah Dowlah, that the Governor and Council had determined to deprive him, in 1765, of the Zemindary of Benaras, though it was afterwards judged prudent to make use of his services in collecting the revenues of that province, to protect him from the hostile resentment of the Nabob Vizier, who had compelled him, in May, 1765, to pay him twenty lacks of rupees, as a fine for his former contumacy, and in order to enable him, the Nabob,

to discharge the subsidy due, by treaty, from 1782. him to the Company, and to raise him to a degree of independence which he had never before enjoyed. On the death of this man, his son, Cheyt Sing, by a woman of a very low caste, was continued in the Zemindary through the English influence with the Vizier. And Mr. Hastings, in 1773, procured from the Nabob a confirmation of Cheyt Sing and his posterity in that rich possession. By the treaty of Lucknow, concluded in 1775, the sovereignty of Benaras and Gauzipore was transferred from the Nabob to the East-India Company. Cheyt Sing was still treated with the utmost indulgence, and no demands were made, on account of his annual revenue, beyond the sum formerly stipulated.— But on the eruption of a war with France, in July, 1778, Cheyt Sing was called upon, according to oriental custom, to contribute his share of the additional expences now to be incurred by his sovereign.

When Sir Eyre Coote was about to embark, in October 1780, for the coast of

1782. Coromandel, and there was a very great degree of probability that Bengal would be invaded by the Marrattas, the plan adopted by the Government for the protection of Bengal and its dependencies from the attacks of our enemies, was, to put the troops of the native princes, connected with our nation, either by the ties of alliance or allegiance, under the discipline, and the command of British officers. As a part of the system of defence, it was unanimously resolved in Council, that a part of Cheyt Sing's cavalry should be put under our orders.

The Rajah did not dispute the right of his sovereign to demand military aid, but he sought to evade compliance, on pretence of poverty: and his excuses and delays to pay his promised subsidy, there was reason to believe, were dictated by the doubts he had been taught to entertain concerning the stability of that authority by which it had been imposed. His repeated instances of contumacy and disobedience, though unjustifiable in themselves, and aggravated by the extreme distresses and dangers of the superior

perior state, appeared to the Governor-General of less consideration on account of their own criminality, than as they were evidences of a deliberate and systematic conduct, aiming at the total subversion of the authority of the Company, and the erection of his own independency on its ruins. He considered Cheyt Sing as culpable, in a very high degree, towards our state, and his punishment, of which he had given him frequent warnings if he did not amend his conduct, as an example which justice and policy required, equally for the reparation of the wrongs which its dignity had sustained, and for the future preservation of its authority. He saw a political necessity for curbing the over-grown power of a great member of the Company's dominion, and rendering it subservient to their present exigencies. These are the reasons urged by Mr. Hastings in his narrative of the insurrection at Benaras, in a stream of eloquence that rarely, if it ever flows, at once with such transparency and such force, where the conclusions of the understanding de-

1782. rive not an impetus from the emotions of the heart.

The Governor-General, with a view to raise supplies for maintaining the war, and in the hopes of being able to effect some interviews that might lead to peace, set out from Calcutta on the 7th of July, 1781, with an intention to proceed to Lucknow, the principal residence of the Royal Family of Oude. He arrived at Benaras on the morning of the 14th of August, whither also Cheyt Sing came to meet him some hours later. The Governor-General forbid the Rajah to come that evening to his quarters, as he had intended; and required him to defer his future visits until he should receive his permission, as he had some previous matters to settle with him, of which he would be informed by the Resident whom he would depute to him, next morning, for that purpose. Mr. Markham accordingly carried a paper to the Rajah, in which Mr. Hastings recapitulated the several instances of his conduct which for some time past had repeatedly drawn

drawn upon himself the severe reprehensions of government, and demanded a clear and satisfactory explanation. He charged him not only with shifts and delays in the payment of a sum of money, which he had promised to contribute in the strongest terms, and which was destined for discharging the arrears due to the army that had marched towards Malva, but also with disaffection and infidelity to the Company, the patrons on whom he depended, and with endeavours to excite disorders in their government. The Rajah, in reply, professed the utmost gratitude to Mr. Hastings, whom he considered as the source from whence alone he derived the fulfilment of all his wishes and desires, apologized for his delays in paying the required subsidy, and number of cavalry, from inability, and urged that the delay in remitting the sum which he had been able to raise to the army did not rest with him. He affirmed, that his whole cavalry did not exceed one thousand three hundred, of which several were stationed at distant places. In compliance,

1782. he said, with the Governor-General's wishes, he had collected five hundred horse, and, as a substitute for other five hundred, he had provided an equal number of Burgandazes, at that moment ready to go to whatever place they should be sent. He added, that, happily for him, the arrival of the Governor-General at Benaras, would enable him to ascertain the truth of what he had asserted concerning his horse, on the spot. He had constantly endeavoured to fulfil the Governor's orders, and to preserve good government : " But," said he, " if a person having committed a delinquency should escape to some other place, so as to elude all discovery, in that case I am helpless."

This answer appeared to the Governor-General to be not only unsatisfactory in substance, but, from an inferior in India to a superior, offensive in style, and less a vindication of himself than a recrimination on the Governor. It expressed not any concern for the causes of complaint contained in his letter, nor desire to atone for them. An answer
couched

couched nearly in terms of defiance, to requisitions of so serious a nature, Mr. Hastings considered as an indication of that spirit of independency which the Rajah had assumed for some years past. Under these alarming appearances of the Rajah's conduct and dispositions, he conceived himself to be indispensably obliged to form some immediate and decisive plan for securing the Company's interests and rights in Benaras. He ordered the Resident to proceed, early on the morning of August the sixteenth, to the house of the Rajah Cheyt Sing, with his usual guard, and put him in arrest.—Mr. Markham, followed by two companies of Grenadier Sepoys, according to his instructions executed the arrest, to which the Rajah quietly submitted, assuring the Resident, that whatever the Governor's orders were, he was ready to obey them. He hoped that he would allow him a subsistence: but, as for his Zemindary, his forts, and his treasure, he was ready to lay them down, with his life, if required, at his feet. In two letters, also addressed to the Governor-General, in the language of despondent

1782. supplication, he professed entire submission to his will. The Governor having now brought the refractory Rajah to the temper he desired, comforted him with a short note, in which he informed him, that Mr. Markham should wait upon him in the afternoon, and explain particulars. In the mean time he desired him to set his mind at rest, and not to conceive any terror or apprehension. The Rajah to this consolatory assurance replied, “ My Protector! wherever you spread
“ your shadow over my head, I am entirely
“ free from terror and apprehension; and
“ whatever you, who are my Master, shall
“ as such determine, will be right.”

The Governor-General had by this time prepared new instructions to Mr. Markham; but before he could set out with them, intelligence was received, that large bodies of men, in arms, had crossed the river from Ramnagur, and proceeded to Shewallah Gaut, Cheyt Sing's house. The guard placed over the Rajah, consisted of two companies of grenadier Sepoys, as above mentioned, from Major Popham's detachment, com-
manded

manded by the Lieutenants Simés, Scott, 1782. and Stalker, and stationed in an enclosed square which surrounded the Prince's apartment in the palace: the Resident's guard had returned with him to Mr. Hastings. It now appeared that these troops were unprovided with ammunition. Major Popham, therefore, sent another company of Sepoys, with ammunition, to reinforce and support the first party. But, on their arrival at the Rajah's house, they found all the avenues blockaded by a multitude of armed men. The minds of this tumultuous assembly, fermented into rage, by a reciprocation of sentiments and passions, and assuming courage from their numbers, made an instantaneous and fierce attack on the Sepoys, who, wanting their accustomed means of defence, fell an easy sacrifice to the superior numbers of their assailants. The officers, it is supposed, were the first victims to their fury; but not until they had, by astonishing efforts of bravery, involved in their fate far greater numbers of their enemies.

In

1782. In the midst of this confusion, Cheyt Sing found means to escape through a wicket that opened to the river; and the banks being exceedingly steep in that place, he was let down by turbans tied together, into a boat which conveyed him to the opposite shore. His adherents followed him across the river in the same tumultuous manner in which they had assembled, leaving the party of our Sepoys which had last arrived, in possession of the house. But if, instead of crowding after the Rajah, they had proceeded to Mahadow Dafs's garden, the residence at that critical hour of Mr. Hastings, the blood of the Governor-General, with that of about thirty English gentlemen of his party, would have been added to the recent carnage, and the British empire in India would have ceased from that moment to exist. For every state around it would have started into arms against it: and its own subjects, according to their degrees of power, would have been forward to renounce their allegiance.

Mr.

Mr. Hastings, on the first intelligence 1782. of this commotion, directed Major Popham to repair immediately to his camp, which was about two miles from the Resident's house, and at the same distance from the Rajah's, and to march instantly with the remainder of his detachment to the support of the party. Major Popham, though he lost not a moment to execute this order, arrived too late, and beheld with sorrow the effects of a massacre which he could neither prevent nor revenge. Cheyt Sing fled to Lutteefpoor with his family, and all his forces, except the ordinary guard of Ramnagur: a vast pile of irregular, but massy buildings, constructed of stone, on the river side, and partly within the bed of the river. To the original strength of this place, Cheyt Sing had added some small bastions of stone and earth; but it possessed a stronger defence in a large town which had grown around it, and the complicated intricacies of the apartments and passages of the palace. Ramnagur had been evacuated during the commotions at She-wallah Gaut: but the first tumults of consternation

1782. Aftertion having fubfided, about two thoufand men had returned to that fortrefs, on the 18th of Auguft, under the command of Ramjeeewuun, a confidential and domeftic chief of the Rajah's family.

The whole ftrength of the Governor-General at Benaras, confifted originally of fix companies of Major Popham's regiment, about fixty Sepoys which he had taken from the garrifon, at Buxar, for the protection of his boats, and a few men without difcipline, and without arms, who had been newly recruited for the Refident's guard. Of Major Popham's regiment, eighty-two men had fallen in the maffacre of Shewallah Gaut, and ninety-two were wounded. The whole number of killed and wounded, amounted to two hundred and five.

The remainder of Major Popham's detachment, confifting of four companies of Sepoys, one company of artillery, and a company of French rangers in our fervice, were ordered to march immediately to Ramnagur,

nagur, and a letter was sent to Lieutenant- 1782
Colonel Blair, to detach a battalion of Sepoys on the same destination, from the garrison at Chunar. These different forces were ordered to halt at a secure distance from Ramnagur, to avoid all hostilities, and to wait for further orders. Major Popham, formally invested with the command of this little body, in order to secure the success of his operations, had chosen a convenient and open plain, on the shore opposite to Ramnagur, for a battery of two mortars, expected from Chunar. These dispositions promised a sure and easy conquest; when an accident happened, which blasted the reasonable expectations, and had well nigh proved the ruin of the whole party. Captain Mayaffre, the senior, and consequently the ruling officer before Major Popham assumed the command, unwilling to lose the opportunity which his present and casual authority afforded him of acquiring military reputation, without plan, without inquiry, against the advice of his officers, and against orders, led the detachment into the narrow streets of the town of Ramnagur, where,
exposed

1782. exposed to the fire of an enemy surrounding them unseen, one hundred and seven men, including Captain Mayaffre who commanded, and Captain Doxat who led on the attack, were instantly killed, and seventy-two wounded. Captain Blair, with the remains of the detachment, made a judicious and safe retreat. The date of this massacre, rather than defeat, was the morning of the 20th of August, 1781.

The Governor-General, plunged in a decided war, and anxious both to prevent its progress, and to bring it to a speedy termination, dispatched written orders, in multiplied copies, to our different military stations, for assistance, to the Resident at the court of the Vizier, for a supply of treasure, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Blair for an instant reinforcement. Certain intelligence was received of preparations at Ramnagur for an assault on his quarters, situated in the midst of the suburbs of Benaras, and consisting of many detached buildings within one large inclosure, surrounded by houses and trees, which intercepted every other prospect.

His

His whole force was now reduced to about 1782. four hundred and fifty men. The reports of an intended assault, encreased with the advancing day : and boats seen in constant motion on the other side of the river, precluded all hesitation concerning a design so probable, except what might arise in chusing means for defeating it. Divided between the dangers of a confined situation, and the want of provisions, even for twenty-four hours, on the one hand, and the disgrace of a flight, and compassion for our wounded Sepoys on the other, the Governor-General remained during the whole course of the day, in the most agonizing suspense. But the disgrace of a flight, yielded to the superior weight of necessity ; and, with regard to the wounded men, the distance at which they were quartered, their distressed situation, and the multiplicity of pressing exigencies which the resolution to remain must have created, would have rendered it impossible either to relieve or remove them. Mr. Hastings, therefore, uniting as much as possible humanity with prudence, in the first place, dispatched a messenger

1782. messenger to the Nabob Saadut-Ally Cawn, or the brother of Asoph-ul-Dowlah, informing him of his resolution to leave Benaras, and recommending to his care the wounded Sepoys; a request which he afterwards renewed when he had effected his escape to the place he had destined for his retreat. In the evening, by the advice of Major Popham, and that of the other Field-officers present, separately asked and given, he gave orders to form their little corps, that they might have time to gain the open country before the enemy, apprized of their design, could cross and obstruct his march; entangled in streets, lanes, and broken ground. They passed a battalion of Sepoys, detached by Colonel Blair to his assistance, who, immediately turned and joined them. Early the next morning, they arrived at Chunar. About this time, the Governor-General received a letter from Cheyt Sing, fraught with expressions of concern for what had passed, and general professions of fidelity in future; and soon after, application was made by the Rajah to some gentlemen of the Governor's party,
for

for their friendly offices and intercession in 1782.
favour of certain specific proposals for an
accommodation. These advances, on the
part of Cheyt Sing, Mr. Hastings, from
several appearances indicating hostile inten-
tions, considered as artifices to gain time.
He did not, therefore, think it becoming
to make any reply to the Rajah's letter.

Soon after our little party was formed, and
the line in motion from Benaras to Chunar,
Mr. Hastings was met by Beneram Pundit,
formerly mentioned in these Memoirs, mi-
nister to Moodajee-Booslah, Rajah of Berar,
and his brother Bessumbar Pundit, on foot,
with only one attendant. The Governor-
General thanked them for the proof they
had given of their attachment, but insisted
on their return to Benaras, where they had
a large family, which, by their continuance
with him, might be exposed to the resent-
ment of Cheyt Sing. But they persisted in
their resolution of accompanying, and com-
mitting their fate with that of our men :
nor could all the importunities of Mr.
Hastings divert them from their purpose.

1782. Benaram Pundit, who was a man of a warm and eager temper, understanding the distress in which our small detachment was involved by the want of both credit and money, offered and pressed on the Governor's acceptance, a lack of rupees in ready money, which he received in the nature of a loan, giving him a note for it in the Company's name, and in the usual form.

In the mean time, the Nabob Vizier, who had expected a visit from the Governor-General, had left his capital, and advanced a short way to meet him. The Governor was not insensible of the advantages to be derived by the presence of the Nabob : but these, he considered, would invert the relation of their alliance, and invest that prince with a superiority in their meeting, which would defeat its object. Besides, he thought it inconsistent with the dignity of the Company's Government, to employ foreign aid in restoring its tranquillity. He, therefore, wrote a letter to the Nabob, requesting him to return to Lucknow, and there remain until he, the Governor,

vernor, should have leisure to prosecute his 1782.
 original journey. The Nabob, however,
 on the first intimation of his difficulties,
 was more earnest than ever to join and sup-
 port him : a purpose which he executed
 with such apparent zeal, that he made his
 first stages with no other attendance than
 about one hundred horse, and about four
 companies of his body-guards, with his usual
 domestic attendants. Mr. Hastings, inform-
 ed of this circumstance, in order to remove
 any unpleasant impressions that might have
 been made on the mind of the Nabob by
 his former letter, sent a second, expressing
 perfect confidence in his fidelity, and apo-
 logizing for what he had before written,
 from an unwillingness to involve him in a
 scene of trouble, and signifying his desire
 of seeing him, according to his own wish-
 es, at Chunar.

Whatever suspicions, or tendency to sus-
 picion, the Governor-General might have
 felt within his own breast on this occasion,
 not of the Nabob, who depended on the
 protection of our government, but of others

1782. who were near his person, and endeavoured to abuse his confidence, he prudently suppressed: nor did he ever suffer his apprehensions to influence his actions; since it was not in his power to use any means for counteracting their designs, which would not appear to proceed from a distrust of the Prince himself. The favourites of the Nabob, the companions of his looser hours, men of weak understandings and dissolute morals, jealous of the superior influence of Mr. Hastings, united with the relations of the Royal Family, in insinuating to their immediate sovereign, the most pernicious counsels, representing the present, as a fit conjuncture for asserting his independence. It is a common error, that plots are to be defeated only by counter-plots. Confederacies and intrigues, in the passions that prompt, and the variety of circumstances which must concur in order to crown them with success, involve weakness in their nature, and uncertainty in their issue: and the most direct road is usually the safest. The undaunted air of the Governor-General, the confidence which he placed, or pretended

pretended to place in the Nabob, the preparations he made for crushing the first beginnings of revolt, without calling, or even accepting the aid of tributary and dependent princes: all these circumstances had a direct and powerful tendency, to maintain an ascendant on the weak mind of Alolph-ul-Dowlah, and to confine his hopes and fears within the channels in which they had been accustomed to flow. But, had the Governor-General openly avowed his suspicions, and demanded the removal of evil counsellors from the person of their sovereign, on the one hand; or endeavoured to form a party in his favour, in the Durbar of the Nabob, on the other: in either case his conduct would have been attended with danger. In the first case, he might have precipitated the designs of his enemies, who might have seized the person of the prince, and armed themselves with his authority: in the second, he would have betrayed weakness and fear, which, instead of dividing, would, in all probability, have united his enemies in a firm purpose, at so tempting a crisis, to effect his ruin. No-

1782. thing, therefore, can be imagined, either more magnanimous, or more judicious, than the conduct of Mr. Hastings, who, without either holding a parley, or inviting an open contest with his enemies, rushed, without a moment's delay, into the securest fortrefs.

There was not, in reality, room, amidst the difficulties with which he was environed, for the slow and indirect modes of political intrigue. The contagion of revolt had flown, in an instant, from Benaras, to Fyzabad, and the territories of Goruckpoor and Bareech. In the city of Fyzabad, the mother and grand-mother of the Nabob, openly espoused the party of Cheyt Sing, encouraging and inviting people to enlist in his service: and the standard of revolt was raised by their own servants. Two battalions of regular Sepoys, in the Vizier's service, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hannay, stationed in Oude, were in various places surrounded, attacked, and many of them cut to pieces. Many of the Zemindars of Bahar, had discovered

coverd symptoms of disaffection; and levies of men, if common report can be credited, were openly entertained in that province for the enemy, by our own subjects.

Through an unfortunate train of official perplexities, which had happened some time preceding this, both Major Popham's regiment, the rangers, and all the corps of the garrison of Chunar, were four months in arrears. The Governor-General, in the midst of these alarming circumstances, when the war in the Carnatic wore an aspect that portended, at best, no more than the probability of being able to prolong an uncertain struggle; when we were engaged in a war with the Marratta states, on the coast of Malabar, and with Madajee Scindiah, near our own borders; when a sudden rebellion had deprived us of every foot of land in Benaras, and, having involved the province of Oude in a similar defection, was extending its contagion over those of Rohilcund, and Doab, and when even our own province of Bahar was ripe for insurrection: while troubles had overtaken, and were

1782. still gathering around him on every side, the Governor-General found himself unable to command three thousand rupees.

Under these accumulated difficulties and dangers, Mr. Hastings derived comfort and relief from the public spirit, the activity, and the personal confidence and attachment of all the officers in the nearest military stations, to whom, after the massacre of Shewallah Gaut, orders, in different letters had been sent for assistance, and from the unshaken fidelity of the Nabob Vizier. The early exertions made by Colonel Blair and Major Popham have been already mentioned. Though every letter sent to Colonel Morgan, commanding the troops at Cawnpore had been intercepted, that officer, rightly judging of the past misadventures of the Governor and his present situation, from constant report and the sudden failure of intelligence, with a solicitude and decision which reflect equal credit on his character, rushed to his aid, under the command of Major Crabb, two regiments of Sepoys, thirty European artillery men, and
two

two companies of the European regiment, 1782. with four six-pounders, one howitzer, tumbrils, ammunition, draft and carriage cattle, and as great a quantity of provisions as he could spare.

He was afterwards ordered to follow with his whole force : and Colonel Sir John Cumming, on receiving an order to occupy his station at Cawnpore, marched thither, with the utmost diligence and alacrity, in the space of four days. Lieutenant Polhill, on the 27th of August, arrived with six companies of Sepoys belonging to the Nabob Vizier's body-guard, stationed at Illiabad. He was ordered to encamp on the opposite banks of the river, for the purpose of preserving a communication with that shore. On the 29th he attacked and defeated a considerable body of troops under the command of the chief Shehaub Cawn, who was stationed at a small fort and town called Seekar, within sight of Chupar.

On

1782. On the 13th of September, Major Roberts, with his regiment and a lack of rupees in silver, arrived from Lucknow, whither he had been sent for a guard to the Governor-General's person, in his intended visit to that capital. A farther supply of fifty thousand rupees was received a few days after, by the collector of the Nabob's rents at Illiabad. On the 11th, the Nabob Vizier arrived at his encampment, which had been formed on the shore opposite to Chunar. Mr. Hastings chose to make him the first visit, the same morning on which he arrived: and it was returned by the Nabob on the next. On the 15th Lieutenant Polhill crossed the river and joined Major Popham's camp.

The whole detachment now consisted of one company of European grenadiers, one of light infantry, one of French rangers, thirty European artillery men, four regiments and one battalion of Sepoys, and six companies of the Nabob's body guard.

The

The troops entertained by the Rajah 1782. Cheyt Sing, amounted nearly to twenty-two thousand, besides a great number of husbandmen and others, who voluntarily took up arms, encreasing his whole forces, at this time, regulars and irregulars, to the number of forty thousand. These were stationed in Luteefpoor, Pateeta, and Ramnagur. Those of them that were reputed the best, were at Pateeta. The great mass of irregulars, with part of the other troops, remained with the Rajah at Luteefpoor, his residence since his flight from his palace at Benaras. Luteefpoor, situated fifteen miles eastward of Chunar, is a large fort built with stone, surrounded by hills, and, whether from neglect or design, concealed from distant view with thick coppice wood and trees. Pateeta is a very large town, surrounded by a rampart of earth, which extends to a great distance beyond it, to the adjoining hills, and including a small square building of stone invisible, at first, to assailants, fortified with four round towers, and enclosed with an high rampart and ditch, which is in most parts broad and deep.

The

1782. The plan of operations originally intended, as above mentioned, was, in the first place, to reduce the town and fort of Ramnagur; the capture of which would lead to the re-possession of the capital, and restore the authority of the English over the whole province. For this purpose battering cannon and mortars were ordered to Major Popham's camp, and all other preparations made that were necessary for a siege; when the system that had been adopted by the Governor-General and the officers of his party, was exchanged for another suggested by Bundoo Khan, a native and inhabitant of the town of Chunar. This man had accompanied Captain Blair, first in his action, already mentioned, at Ramnagur, and afterwards in another action at Pateeta, of which the following is a brief account.

Captain Blair, on the 3d of September, was detached by Major Popham with his battalion, and two companies of grenadiers, to surprize the enemy's camp at Pateeta.— Having marched at three in the morning, they arrived by day-light at the ground; but

but they found it abandoned, and the ene- 1782.
my, who had by some means or other been apprized of their design, waiting for their approach, on ground which they had chosen about a mile beyond it. An engagement immediately ensued, in which the enemy, furious and daring from recent success, fought with desperate intrepidity. Our Sepoys had begun to give way, when the Lieutenants Fallon and Birrel, at the head of the two companies of grenadiers, turning the tide of fortune, obtained possession of the field of battle, with four guns and four tumbrils loaded with ammunition.

The loss sustained by our small detachment in this bloody action was very great: forty-eight men killed, and eighty-five wounded. The enemy were furnished with all the apparatus of artillery, equal, or nearly equal, to the production of an European laboratory. It was from their cannon, which was well served, that our party principally suffered. This victory, though it did not drive the enemy from Patetta, and though purchased by the expenditure of one fourth

1782. fourth of the party, was yet a victory in its effects, as it encouraged our troops, but dispirited the enemy, and, at a time when the minds of all men were in suspense concerning the party it would be prudent to flee or to follow, tended to form an important preface of our success in the public opinion.

Bundoo Cawn, who, by his knowledge of the ground and his advice in the application of it, had rendered eminent as well as gratuitous service to Captain Blair, in this as well as a former action at Ramnagur, was induced by the interest and safety of a large family, which depended on our success, and encouraged by the confidence and applause of the little English army, to offer his information and advice, on all occasions where he thought they might be of service. He represented, that, as the Rajah's force was principally collected at Luteefpoor and Pateeta, and was daily increasing, it would be exceedingly difficult to dislodge him, if he should be suffered to establish himself by a series of detailed operations, supporting each other and combined in a system.

The

The approaches both to Pateeta and Lutteefpoor were strongly guarded, and especially those of Lutteefpoor, to which the only road that was practicable ran through Pateeta. But even if Lutteefpoor could have been carried, on another side, it would be untenable, the Cawn represented, from the strength of the pass, called, Suckroot, behind it, of which the enemy would keep possession in defiance of all their efforts, and against any superiority of numbers. He therefore advised that two attacks should be executed at the same instant of time: one on the pass of Suckroot, another on the fort of Pateeta. Of the pass, he said, which was of the easiest access, being unguarded from above, our forces might easily obtain possession, and thereby gain the same advantage over the garrison of Lutteefpoor, as the garrison would have over them, if they took possession of that fort first: and every other road of communication with Lutteefpoor, would be commanded by the possession of Pateeta. Bundoo Cawn offered to conduct the party which should be sent against the pass, by a road unfrequented and
unknown,

1782. unknown, but which he described most minutely, and, as has since appeared, with astonishing correctness.

A similar instance of this topographical ingenuity in the natives of Asia, which appears to be somewhat akin to their disposition and faculty for imitation *, was experienced by Colonel Fullarton, who commanded the English army south of the Coleroon, towards the conclusion of the war with Hyder and Tippoo Sultaun. When the army encamped before Daraporam, it was not found practicable to approach so near the fort, as to determine with precision the most advantageous point of attack.—But a Bramin hircarra, or intelligencer, explained every particular respecting the po-

* The nature of the Hindoos is peculiarly fitted for works of imitation by a delicate sensibility of corporeal organization, by that patient perseverance, which so eminently distinguishes them, and by another quality, if it be another, namely, that they are wholly occupied and absorbed in the present object. No distraction of thought; no wandering of imagination: the force of their mind is brought to bear with effect on one point, by means of deeply fixed attention. Hence, the original model is not to be distinguished from the new production, in any kind of cloth, earth, metal, wood, or stone.

sition

sition of the works, and the nature of the ground adjacent, in such a manner as enabled him to draw a plan from his description. The Adjutant-General, Captain Oram, also drew a plan from the accounts of another Hircarrah. The two plans thus drawn from verbal information, were found so exactly similar in every material point, that, on the strength thereof, a body of our troops marched in a dark night, crossed a river, and occupied a strong position within four hundred yards of the fort, from whence they erected batteries, and effected a breach. 1782.

A better military plan than that which had been proposed by Bundoo Cawn, could not have been laid down by the most experienced commander. Major Popham instantly saw its propriety, and adopted it. He formed the army into two divisions. The Major, at the head of one of these, marched to Pateeta, which he took by storm, on the morning of the 20th of September*.

* At the storm of Pateeta, two Nujeebs were wounded and taken prisoners. They were part of a body of six hundred men recruited at Fyzabad, by the Begum's orders, and sent to join Cheyt Sing.

1782. Major Crabb conducted the other division through ways almost impracticable, to a village called Lora, about two miles from the Suckroot pass, where he found a body of men, with three guns posted to oppose him. The enemy, after a stout resistance, by which we lost twelve men, but they themselves a much greater number, fled through the pass to Lutteefpoor. Our detachment followed them as far as the head of the pass, where they encamped for the remainder of the day.

The mind of Cheyt Sing, amidst these events, appears to have been actuated by ideas of hostility or of submission, according as it was impressed by present objects of hope or of fear. After the action of Captain Blair, at Pateeta, in which his party suffered severely, and his return to Chunar, which was probably represented as a retreat, the Rajah, either authorized, or countenanced a massacre of fourteen of our sick prisoners, who had fallen into his hands, in cold blood. At other times he sent letters, fraught with assertions of his innocence, professions of submission, and offers

offers of accommodation. These, indeed, 1782. were so strong, and so often repeated, that had they proceeded from a sensible and manly character, the Governor-General, situated as he was, must have been inclined to listen to them with pleasure. But Cheyt Sing was a weak and irresolute man. He varied in his views according to accidental advices and impressions, and, in proportion as he was removed from actual danger, by distance of place or time, he became confident of his wealth, his strong-holds, the number of his adherents, the distresses of our government, and the power of its increasing enemies. And, whatever may be thought concerning that political necessity, which impelled the Governor-General to provide for extraordinary exigencies, by extraordinary means, or, when the fate of his country stood trembling on a precipice, concerning the propriety of fixing his eye for relief, where wealth, acquired by the Company's patronage, was united with designs against the Company's safety; certain it is, that hostilities against the Rajah, had been too far prosecuted to be abandoned;

1782. for his prosperity could not co-exist with that of the British nation in India.

The news of our successes against Pateeta, and the Suckroot pass, heightening terror by surprize, disarmed Cheyt Sing of all resolution. His last refuge was Bidjey-Gur, a fort erected on the solid rocks of a hill, rising from the ground to the height of seven hundred and forty-five perpendicular feet. This fort, which was the repository of all his own and his father's treasures, is situated about fifty miles in a south-east direction from Chunar. The road to this place lay through the pass, which he durst not attempt. But, by making a circuit over the hills, he gained the high road, at the distance of some miles beyond Suckroot, and proceeded with a few followers to the neighbourhood of Bidjey-Gur. He was now forsaken by all his adherents. On the approach of Major Popham, who advanced from Lutteefpoor to Bidjey-Gur, without loss of time, he fled by the route of Rewa, to the capital of Bundle-Cund; taking with him as much treasure as his elephants

elephants and camels could carry, which, 1782. besides jewels, amounted in specie, to four hundred thousand pounds sterling. He left his wife, a woman of an amiable character, his mother Pauna, and all the other women of his house, with the survivors of his father's family, who were connected with his, in the fort.

The whole province of Benaras returned under the obedience of the Company. The town was placed under the government of a newly-created and independent magistracy; and the Zemindary bestowed, on the 30th of September, on Bauboo Mehipnairain, grandson in the female line, to the Rajah Bulwant Sing, according to the Hindoo law the next lineal heir, after his mother and grand-mother, who, in his favour, formally yielded up their pretensions.

It was agreed on between the Governor-General, in the name of the East-India Company, and the Nabob Vizier, that a reduction

1782. duction should be made in the expence and the numbers of the Nabob's troops, consisting chiefly of a disorderly and useless rabble, and that a new military establishment should be formed, well appointed and commanded, efficient in service, and such as should protect, instead of distressing his country: and that, as great distresses had arisen to the Nabob's government, from the military power and dominion assumed by the Jagheerdars, he should be permitted to resume such Jagheers as he might find necessary, with a reserve, in case of the resumption of any jagheers for the amount of which the Company were guarantees, that an equivalent for their clear collections or rents, should be paid through the resident at Lucknow in ready money.

Agreeably to this convention, a resumption was advised by Asoph-ul-Dowlah, and agreed to by Mr. Hastings, of the jagheers or estates of the Begums or Princesses of Oude, his mother and grand-mother, who, as above mentioned, had united their authority and influence to embarrass the Nabob's government,

government, and to extend and aggravate 1782.
the difficulties of the English. A provision
at the same time was made, for replacing
their income at the exact rate at which it
stood in their own estimate, while they held
the jagheers, by making it the condition of
the resumption, that they should receive a
pension equal to the amount of those pos-
sessions, in equal monthly payments: and
these, for the fullest security, were made
payable from the produce of the Company's
assignments. The hoarded treasures of the
Begums, at the request of their son and
grandson, to whom they belonged by the
right of hereditary succession, were also re-
sumed: by which means the Nabob was en-
abled to pay the arrears of subsidy due from
Oude for the protection of the Company,
which furnished a very seasonable and ne-
cessary supply for the support of his own
authority, by that of the British government
in India. But this was not effected with-
out a temporary confinement of two eunuchs,
confidential servants of the Begums, and
even subjecting them, for a short time, to
the rigour and indignity of irons. The usual

1782. and necessary subsistence, too, was withheld from the inferior women and children of the late Nabob Sujah-ul-Dowlah, for some days: an act of cruelty which originated in the negligence of the Phoufdar of Lutteefpoor, and which was removed by the interference of the British officers. It cannot be imputed in any degree to the Governor-General, who was entirely ignorant of it till it was over.

The successful vigour of Mr. Hastings, the alacrity with which he was supported by our military stations, the rapidity with which his collected force quashed rebellion, and exalted the power of his country on its ruins, excited the astonishment of India, and the admiration of Europe. But the exultation of a great party in the House of Commons, on this occasion of triumph, was lost in compassion for Cheyt Sing, the imprisoned eunuchs, and the Begums; in indignation against the Governor-General, whom they compared to Nero, Cortez, Pizarro, and other odious tyrants; and in melancholy forebodings of that ruin which
the

the awakened resentment of all the native 1782.
Princes must soon involve, if they had not
already involved the British interests in In-
dia. They expatiated on the royal blood
of Cheyt Sing, and bewailed the hardships
of the Princesses of Oude, whose advanced
years, tender sex, and recluse manner of life,
rendered them very unfit persons to wage
war with a disciplined European army.—
They denied that there was the least reason
for imputing rebellious designs to Cheyt
Sing or the Begums, and found fault with
whatever kind or degree of evidence was
alleged or produced of hostile intentions or
actions. If the testimony of Hindoos was
produced, they were under the influence of
fear : if that of Europeans, they were under
the impressions either of gratitude, or the
hope of favour. If in any instance the
Governor-General acted on the strength of
public notoriety, they demanded legal evi-
dence : if the best evidence that could be
obtained was given, they construed the
foreflight that obtained it into a proof of
conscious guilt. If the friends of Mr.
Hastings pled the difference between Asia-
tic

1782. tic and free European Governments, they replied, that, however *fear* might have been the ruling principle in India formerly, they had projected, and even begun to make an experiment of an opposite system. If it was said that dominion, especially in times of political danger, is best retained through the same means by which it was acquired, and that, in such cases, new experiments are dangerous, the answer was, *Fiat justitia, ruat cælum* *.

To maintain a prosecution against a man allowed to possess many amiable qualities as well as great talents, unsuspected of private rapacity, and who, at the worst had saved our settlements in India by arts exactly similar to those by which we had obtained them, required uncommon abilities, and found them. Mr. Burke, in his charge against Mr. Hastings, was ably supported by many of his political friends: but the most distinguished of his auxiliaries was Mr. Sheridan.

* This maxim, which may be translated; *Do justice and be damned*, is very justly considered by Mr. Hume as an absurd sacrifice of the end to the means.

Richard Brindley Sheridan, a descendant 1782.
of that Sheridan whose name is immortalized
in the writings of Dean Swift, was, like
Edmund Burke, a political adventurer, and a
native of Ireland, though he was educated
in England, and, for some years, under the
tuition of the learned and classical Doctor
Samuel Parr. He possessed, like his il-
lustrious countryman, excellent qualities
both of body and mind, improved by a
learned and liberal education: an expressive
countenance, a manly yet pleasing deport-
ment, great insinuation and address, veras-
tity and accommodation of manners in the
common intercourses of life, but, in mat-
ters of importance, inviolable attachment
to his professed principles. He was intro-
duced to public life by Mr. Fox; and he
has paid the finest compliment that was
ever yet made to that wonderful man's pe-
netration and discernment of character.
He was distinguished, as well as Mr.
Burke, by learning, eloquence, wit, and
humour, and, like Mr. Burke, he maintain-
ed unshaken fidelity to his friends, with a
narrow private fortune. In short, the
country, the situation and the friends of
these

1782. these men were the same ; and their talents and virtues nearly equal in degree, but different in kind. Though Mr. Burke knew how to excuse the follies and frailties of his fellow-men, he was from the sensibility of his temper, not indisposed to remark them. Mr. Sheridan had a quick apprehension of whatever was either odious or ludicrous in human life and conduct, but, except on the theatre he seemed too good-natured to observe it. Mr. Burke inclined somewhat to the sternness of republican virtue : Mr. Sheridan to the indulgence of a court. They both of them seasoned their orations with the pleasing excursions of fancy : but, while Mr. Burke often rose from Earth to Heaven, and it was not every one who accompanied him in his flight that could distinguish the summits of mountains from clouds, clear argument and business were always the predominant features in the speeches of Mr. Sheridan. The former preserved his dignity by husbanding fortune ; the latter by despising it. Mr. Burke, like Cicero, sacrificed, at his *Tusculum**, both to the muses, and the household Gods. Mr. :

* A beautified farm.

Sheridan, like Cæsar, fought to reign in 1782. the hearts of men, refused nothing when he had aught to bestow, and, in every situation, with his eye fixed on the objects of a lofty ambition, waited in perfect tranquillity for that relief which the common vicissitudes of human affairs, rightly improved by commanding genius, are wont to bring to all difficulties.

Mr. Sheridan, acting the part committed to him by his political friends, on the 17th of November 1782, at night, paid a visit to a gentleman, who was known to have taken a very active part in favour of Mr. Hastings, in whose family he had lived in India. This gentleman Mr. Sheridan had not visited before this night for several months, and the intimacy between them, though not broken off, had long been suspended. The express and avowed purpose of this visit, was, to talk over the affairs of Mr. Hastings ; and it was agreed between this gentleman and Mr. Sheridan, that the former should call on the next morning upon Major Scott, to communicate what had

1782. had passed: and Major Scott was to be desired to meet Mr. Sheridan at eleven o'clock that morning, at a third house. The communication made by the gentleman who visited Major Scott was, as he understood, that he came to him with the olive branch; that Mr. Hastings might come home with perfect security, with half a million, or whatever might be the amount of his fortune; that the ministers had strength enough to carry Mr. Fox's bill by which the government of India was to be vested in seven commissioners appointed by the House of Commons, but they knew it would be opposed at the India House. The condition therefore required from Major Scott, was, that the friends of Mr. Hastings should not join in the opposition to the bill. In reply to this communication, Major Scott at once said he would not meet Mr. Sheridan, but that he would go to the gallery of the House of Commons, where he should hear Mr. Fox himself: and he further told the gentleman who called upon him, in answer to some doubts that were expressed whether Mr. Hastings would come when recalled,
that

that all the world knew there had been a letter upon the table of the Court of Directors, since the month of September, in which he expressly desired them immediately to appoint a successor to the government of Bengal. The gentleman who waited upon Major Scott further told him, that, if the negociation came to nothing, no notice was to be taken of any offer of the kind having been made. Mr. Fox made his famous speech on the 18th of November, in which he grounded the necessity for his bill upon the mismanagement of Mr. Hastings, and said, that his whole proceeding was the proceeding of a man who had drawn the sword, and thrown away the scabbard. The following morning, the 19th, Major Scott, and the friend who had called upon him, met again, when the latter clearly declared, that after Mr. Fox's speech, Mr. Sheridan had no right to expect secrecy from either of them. The press was not idle: every paper teemed with gross and *anonymous* abuse of Mr. Hastings, with threats of vengeance, and now and then with something like a promise of favour, if the friends
of

1782. of Mr. Hastings would be less active. In answer to one of these paragraphs, Major Scott, openly, and with his name at full length to the assertion, avowed, on the 27th of November, ten days after Mr. Sheridan had visited his friends, that he, Major Scott “*rejected the offer of an act of oblivion for his principal, provided he would remain silent during the present attack upon the East India Company.*” This avowal, written before the Committee of proprietors at the India House, and inserted in the Morning Chronicle, was never answered; nor was the gentleman whom Mr. Sheridan had visited, or Major Scott, taxed with a breach of secrecy.

Mr. Sheridan having failed of success in the character of a negociator, displayed transcendent eloquence in that of an accuser. The part he undertook, was, to make good the charge of oppression and cruelty, on the part of Mr. Hastings, towards the Princesses of Oude, or, as they were commonly called, the Begums of Fyzabad. He spoke six hours and an half without producing in his audience any symptoms of fatigue,

fatigue. He shewed consummate art in 1782.
the arrangement of his matter, and skill in
the conduct of the passions; making a just
estimate of the impression that it was rea-
sonable to suppose what he had said, in
the different stages of his oration, had
produced, addressing himself to the tone
of his audience, passing by natural transi-
tions from one topic to another, relieving
the attention by wit and humour, or com-
manding it by glowing sentiments of com-
passion and of indignation. At the con-
clusion of his speech, a great number of
the members had the indecency to clap their
hands, and to stamp with their feet and their
staves, as if they had thereby expressed their
satisfaction at a theatrical entertainment.
Yet, although he acted the part so proper-
ly committed to his powers, with all this
ability, a little recollection would have suf-
ficed to discover, in many instances, the
weakness of his ground; nor would his
eloquence have silenced, for a time,
almost the whole House of Commons, if
they had not been pre-disposed to acquiesce,
either in reality or in appearance, in his

1782. reasoning. Mr. Pitt, the first Lord of the Treasury, jealous of the great mind of Mr. Hastings, embraced with avidity a pretext for humbling the man whom he considered as his rival, and veiled his own hostile fears under the sacred name of a regard to justice. But, as he owed his station to the friends, and to the personal magnanimity of Mr. Hastings, in refusing to purchase his quietus by joining a faction against him, and might still, perhaps, have need of support from the East-India Company, he mingled praise with his slight censures, and seemed willing that no heavier stigma should be affixed to the name of Hastings than what might just be sufficient to preclude all ideas, at least for a long time, of placing him at the head of the administration for India.—When Mr. Pitt, after an equivocal exordium, gave his voice for bringing an impeachment against Mr. Hastings, on the day after Mr. Sheridan made his speech; certain spectators in the gallery of the House of Commons, expressed their surprise and disgust, in involuntary bursts of astonishment and indignation. Among those

those who walked out on that day, under 1782. the shadow of the ministerial wing, to vote against Mr. Hastings, was, Mr. Henry Dundas, who, on different occasions, had emphatically acknowledged, that, but for the exertions of the Governor-General, India must have been lost to Great Britain. Here we shall take an opportunity of recording the following extraordinary fact. The vote of the House of Commons for recalling Mr. Hastings, above-mentioned, though it originated with Mr. Burke, was moved by Mr. Dundas, who publicly and repeatedly declared, that he did not make his motion, though pressed to make it by the importunities of Mr. Burke, on the ground of delinquency.

Other inferior charges were brought against Mr. Hastings by inferior orators.—At a time when the world waited to know what mark of honour the Court of London would bestow on the man who had saved India, and in fact the British empire, Sir James Erskine, one of the representatives of the people, pursued him with hostile vengeance, for not driving an harder

A a 2

bargain

1782. bargain in certain opium and bullock contracts.

But, in the midst of all these proceedings, when a singular concurrence of prejudice, faction, and private jealousy, under the standard of the most fascinating eloquence, aimed at the ruin of Mr. Hastings, and dazzled and confounded the credulous multitude with the boldness of their assertions, the candid and considerate part of the nation, whether in Parliament or private societies, in favour of the Governor-General of Bengal, urged, or listened to such arguments as these :

“ In the whole compass of morality there
“ are two things principally to be considered : first, What are the sentiments and
“ what the tenor of conduct that denominates one action, or course of actions, virtuous, and the contrary vicious ? and, secondly, by what principle or law is virtue recommended and authorized, and vice stigmatized and reprobated ? Concerning the
“ last of these questions metaphysicians have
“ differed,

“ differed, and will probably continue to 2782.
“ differ: but, with regard to the first and
“ most important, they are, all of them,
“ very nearly, if not wholly agreed. They
“ assign, as the ultimate reason for every
“ rule which they establish, the necessities
“ and the conveniencies of mankind, and
“ readily admit, that the first and funda-
“ mental law in all political constitutions,
“ is the preservation of society. It has ac-
“ cordingly been the uniform practice of all
“ countries, when there was a prospect of
“ war, on public grounds of suspicion, to se-
“ cure the persons of individuals thought to
“ be disaffected to the state, by which means
“ great public calamities are prevented.—
“ On the same ground of public utility and
“ advantage, villages are destroyed, lest they
“ should afford shelter to the enemy. It
“ is true, that, in such cases, reparation is
“ made to the inoffensive inhabitants: and,
“ accordingly, reparation has been made to
“ the Princesses of Oude, for the resump-
“ tion of their jagheers; and their hoarded
“ treasures belonged of right to their son
“ and grandson.

1782. “ With regard to Cheyt Sing, without
“ determining whether the insurrection at
“ Benaras was accidental or designed, it is
“ sufficient to observe, that having fled on
“ the restoration of tranquillity with his
“ treasures to the Rajah of Bundle-cund,
“ he neither experienced the rigour of our
“ government, nor its lenity or justice.—
“ Has the British Parliament, in which we
“ find the men who held in their hands
“ the reins of Government, during that
“ conflict with so many nations, whose as-
“ flicting consequences we all feel and de-
“ plore, has the British Ministry and Par-
“ liament, in all cases, made compensation to
“ those who have suffered in the cause of
“ England, as ample, as equal, as permanent
“ and secure as that which the justice of Mr.
“ Hastings has granted to the Princesses of
“ Asia. The American Loyalists, on the very
“ scene, braved the fury of prevailing rebellion
“ with an intrepidity and constancy that re-
“ proached that timorous and temporizing
“ policy, that indolence and infatuation in
“ the servants of the crown, both by sea and
“ land, and that cruel rage of faction,
“ which

“ which impeded the wheels of a weak 1782.
“ government, in more forcible strains than
“ the most piteous complaints that could be
“ poured forth before a generous people.—
“ This is a subject worthy of all the Mu-
“ ses fire, never worse employed than in
“ arraigning one of their most favoured sons!
“ In what pathetic accents might not the
“ inimitable eloquence of Burke and She-
“ ridan represent the disconsolate widow,
“ sitting in solitary places, mourning an hus-
“ band slain, an infant lost? And how easy
“ would it be for the logical distinction of
“ Mr. Pitt, were he inclined, to find some
“ precedent or pretext for ranking the mis-
“ conduct of Mr. Hastings, and the sufferings
“ of women who had been reduced to the ne-
“ cessity of accepting a yearly revenue from
“ their son instead of a landed estate: how
“ easy would it be for the subtlety of Mr. Pitt
“ to find some reason or other for ranking the
“ misconduct of Mr. Hastings, and the grie-
“ vances of the Begums, in an order infe-
“ rior to the enormities that disgraced dif-
“ ferent parties in the conduct of the Ame-
“ rican war, and the calamities that afflict-
“ ed

1782. “ ed and still afflict the loyal subjects of
“ Great Britain across the Atlantic? Does
“ the pittance allowed by Government, as
“ an indemnification to the Loyalists, bear
“ any proportion to the income continued
“ to the Begums? Ladies secluded from the
“ world in the recesses of a seraglio, and in
“ whose hands political power and import-
“ ance served only, by nourishing a spirit of
“ ambition, to dissolve the ties of blood,
“ and to embitter the fallen state of their
“ family by domestic discord? Far different
“ from theirs is the condition of the disper-
“ sed families of the Loyalists! Aged pa-
“ rents, accustomed to receive their kindred
“ and friends with plenty and hospitality,
“ now in the character of petitioners for
“ some provision against the extremity of
“ want for themselves and their children ;
“ and the tender sex struggling by every ef-
“ fort to unite that delicacy and dignity of
“ sentiment, in which they have been bred,
“ with the means of self-preservation! While
“ such objects, related to us by blood, by
“ language, manners, and religion, by
“ friendship ill-requited on our part, and
“ fond

“ fond confidence misplaced on theirs ; while 1778.
“ such objects present themselves to our view,
“ whence all this gallantry to Bow Begum,
“ and the women of the Haram of Sujah-ul-
“ Dowlah?

“ Charity naturally begins at home.
“ That which seeks objects of compassion
“ in an opposite hemisphere, is suspicious.—
“ In the relation that subsists between sove-
“ reigns and their subjects, if allegiance is
“ implied on the one part, protection is pre-
“ sumed on the other. The Loyliasts, there-
“ fore, if the affairs of state, even on the
“ greatest emergency, are to be squared by
“ the abstracted accuracy of eternal justice
“ and truth, have an undoubted right to an
“ absolute restitution of all they have lost,
“ and reparation, as far as that is possible,
“ for all they have suffered. But is it ar-
“ gued, that full restitution, as well as com-
“ plete reparation to the unfortunate subjects
“ of Britain in America, is impossible?
“ Then it is admitted, that political exigen-
“ cies may not only suspend, but supersede
“ the execution of justice. Under this
“ conviction,

1781. “ conviction, then, let the candid mind
“ judge of the conduct of Mr. Hastings re-
“ specting the Begums of Oude and the Ra-
“ jah of Benaras.

“ Whoever imagines that, by all the
“ mildness we have mixed, or that it is
“ possible for us to mix with our tyranny
“ over the Princes of Asia, we shall be
“ able to gain their confidence and affection,
“ is egregiously mistaken. Whatever aro-
“ matics we may infuse in their cup,
“ the bitter taste will still so far prevail as
“ to induce a strong desire of casting it from
“ them, whenever they can: and the greater
“ the hope of being able to do so, the more
“ ardent also will be the desire. It is a
“ property in human nature, that any emo-
“ tion which attends a passion is easily con-
“ verted into it, though in their natures
“ they be originally different, and even
“ contrary to each other. Hence hope is
“ able not only to inflame the desire of ob-
“ taining any particular object, but also to
“ excite anger against the person who with-
“ holds it, or to heighten it where it was
“ before-hand the predominant passion.

“ To govern reduced provinces, espec- 1782.
“ ally such as are remote from the seat of
“ government, by slackening the curb of
“ power, and granting a few indulgencies
“ to a subjected people, imperious nations
“ have always found to be difficult, and
“ for the most part impossible. After
“ what has so recently passed in America
“ and in Ireland, we cannot be at a loss to
“ judge of the effects of partial concession.
“ Every degree of liberty indulged to men
“ tends to produce at once a desire, and a
“ sense of their natural right, to enjoy it in
“ its full extent.

“ It was through the grand-mother of
“ Asoph-ul-Dowlah, as was justly observed
“ by the accusers of Mr. Hastings, that he
“ succeeded to the rank and power of the
“ Nabob Vizier, she being the daughter
“ and only heir of the antient Soubah.
“ She is allowed to be a woman of an
“ high spirit ; and her pride is naturally
“ heightened by the recollection of her an-
“ cestry and of former times. She therefore
“ considered the English as the oppressors of
“ her

1782. “ her family, and the usurpers of its inheritance. The resentment which she naturally entertained against our nation, there was reason to dread, would be inflamed by the hope of gratification. She was not uninformed of the situation of affairs in the western world. The crowns of that monarch, whose power she had long equally dreaded and detested, seemed now to totter on his head ; and that of America had already fallen. The French, the Spaniards, the Dutch, the three greatest maritime powers in the world next to ourselves, whose strength was but too well known in the east, pressed with their united weight on the English, and the standard of revolt began to be raised in Benaras. In such circumstances what confidence could Mr. Hastings repose in the attachment of the high-spirited Begum, or what in her numerous subjects? Mankind are governed by opinion ; and the opinion by which they are governed is two-fold : an opinion of interest, and an opinion of right. Ideas of right have an influence on the minds of men which
“ have

“ have been found, in some instances, to
“ prevail over those of interest.

“ Hence in all nations, and in none more
“ than in Great Britain, Chiefs have been
“ found, who, in the full possession of their
“ privileges and fortune, have flown to the
“ standard of exiled Princes, followed by
“ bands of voluntary vassals. But in Asia,
“ where the reverence to royal blood is
“ stronger than in Europe, and where the
“ oppressions of Europeans, compared with
“ those the people suffer under their na-
“ tive princes, are greater ; in Asia, where
“ all ranks of men are divided against us by
“ an opinion both of right and interest, and
“ ready to start into a posture of hostility
“ on every occasion where there is any
“ prospect of success, and in circumstances
“ so full of alarm, why should Mr. Haf-
“ tings deem it incredible that the Princesses
“ of Oude should join the general conspiracy
“ of the world against Great Britain, or
“ seek for theories by which he might recon-
“ cile hostile appearances with benevolent
“ intentions ? Is not our government over
“ the

1782. “ the natives of India, whatever palliatives
“ we may apply or project, in reality despo-
“ tic? Is not the first principle of des-
“ potism, jealousy of its subjects? Was
“ there no ground of jealousy, jealousy
“ heightened beyond the pitch of its usual
“ vigilance, in the circumstances in which
“ the Governor-General of Bengal was pla-
“ ced towards the close of the year 1781?
“ If there was, is his country, which his
“ services have so eminently contributed
“ to save, to make no allowance for the
“ force, for the violence with which reports
“ of military preparations must have fallen
“ on a mind anxious for the preservation of
“ all that was committed to the exertion of
“ its powers? If there were among his col-
“ leagues in the Company’s service, men
“ who were perfectly undisturbed amidst
“ growing alarms, there was the more reason
“ for Mr. Hastings to be vigilant. On the
“ one hand, it was at least probable
“ that a revolt was begun in the pro-
“ vince of Oude as well as in Benaras,
“ and more than probable that it was
“ intended: on the other, it was possible
“ that

“ that the reports concerning the orders 1782.
“ and designs of the Begums might be false.
“ If the fears of the Governor-General
“ should prove to be groundless, and that,
“ in seizing the resources of the Begums, he
“ should commit an injury, that injury
“ might afterwards be repaired; but if, on
“ the presumption that their intentions,
“ notwithstanding all appearances to the
“ contrary, were pacific, he should forbear
“ to act as he did, the empire of Great
“ Britain in the East might be lost.

“ In our wars with the house of Bour-
“ bon, have we not been accustomed, on
“ the appearance of hostilities on the part
“ of that kingdom, to anticipate an attack
“ by making one? Is this conduct to be
“ condemned? Are the ministers who fol-
“ lowed it with success to be impeached, and
“ those who, notwithstanding the commu-
“ nications from Lord Stormont when am-
“ bassador at Paris, neglected it to the dis-
“ grace of Britain, to be promoted and ho-
“ noured? Was not the conduct of Mr.
“ Hastings exactly in the spirit of the great
“ Earl

1782. “ Earl of Chatham, when, being apprehensive of the designs of Spain, he nobly dared to despise vain forms, and by a sudden blow to prevent their execution?— And whether are we to reprobate the memory of the father, or to approve the *legal policy* of the son; who, as if he were born to refute the doctrine that the qualities of the mind are hereditary as well as those of the body, condemns in Mr. Hastings what raised his progenitor to immortal honour?

“ Though the Begums of Oude lived under the protection of our ally, and were in fact our subjects, they were divided from the English by all those circumstances of diversity which commonly prove the sources of animosity and contest among nations. Though overborne by superior power, the unconquerable will remained of shaking off the English yoke: and who, reasoning on the principles of the law of nature, will affirm that they had not a right to spurn it if they could? The very circumstance of their
“ subjection

“ subjection was a reason why we should 1782.
 “ be jealous of their endeavours to overturn
 “ it. There were more points of oppo-
 “ sition between them and the British na-
 “ tion, than between the British nation
 “ and the Spaniards: and their minds
 “ were at least equally hostile. What is
 “ the magic then, in the name of God, of
 “ their being our friends, allies, or subjects,
 “ that should supersede the propriety of con-
 “ sidering what are their real inclinations,
 “ and what their power in all situa-
 “ tions when vigilance becomes the first
 “ duty of a statesman, when jealousy be-
 “ comes a virtue? The only question is,
 “ concerning the different degrees of the
 “ dangers which threatened Great Britain
 “ from the Spaniards in 1762, and from
 “ the Princes of India in 1781. And here
 “ an opportunity is presented of displaying
 “ the striking contrast between the glorious
 “ successes of the English arms in the for-
 “ mer period, and the misfortunes which
 “ menaced our independence in the latter.
 “ But it is superfluous to dwell on so fertile
 “ a theme. For who that, dismissing the
 “ VOL. I. B b “ illusions

1782. “ illusions of the imagination, yields to the
“ conduct of his understanding, does not
“ perceive the absurdity and injustice of ap-
“ plauding the vigour, promptitude, and
“ prevention of the Earl of Chatham in
“ times of national splendour unfilled by a
“ cloud, and condemning the same quali-
“ ties and a similar course of conduct in Mr.
“ Hastings, when condensing storms seemed
“ ready to wreck the state on rocks and
“ shoals, or overwhelm it in the troubled
“ ocean ?

“ Supposing, not granting, that there was
“ not sufficient evidence to convict the Be-
“ gumseither of rebellious actions or designs,
“ before an ordinary court of justice in ordi-
“ nary cases, yet if the situation of affairs
“ was such, that either the public safety
“ must be ruined, or some sacrifice or other
“ made for its preservation, it was the duty
“ of Mr. Hastings to make such a sacrifice:
“ and if there was an option of sacrifices, it
“ was also his duty to fix on that which was
“ the most effectual for obtaining its end,
“ and which could be made with the least
“ violation,

“ violation, or appearance of violation, of 1782.
justice.

“ But to resume the jagheers (an equivalent being intended), and to seize the
“ treasures of the Begums, was the most
“ effectual sacrifice that could be made.
“ It was also that which could be made
“ with the least violation, or appearance of
“ violation, of justice: for there was at
“ least a degree of probable evidence that
“ those Begums entertained hostile designs
“ against the English, and that they had
“ even begun to carry them into execution:
“ therefore, the measures taken by Mr.
“ Hastings, on the emergency in question,
“ were, in all respects, the most proper that
“ could have been possibly imagined. If
“ they were improper, let the English nation
“ restore their treasures to the Begums.

“ The governments in Asia are despotic,
“ and it is by summary proceedings alone,
“ and a strong arm, by which, in their present
“ moral condition, they can be govern-

1782. “ ed. To introduce new forms of govern-
“ ment into nations, if practicable at all, is
“ the work of time. Attempts were made
“ to introduce at once liberty into Russia,
“ but they proved abortive ; and, in like
“ manner, the steps that have been taken to
“ introduce the English law into India have
“ been attended with great confusion, and
“ been productive of much inconvenience
“ and mischief. It is found difficult to
“ govern the Hindoos by our laws, even in
“ times of profound peace. What then
“ was Mr. Hastings to do in times of infi-
“ nite difficulty and danger ? In proportion
“ to the embarrassments of the English, the
“ ideas and pretensions of the native princes
“ of India naturally revived. The novelty
“ and the odiousness of our institutions were
“ more sensibly felt ; the sanctions by which
“ they were established were weakened ;
“ and all things seemed rapidly to revert
“ to that situation in which we found In-
“ dia, when, under the pretence of being
“ the treasurers and tax-gatherers of the
“ Great Mogul, we extended our power
“ over so many provinces of Asia.

“ The

“ The British power in India was only 1782
 “ of an artificial kind, the whole mass of
 “ numbers, and opinion of right being against
 “ it. If the truth must be told, it was
 “ purely despotic, and depended, for its ef-
 “ ficacy, on the principle of FEAR. Should
 “ the pressure and weight of Government
 “ be lessened, the fire, which was smo-
 “ thered only by that weight and pressure,
 “ must break out with an explosion fatal
 “ to the oppressors. The feeble, the par-
 “ tial, and varying attempts that had been
 “ made to establish a new order of affairs,
 “ had not formed such a strength of Go-
 “ vernment as could be depended on in a
 “ new and unprecedented situation, big
 “ with danger and final destruction. The
 “ artificial mounds by which we had some-
 “ times endeavoured, and might yet pro-
 “ pose to confine and lead the stream of po-
 “ pular opinion, would give way to that
 “ storm which was ready to fall, and restore
 “ all things to their usual, and their deepest
 “ channel. It is justly observed by the Ro-
 “ man Historian Sallust, that dominion is
 “ easily preserved by the same means through

1782. “ which it was gained. On the occasion
“ of an extraordinary and alarming conjunc-
“ ture in India, the Governor-General of
“ Bengal reverted to the principles by
“ which our dominion there had been both
“ acquired and supported, and provided for
“ the public safety by expedients, which,
“ in times of tranquillity, and in European
“ Governments, might be deemed violent
“ and irregular, but which, in the circum-
“ stances in which he was placed, were
“ proper, because they were necessary. He
“ burst through the cob-web sublimations
“ of casuists, which cannot, in all cases,
“ consistently with the best ends of
“ Government, be reduced to practice, and
“ left faction to blame, his country to judge,
“ and the world to admire him.”

But among those who, on the whole, admired the character, and approved the conduct of Mr. Hastings, there were not a few who, under the conviction, that the proofs of premeditated rebellion in Oude and Benaras were vague and imperfect, regretted that the Governor-General did not openly avow the necessity

neceſſity of ſeizing for the public ſafety, money, wherever he could find it. Without entering either into the deſigns of Cheyt Sing and the Begums of Fyzabad, or into the opinion that Mr. Haſtings might be ſuppoſed, on probable evidence, to entertain concerning thoſe deſigns, and to confine our views merely to local circumſtances and political advantage, it is obvious that, to have acknowledged a neceſſity, on the part of Great-Britain, to ſeize the wealth of individuals, would have undermined that power which it was intended to ſupport. It would have announced our extreme neceſſities to all India: the natives would have made no diſtinction between an act of rapacity, and a ſeizure of property in the nature of a loan, or a promiſſary note or bond; and the whole circulation of the country would at once have ſhrunk and diſappeared. Mr. Haſtings, even when the clamour excited againſt him was at the higheſt pitch, was, on the whole, juſtified by men of integrity and ſenſe on this ground. In this, unprejudiced men, of all denominations agreed. The propriety of Mr. Haſtings's conduct was admitted

1782. by the most distinguished lawyers, soldiers, and country gentlemen. It was asserted by the manly sense as well as metaphysical acumen of Lord Thurlow; by the the solid judgment and liberal views of Lord Hood; and the fair and just constructions of Mr. Dempster. In reality, even without making allowance for Asiatic manners and customs, there was nothing in the conduct of Mr. Hastings that was not perfectly consonant to common sense and the practice of all nations. It readily occurs as a natural and incontrovertible maxim, that the dependants of an empire, who have flourished under its auspices in the days of its prosperity, should contribute to its support in the hour of difficulty and danger. It was thus, that, about twenty years ago, the British Parliament imposed arbitrary taxes on the Americans. If we abstract certain accidental circumstances of moral and political situation, there was not any material difference betwixt the case of the Zemindar, William Penn, and that of the Rajah Cheyt Sing. It should be recorded, at the same time, that there was an unaffected, though vague and undefined

finer sympathy with the oppressed Hindoos, 1782.
that pervaded the nation. Yet neither should
it be omitted, that Mr. Fox was almost
the only man, who had consistency enough
to talk seriously of restoring CheytSing to
his Zemindary : and not one man ever pro-
posed to return their treasures to the Begums.
The fact is, the progress of luxury, in this,
as in other nations, keeps pace with that
of humanity. We feel a little for the Hin-
doos, but we would feel more from the
want of those advantages which we have
been accustomed to draw, by all means in
our power, from their country.

As in the course of these Memoirs, it
has been to often necessary to introduce the
name of Mr. Hastings, who was, in fact,
the great supporter of the British interests in
India, during a long and most arduous
struggle, it may be expected that we should
give the world a more particular account of
this extraordinary man.

Mr. Hastings is the son of a clergyman
of the church of England, and was born at
Darlesford,

1782. Darlesford, in Worcestershire, the seat of his ancestors for many generations, in the year 1732. His family is one of the oldest and the most respectable in that county: but having taken part with Charles the First during the civil wars, many of its possessions were sold, and the produce expended in the service of that unfortunate Monarch. Four mansions near Barford, in Oxfordshire, are now in the possession of the lineal descendant of Mr. Lenthal, the Speaker, which were made over to that gentleman, in order to preserve Darlesford, which had been in the family of Hastings since the year 1250; as appears by Doctor Nash's Antiquities of Worcestershire. The last portion of their patrimonial estates was sold by the grandfather of Mr. Hastings, to Sir John Knight; and his father dying when he was young, Mr. Hastings was left under the care of an uncle, Mr. Howard Hastings, who sent him to Westminster school, where he was distinguished as an excellent scholar, and went into College, the head of his election, in the year 1746. He there gave the first proofs of those "uncommon abilities,"

as Mr. Francis calls them, which have 1782.
distinguished him through life—nor was he
more remarkable as a scholar, than for per-
sonal intrepidity. His uncle dying in the
year 1749, Mr. Hastings was left under
the guardianship of Mr. Criswicke, an East-
India Director, who appointed him a writer
to Bengal, much against the inclination of
of Doctor Nichol, the Head Master of
Westminster, who entertained so high an
opinion of little Warren Hastings, as he
called him, that he offered himself to edu-
cate him at Oxford.

Mr. Hastings arrived in Bengal in the
year 1750, when the English possessed nei-
ther territory nor power in Hindostan.—
He was in the interior parts of Bengal when
Calcutta was taken by Surajah Dowlah, in
the year 1756, and was allowed his liberty
at Manhedabad, a singular mark of the
esteem in which his character was at that
time held. At the capture of Calcutta by
Colonel Clive and Admiral Watson, he
served as a volunteer in the army, and be-
ing the first Englishman in Bengal who
spoke

1782. spoke the Persian language, he succeeded Mr. Scrafton in the year 1758, as Resident at the Court of Meer Jaffier, one of the most considerable offices in Bengal.

Here Mr. Hastings remained until he obtained a seat in the Council of Calcutta. He quitted India in the year 1765, with an unblemished reputation, and a fortune so moderate, as only to entitle him to lodgings in Essex-street in the Strand.

Disappointed in his hopes of returning to India, he had formed a plan, in concert with the late Doctor Samuel Johnson, of founding a Professorship for the study of the Persian language at Oxford; but a change soon after taking place in the East-India Direction, he was appointed second in the Council at Madras, in the year 1769, and ordered to succeed to that Government.— In the year 1771, the Directors removed him to a country with which he was better acquainted, and he became Governor-General of Bengal in the year 1772.

He

He soon found that Lord Clive had sta- 1782
 ted the revenues of the company too high,
 and the expences of government too low.
 The East-India Company, by paying an-
 nually four hundred thousand pounds to the
 state, dividing twelve per cent. on their capi-
 tal, and receiving bills from Bengal to a
 very large amount, were reduced, in a sea-
 son of profound peace, to the necessity of ap-
 plying to parliament for relief, and Lord
 North seized this opportunity of assuming
 the management of their affairs: an act of
 usurpation which has been transmitted to
 posterity by the protest which was made on
 that occasion by the Dukes of Portland and
 Richmond, the Lords Rockingham and
 Fitzwilliam, and other members of oppo-
 sition. Mr. Hastings did not expose the
 alarming necessities of the Company with-
 out taking measures for supplying them *.

The

* The disputes which at present prevail in a neighbouring kingdom, present, at this stage of our narrative, some points of comparison. Mr. Neekar over-rated the revenues of France, and under-rated the public debts and expenditure. A demand was made of extraordinary taxes to supply the deficiency

1782. The Mogul, before the return of Mr. Hastings to Bengal, had withdrawn himself from the Company's protection, and thrown himself into the arms of the Marattas. The Governor-General, therefore, withheld from that Prince the tribute stipulated as a condition of his amity, and concluded a very advantageous treaty with the Nabob Vizier, Sujah-ul-Dowlah, by which a part of that treasure which had been so absurdly exported from Bengal, was brought again into circulation. A suc-

deficiency in the revenue, under the sanction of the Notables, and advantage was taken of this circumstance to wrest if possible the imposition of taxes from the crown, and thereby to introduce an innovation in the most important branch of legislation. So natural it is for popular assemblies, as well, as kings, to seize every opportunity of extending their power!

Mr. Hastings, from the same comprehensive view, and minute acquaintance with the Company's affairs that qualified him to point out the distemper in their state, was also enabled to effect the remedy. Mr. de Calonne, who discovered the public embarrassments of France, and best knew their origin and progress, was the most proper person in the kingdom for retrieving them, and in all probability, he would have retrieved them, if he had not been abandoned in the midst of his process for this purpose.

cessful

successful war with the Rohillas, founded on their 1781.
breach of treaty, by the conquest of a rich
but hostile country, extended and secured
the frontiers of the Nabob Vizier our ally,
and added fifty lacks of rupees to the Com-
pany's treasures.

Mr. Hastings, by his regulations of the
public offices, of the collections, and by
various other æconomical reforms, which,
notwithstanding the difficulties that retarded,
and the temporary odium that accompanied
and followed it, he had effected in the space
of thirty months, with the supply of treasure
just mentioned, raised the reputation of the
Government of Bengal to the highest pitch.

It was this prosperous state of the Com-
pany's affairs in Bengal, at his accession to
the chair deemed irretrievable, which en-
abled him to make those exertions of which
some account has been given, for the sup-
port of our other establishments in India,
and, in spite of the formidable confederacy
that assailed us in every quarter, to impress
on

1782. on the minds of the Princes of India a superstitious dread of the name of Hastings.

The Governor-General had relieved the incumbrances and improved the revenue of Bengal, drawn off the Nizam and the Rajah of Berar from the confederacy against the English by strokes of policy, and Madajee Scindiah by force of arms, effected a peace with the Marrattas, carried relief to Madras, and, by well-timed succours, enabled the Bombay government to divert the Mysorean armies from the Carnatic, and was continuing his efforts for the welfare and glory of his nation, when the Grey-hound Packet arrived with dispatches from the Court of Directors, tending to persuade every man in Bengal, that the removal of Mr. Hastings was neither distant nor evitable.

He had long borne up under this counteraction, but conceiving now that there was a determination to force him from Bengal, and that, without support from home, he could not expect to conduct the
public

public affairs with success, he sent a letter 1782.
to the Directors, on the 21st of March,
1783, in which he briefly touches, with just
confidence, both on the success of his mea-
sures amidst the dangerous vicissitudes inci-
dent to an unsettled and undefined Govern-
ment, and the rectitude of the motives from
whence they sprung; complains of an uni-
form counteraction from those very powers
from whom he derived his authority, and
who were bound to support it: and desires
them to obtain an early nomination of a
person to succeed him in the government of
Fort William, declaring that it is his in-
tention, after allowing a competent time for
the choice of a successor, to resign the ser-
vice. But he added, that if, in the inter-
mediate time, they should proceed to order
the restoration of Cheyt Sing to the Ze-
mindary from which, by the powers he le-
gally possessed, and conceived himself bound
to assert, he had expelled him, and that
their council should resolve to execute
their orders, he would instantly give up
his station. The Court of Proprietors,
on the receipt of this letter by the Direc-

1782. tors, voted their thanks to Mr. Hastings for his services, to which they added a request, that he would not resign until the complete restoration of peace, and the establishment of the stipulated arrangements in India.

By this time Mr. Fox, then Secretary of State, had formed the plan of bringing the complete management of India under the controul of administration. To effect this, Mr. Hastings was represented as a man who had formed connections dangerous to the interests of Great Britain, and it was said that he had so far mismanaged India, as to make it absolutely necessary both to recall him, and to annihilate the Company. Mr. Pitt on this occasion joined most cordially with the friends of Mr. Hastings, and Mr. Fox and his bill shared the same fate. The friends of the Governor scorned to stipulate any conditions either for themselves or for him: the consequence of which was, that Mr. Hastings, on his return, became an object of vengeance to a defeated party.— But these political intrigues have carried us
far

far beyond that point of the war in India, 1782. from which they have diverted our attention.

A private letter from Mr. Hastings, Governor-General of India, to Lord Macartney, President of the Council of Madras, informed his Lordship that peace was concluded with the Marrattas. This intelligence was announced with the firing of the guns in camp, and the artillery of Fort St. George, on the 29th day of June, 1782.—Sir Eyre Coote, invested with the powers of peace or war, required Hyder to accede to the treaty, with intimation, that if he did not restore all the forts he had taken, and at the end of six months evacuate the Carnatic, the Marratta arms were to be joined, for the purpose of compelling him, to those of the English. On this Lord Macartney was alarmed, and, in order to participate, at least, in whatever honour or advantage might be found in this pacificatory negotiation, acquainted Hyder, that without their concurrence and mediation, no permanent treaty, or temporary convention, would be

C c 2

valid,

1782. valid. What effect this interference must have produced on the discerning mind of Hyder-Ally, it is impossible to tell, but not difficult to conjecture.

The General, with a view to counteract the alarming industry, and to be at a distance from the eye of Lord Macartney, left Madras on the 1st of July, and on the business of peace, approached to Hyder. The Khan, grown old in Asiatic arts, amused and detained him in the neighbourhood of Vandewash, till our army had consumed not only their own rice, but that also which was for the use of the garrison. Having gained this point, he suddenly required time for the better adjustment of preliminaries, and withdrew his vakeel, leaving the General wholly in the dark concerning his intentions. Sir Eyre Coote returned with the army to Madras.

A combined attack on Negapatam had been planned by Hyder and the French Admiral; to favour which, by detaining the army, the former amused our people with
the

the hopes of peace. His artifice, however, 1782.
was foiled by the chances of war. Suffrein,
in sailing for Negapatam, was descried by
the English fleet, and in spite of every at-
tempt to gain the roads without fighting,
he was, by the masterly manœuvres of his
opponents, forced to give them battle. At
three o'clock, on the 3d of July, the
English Admiral left the road of Negapa-
tam, stretching southward with his squa-
dron all that evening and night, in order to
gain the wind of the enemy. He effected
his purpose, and by day-break gave signals
for forming the line. About eleven, the
engagement became close and general, and
continued so till half past twelve, when the
French line appeared greatly disordered, se-
veral of their ships having suffered severely
both in their hulls and rigging. At the mo-
ment when victory seemed ready to declare
decisively for the British flag, a sea breeze
springing up rescued the enemy from im-
pending ruin. Our line was thrown into
disorder, and Suffrein effected a masterly
retreat, fighting his best ships to protect
those which had sustained the greatest da-

1782. mage. The victors remained floating about in the utmost confusion, without being able to renew the attack. The next day, the French, without the loss of a single ship, escaped to Cuddalore. From this nominal victory no advantage resulted ; and it was accompanied with the loss of Captain Dunbar Maclellan, an officer, for his naval and military abilities, deservedly in high estimation. He commanded the flag ship, and was shot through the heart early in the engagement.

Sir Edward Hughes, after informing the garrison of Negapatam that the danger which threatened them was retarded, for a season at least, brought his squadron to the roads of Madras, where he was joined by the Scepter, a new ship of sixty-four guns, belonging to Sir Richard Bickerton's fleet.

The designs of Suffrein against Trincomalé being known, or suspected, it was determined to reinforce that important place. Accordingly, about the first of August, the Scepter and Monarch, ships of the line, with

with about two hundred troops, sailed on 1782. that expediton, leaving the rest of the squadron for repairs in the roads of Madras. Two days after the departure of this reinforcement, Sir Edward was informed, that the French Admiral, with his fleet, had left Cuddalore on the first day of the month. On the 16th, the Coventry, a frigate of twenty-four guns, arrived from Bombay. Captain Mitchell, her commander, reported, that he had by the way engaged the Bellona, a French ship of forty guns, off Friar's-hood, on the island of Ceylon ; that after a severe conflict of two hours and a half, the Bellona fled towards the French fleet, consisting of twenty-three sail, in Battacola road ; and that the Coventry had suffered so much in her masts and rigging, as not to be able to overtake her. The Scepter and Monarch returned with information, that they had found Suffrein off Trincomalé harbour, and had with difficulty escaped. At length, on the 21st, Sir Edward Hughes having completed his tedious repairs, set sail to protect Trincomalé, to fight Suffrein, or, if necessary,

1782. to co-operate with the army in the intended attack on Cuddalore.

Hyder having marched to the Tanjore country, found that the defeat of Suffrein had frustrated their intended operations against Negapatam. He therefore returned, directing his march towards his magazine at Arneé. This movement being reported to the British army, the General took the alarm, being apprehensive of danger to the fort of Vandewash. Abandoning, for the present, his designs on Cuddalore, he advanced a day's march towards the fort: but receiving intelligence that very evening from the commanding officer, that Hyder had past the Arneé river, he resumed his original route, and, on the 6th of September, encamped on the Red-hills of Pondicherry, the place of rendezvous appointed for the enemy's shipping. Two days past, without the appearance of any ships, or any accounts of them. But, on the third, certain notice arrived, that Suffrein's active valour had reduced Trincomalé: and soon after, a frigate brought intelligence, that

that the two fleets had fought a fourth battle, and that the English Admiral was on his way for Madras. Sir Eyre Coote, who had suffered about this time a second stroke of the palsy, sailed for Bengal in the beginning of October, leaving the army under the command of General Stuart. The General, connecting with this return of Sir Edward all the consequences of a defeat, gave instant orders in person for beating an alarm. A hasty retreat from Pondicherry ensued, the more remarkable for happening on the same day and month of the year with the flight from Conjeveram : a circumstance which did not escape the notice of the soldiers. At eleven in the night, the army encamped at Killenar, having in the hurry lost their rice and baggage. The march continued, unaccompanied by any circumstance worthy of record ; and, on the 19th, the arrival of the army at the Mount concluded the campaign of 1782 : a campaign somewhat resembling the expeditions of feudal times, when kings could only keep the field for thirty or forty days,

The

1782. The army now found, that, instead of a n imaginary defeat, Sir Edward Hughes had obtained another victory. On the night of the 2d of September, he arrived off Trincomalé, and the next morning discovered French colours flying on all the forts, and their squadron, reinforced by the *Illustre* of seventy-four guns, the *St. Michael* of sixty-four, and the *Elizabeth* of fifty, with several frigates, making in all thirty sail, at anchor in their several bays. The English might easily have avoided an engagement, for though, immediately on their appearance, the French squadron got under sail, yet, for several hours, they shewed manifest tokens of hesitation. But the ardor of our officers, incensed at the loss of Trincomalé, was not to be restrained. At half past two o' clock, the French line began firing on ours; and five minutes after, the engagement, from van to rear, became general.— The *Worcester*, in the rear, was furiously attacked by two of the enemy's additional ships, but made a brave resistance, and was gallantly supported by the *Monmouth*; while, at the same time, in the van, five ships

ships bore down in a crowd on the Exeter and Isis, and by a close and concerted fire, forced the former, much disabled, from the line, leaving the Isis to receive their fire as they past in succession. The opposing centers, in the mean time, were warmly engaged, ship to ship. For three hours the battle continued to rage, with equal fury and obstinacy through every part of the line. The contending Admirals displayed great bravery and skill. Suffrein, in the Heros, having come down upon the fire of two of our largest ships, two of his masts were shot away by the board, and his vessel soon reduced to a mere wreck. He instantly removed his flag to another, giving the Heros up for lost; but, by some negligence on our part, and the brave conduct of a French frigate, she was towed round to their fleet.

The fight was terminated only by the darkness of the night; and its consequences must have been far more signal, had the French wanted the shelter of Trincomalé: nor would the British Admiral have immediately steered for Madras, if Suffrein had
not

1782. not been so near his port. So completely routed were the enemy, that their ships crowded without order into Trincomalé. One of them was lost upon the rocks; and it was ten days before two others, dismasted and shattered, were able to get into harbour. These, Suffrein did not scruple to say, he regarded as presents made him by the English Admiral.

The loss on our side in men was incredibly small, not exceeding fifty-one killed, and three hundred wounded; but in officers we suffered most severely. The Honourable Captain Lumley of the *Isis*, a very promising young man, was slain: Captains James Watt, of the *Sultan*, and Charles Wood, of the *Worcester*, both officers of high desert, were mortally wounded. The 78th and 98th regiments, too, lost many of their bravest men.

The loss of the French was, comparatively, enormous, amounting to four hundred and twelve killed, six hundred and seventy-six wounded. The carnage on board of the *Héro* was such as is seldom seen,
except

except in cases of burning or explosion. Six 1782.
French Captains were broke, and sent prisoners to the Island of Mauritius.

On the arrival of the English Squadron at Madras, their situation was found to be such as induced the Admiral to think of proceeding to Bombay, and in this purpose he persisted, notwithstanding the opposition of the Governor, Lord Macartney. A great number of ships, at this time, sent from Bengal, lay in the roads, laden with rice. The Governor laid an embargo on them; yet refused, it was said, to give a price for the grain equal to the risks of trade, or to allow it to be sold to the suffering inhabitants, who, amidst a famine that raged throughout the whole of the coast of Coromandel, were dying by hundreds in a day. Suspicions were entertained according to the manner of the people, of a contrivance for engrossing the grain. Nevertheless, the passive genius of a despotic climate conspired with the artillery of Fort St. George to prevent such an insurrection as would have been unavoidable, in similar circumstances, under the
most

1782. most arbitrary Government in Europe. The gentlemen of Madras, alarmed at the conduct of the Governor, having assembled together, drew up a decent remonstrance. But his Lordship threw it aside, charging the meeting in which it was framed with audacity and sedition. It afforded but little consolation to dying multitudes of men, women, and children, that the Governor observed the decency of sending away his carriage horses. The approach of the monsoon made not any impression on the mind of Lord Macartney. He persevered in his views, whatever they were, and the rice ships were forced still to lie at anchor. But, on the fifteenth of October, the sky began to lower, and the gathering clouds burst towards the evening in a violent storm. The return of day presented the dismal prospect of wrecked vessels, and dead bodies floating along the shore. Of the rice ships, driven by the hurricane from their moorings, the greater part were lost, and the remainder stranded on different coasts. As the tempest blew from the shore, his Majesty's fleet, anchored in water fifteen fathom deep,

deep, on the first appearance of the storm, 1782. stood out to sea, and, after weathering many dangers, happily arrived, though not a little shattered, at Bombay, in the end of December. But the widest doors of calamity seemed now to be thrown open at Madras; and fears and future evils pressed down the load of actual suffering. Our squadron was absent, the French Admiral in our neighbourhood, multitudes swooning in the suburbs and streets of the town for want of food, provisions nearly expended in the garrison, the land around, since Hyder's irruption, uncultivated and unsown: in a word, famine and war encircling the Fort of St. George without, and civil dissention blazing within it.

It was dreaded at this time, that Suffrein would block up Madras, and that the army must be dispersed: but the sea remained open, and this disgrace was prevented.—A few days after the storm, Sir Richard Bickerton arrived from Bombay with five ships of the line, without having either experienced any ill weather, or seen a single ship

1782. ship belonging to the fleet. After covering the Indiamen under his convoy, having on board three regiments of infantry, with a thousand recruits raised in Ireland, and Sir John Burgoyne's regiment of light horse, Sir Richard returned immediately without making a halt, that he might join Sir Edward Hughes at Bombay, at which place Sir Richard arrived even some weeks before the Admiral. It was, perhaps, the movements, and the consequent junction of our squadrons, that diverted the attention of Monsieur Suffrein from Madras, and saved our army from dispersion.

During the whole month of October, our affairs in the Carnatic continued to wear a gloomy aspect. But, in the month of November, they assumed a more prosperous appearance, and, before the end of the year, the face of sorrow was brightened up by the meritorious exertions of the government of Bengal, who supplied Madras with plentiful stores of grain. The conduct of Lord Macartney, with regard to the rice ships sent from Bengal formerly, has never been made
a subject

a subject of either public accusation or en- 1782.
 quiry. Neither has his persistence in refusing; to the repeated requests of Monsieur de Suffrein, an exchange of prisoners.—Of this matter, as it is not the object of this narrative to connect events merely by coincidence of time, but much more by other relations, it is not unnatural to give some account in this place, which may be done by a simple exhibition of the following correspondence between the French Admiral and Mr. Hastings.

Mr. de Suffrein, in a letter dated on board the Hero, at Tranquebar, the 8th of May, 1783, writes thus: “ Permit me,
 “ Sir, to recommend to you the French prisoners detained in Bengal, particularly
 “ Mr Soverain, a gentleman of my province,
 “ and Mr. de Goy, an Officer embarked
 “ with me, and for whom I have a great
 “ regard. I do not know whether they are
 “ allowed to write, but I have not received
 “ any letter from them. I have not only allowed
 “ letters to be written, but I have taken
 “ some trouble to give a passage to them. I
 “ have

1782. “ have left several people on their parole at
“ Tranquebar : I have sent some of them
“ to the Isle of France, and from thence
“ to Europe ; for example, Mr. Christie,
“ Captain of the Hannibal. None of my
“ prisoners has had this satisfaction. I have
“ written to Lord Macartney, and proposed
“ to him an exchange. He says, that he never
“ received my letter. But knowing my incli-
“ nations, and that I had written to him on
“ that subject, he might well have written
“ to me. He has received the letters of Mr.
“ Motaix, Intendant of the Army, charged
“ with full powers from me, to agree to an
“ exchange. Sir Eyre Coote has received
“ those of Mr. du Chamier. Sir Edward
“ Hughes daily refused the exchange of
“ Mr. Degoy and seven men. Amidst the
“ ambiguity of all the answers I received,
“ it was clearly apparent, that they did
“ not desire an exchange.

“ Having no place of security on the
“ coast, destitute of provisions, grieving
“ to see the unhappy men, who had been
“ six or seven months at sea, die of the
“ scurvy,

“ scurvy, I have been *now* obliged, to my 1782.
“ great regret, to deliver the prisoners * to
“ the Nabob. I took every precaution for
“ their good treatment. I am sure, those
“ who know me, will do justice to the
“ feelings of my heart. Even the un-
“ happy men will pity me, and, in their
“ despair, only curse those whose cruel
“ policy reduced me to this terrible ne-
“ cessity. I have entered into this detail,
“ because I prize the esteem of any one,
“ who is so generally esteemed as you are.
“ Lord Macartney has written to a Cap-
“ tain of the Squadron, a letter *antedated*
“ six months, to make an overture, for-
“ getting all that has passed, and attend-
“ ing only to the interest of humanity.
“ I wrote instantly to him, to assure him
“ of my desire, that an exchange might be
“ made; and to apprize him, that I had
“ no longer any concern in it; that it was
“ to Monsieur le Marquis de Bully that
“ he should address himself.” *Postscript.*
“ I send you back an unfortunate invalid

D d 2

“ with

* In number from three to four hundred.

1782. “ with a wooden leg; and at different
“ times, I have given leave to more than
“ twenty Captains or Officers, besides those
“ which I permitted to be Tranquebar,
“ on their parole, and who went away
“ from thence without any other reason,
“ than that they found the residence there
“ inconvenient.”

Mr. Hastings, in answer to this, after respectfully saluting M. de Suffrein, wrote as follows:

“ Your letter, and the candid intention
“ with which it was written, deserved an
“ earlier acknowledgement of it; nor
“ should I have failed to make an immediate reply, had I not been disabled by
“ a severe indisposition.

“ I hope that the gentlemen of your nation will all do this Government the justice to attest, that however I myself
“ may have been deficient in personal attention, its conduct towards them has
“ been marked with every substantial effect

“ of

“ of humanity and tenderness. To Mr. 1782.
“ de Soverain I am precluded from af-
“ fording any proof of the respect which
“ I am desirous of shewing to your recom-
“ mendations, as his own personal merit
“ had before excited in my breast every
“ sentiment which could have been pro-
“ duced by the knowledge of your wishes
“ in his favour. I have requested that he
“ would afford me an opportunity of being
“ acquainted with Mr. Degoy, whom I
“ have not yet seen, as he has been some
“ time confined by sickness.

“ I am sorry that none of the letters
“ from your Officers, who are resident in
“ this province, have reached your hands.
“ No prohibition has been ever expressly
“ made against their maintaining such cor-
“ respondence with their friends, as the
“ precautions necessary to a state of war
“ might allow. On the contrary, they
“ had frequent opportunities by Danish
“ ships; and I believe it has been well
“ understood, that they would not have
“ been prevented, on a proper application,

1782. “ from sending them through the chan-
“ nel of our own.

“ The regret which you express for the
“ unhappy necessity which compelled you
“ to send the prisoners of our nation to
“ Hyder-Ally-Cawn, is evidenced by terms
“ which could only have been dictated by
“ a mind conscious of its truth, and a
“ sensibility wounded by the reflection of
“ having been, however repugnantly, the
“ instrument of others sufferings. It is
“ too late to look back.---I trust to the
“ generosity of your sentiments, and above
“ all, to the virtues which have most emi-
“ nently distinguished your public charac-
“ ter, and which are rarely known to ex-
“ ist in an unfeeling heart, that you will
“ exert your influence to its utmost effect,
“ for obtaining the deliverance of our pri-
“ soners who are now in the hands of the
“ Ruler of Myfore. It is in my private
“ character only that I express to you this
“ wish, the duties of my office not ex-
“ tending to the object of it: nor is it in
“ your authority that I rely for its accom-
“ plishment,

“ plishment, as you have told me that 1782.
“ this is the province of the Marquis de
“ Buffy, but on the claims which you
“ possess on every Chief of your own na-
“ tion, which you have so faithfully served;
“ and yet more on the man, who owes his
“ present existence perhaps wholly to your
“ support.”

This letter, the production of an elegant and feeling mind, was dated at Fort William, the 16th day of July, 1783.

From this correspondence it is evident, that if the conduct of Suffrein, in giving up his prisoners to the Barbarians, was not wholly excusable, his offence was attended with circumstances of extenuation. But, before these alleviating circumstances, which the letter here published has first revealed, were known, that act of the French Admiral, which was regarded by every gentleman in Hindostan with horror, in England was scarcely mentioned, and never with any marks of disapprobation; while the ridiculous circumstance of two eunuchs

1782. confined until they should give up the treasures under their custody, in payment of a legal debt, has been circulated throughout the whole kingdom in terms of the grossest exaggeration. It deserves to be recorded, as strongly characteristical of the times, that from the commencement of the American war to the present moment, both orators and authors, by aggravating a few facts, and circulating, if not inventing many falsehoods, have laboured, with an industry that exceeds the usual licentiousness of liberty and extravagance of faction, to degrade our national character, in the eyes of Europe and of the world. It was in this spirit, that, when the Bostonians in 1776, treated Sir Archibald Campbell with the most shocking inhumanity, a powerful and active party in England sympathized with the Americans, whom they called our injured fellow-subjects, and almost exulted in the sufferings of that gallant General. Several English gentlemen, connected with the first families in the kingdom were put to death, in cold blood, by Hyder-Ally-Khan, or his merciless successor.

cessor. Some were confined, upwards of 1782. three years, in dungeons, and loaded with irons, with an allowance scarcely sufficient to purchase rice and water for the sustenance of life. Others were compelled to renounce their religion and their country, in order to avoid a cruel and lingering death. Yet no one man in England has publicly lamented the fate of these meretorious Officers, and many have affirmed, that their sufferings were well deserved. We are happy, that we have been enabled at last, from authentic documents, to prove their innocence: which shall, by and by, be done in its proper place,

The conclusion of 1782 was marked by the death of Hyder Aliy. His age is not exactly known, though it is certain that it was not under four-score. He preserved the powers of his mind entire, and persevered in his usual habits, acting the part of a profound politician, and able commander, to the morning, it is said, of the third day before that on which he died.

Tippoo-

1783. Tippoo-Saib, at this time, was engaged in opposing an irruption, of which an account shall be given hereafter, into the Myforean territories. But, the moment he was informed of the death of Hyder, he returned with incredible celerity to the Carnatic, secured the good will of the principal officers of the army, by liberal presents of money, as well as promises of favour, and anticipated the formation of any hostile faction, by the authority of his presence, and an immediate exercise of the powers of Government. Tippoo, though the first-born of Hyder, was the son of a concubine. His brother, though younger, possessed the advantage of being descended from a Princess of royal extraction.— Though neither the capacity nor the ambition of this young man were such as to impress the great mind of Tippoo with fear, he yet judged it prudent to fix himself in the administration of affairs, in the first place, and by firm possession, to prevent all ideas of competition.

The

The first important act of Tippoo Sultan's Government, was a proposal of peace to Lord Macartney, on terms that were rejected by his Lordship without submitting them to his Council. The Sultan, thus repulsed, connected himself as much as possible with the French. And, although, in order to avoid the arms of the Marattas, he determined, within the time specified in the treaty between that nation and the English, to withdraw his troops from the Carnatic, he destroyed Arcott, and the forts which he had garrisoned; carried with him a battalion of French troops, and left for the use of our enemies at Cuddalore 2,000 cavalry, under the command of Sid-Saib. These things were transacted before the end of February.

Our army having dismantled the forts of Charanagooly and Vandewash, and relieved the garrison of Vellore, returned to the Mount, where they encamped on the 20th of March. On the 12th of April, Sir Edward Hughes, with his whole squadron, came to anchor in the Road of Madras.

1783. drafs. This was the fineſt fleet that had ever appeared in the Indian Ocean. It conſiſted of ſeventeen ſail of the line, four frigates, one ſloop of war, two cutters, and a fire-ſhip : all ſheathed with copper. Suffrein, not ſuſpecting that the Engliſh fleet was ſo near, had ſcattered his ſhips for the purpoſe of making captures. It was only on the evening preceding the arrival of Sir Edward Hughes, that a cruizing ſquadron of French ſhips paſſed almoſt within cannon ſhot of Fort St. George. On the night of the 20th, the French Admiral, with only ſeven ſhips, paſſed Sir Edward Hughes on his return to Trincomalé : So narrow were the eſcapes which were made at this time by the fortune of France, from utter ruin in India,

The hopes that were entertained, on the arrival of Sir Edward, in ſuch force, from Bombay, were ſuddenly exchanged for an apprehenſion that a large and valuable fleet from England, whoſe near approach was announced by the arrival of one of its ſhips, would fall into the hands of the French

1783.

French Admiral. The situation of Suffrein to windward, and that of Hughes to leeward, afforded matter of serious alarm. But Heaven soon relieved the anxiety of our countrymen. The arrival of the Bristol man of war, with ten Indiamen, and three store-ships, gave upwards of 600 men to the squadron, and about 1,000 recruits to the army. A French officer, who stood by when this fleet landed at Madras, exclaimed, "There is but one God, and that God must be an Englishman!"

The military preparations for an attack on Cuddalore, retarded by the dissensions of men in power, with opposite opinions and pretensions, advanced but slowly, when a circumstance occurred which converted those very dissensions into the means of accelerating them. Intelligence was received that Sir Eyre Coote had sailed from Calcutta, with power to head the army, independently of the Madras Government. Lord Macartney had determined to resist to the utmost, the powers with which Sir Eyre was invested by the Supreme Authority

1783. rity of Bengal. That he might the more easily effect this purpose, it is said, he resolved that the General should not find the army in the neighbourhood of Madras. A peremptory command was sent to General Stuart to march the army on the 21st of April, towards Cuddalore. On that day, before the necessary arrangements were completed at land, or the store and fire-ships ready to accompany them, they marched from Tamberam. At Chingliput, where they halted to bury their dead, which, for the most part, were Irish and Hannoverians, they were informed that Sir Eyre Coote died at Madras, on the 26th of April, being the third day after his arrival from Calcutta. The ship that carried him was chased for five days by the French cruizers that passed Fort St. George on the 11th. This circumstance, it is thought, operating with too forcible an impression on his mind, which was lofty, and prone to irritation, was that which brought on the third and mortal blow of the palsy, which terminated his life without pain, and without a groan.

On

On the 7th of June our army arrived 1783. before Cuddalore. The enemy, who had hitherto only guarded against a north attack, began now to raise works to the south. On the 12th, it was discovered that they had, with uncommon celerity, extended works from the sea on their left, to the Vandy-Pollam Hills, which formed a sweep around the British front and flanks. To have postponed an attack any longer, would only have exposed our army to farther difficulties. It was therefore determined in a Council of War, to attack the enemy the next morning.

Colonel Kelly, with a brigade of native troops, and 180 Europeans, marched, about midnight, without artillery, by a foot-path unknown to the French, which led to the rear of the work on their right hand, on the Vandy-Pollam Hills. To seize that post was the first and leading object in the plan of operations, adopted by the General, but suggested by Kelly. The European grenadiers, about 300 rank and file, and the 73d regiment, about 200, with

1783. with two battalions of sepoy, covered by the fire of a battery of six 18 pounders, were to wait the success of Colonel Kelly, and storm the intrenchments to the enemy's right. The immediate success of this was to be followed by assaults on their left and centre, supported by the Hannonerians.

On the 13th of June, as the day began to dawn, a cannonade from the 18 pounders, and from some field-pieces brought up by that valuable Artillery Officer, Major Mackay, opened at Point Blank, and from commanding heights upon the works to the enemy's right. Colonel Kelly's column, soon after appearing in their rear, they were struck with terror and surprise, fled from their strong-post on the Vandy-Pollam Hills, and retired in confusion to their second work, leaving two 6 pounders, and several guns, to be possessed by our men, upon the intrenched ground below. Colonel Kelly did not pursue this blow, but remained, according to orders, in the post that had been occupied by the French,
the

the rest of the day. Nor did the troops 1783. under Colonel Stuart make any movement, when that post fell into our possession. But the 73d regiment, led on by Major Lamont, made a resolute attempt to storm the enemy's second works. They were driven back, by grape shot, to the ground from which they had advanced, where they waited for the general attack.

The battery of the 13 pounders, which had opened from a commanding height, and driven the enemy from their first post, having ceased to fire, that eminence was chosen by the General as a fit place for the purpose of making signals. Word was sent round throughout the troops, that the General would fire three field-pieces from the hill, as notice for a general and connected attack. But it was impossible that our officers should distinguish the sound of the signal-guns from that of those that were firing all around them. The three intended attacks, therefore, did not commence together. It was upon seeing the centre engaged, that Colonel Stuart guessed that

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1783. the general signal had been made. Our troops waited no longer for signals, but stood to their arms, and moved on to the attack, through a deep sand, with too eager rapidity. But the movements of our different battalions were found to want due system and connection. Before the grenadiers and the 73d regiment came up, the intended assault against the enemy's left wing had miscarried, and that which was made on their centre, had given way to their heavy fire. The enemy, eager to complete the rout, quitted their works to pursue, and thus fully committed the business of the day to the decision of valour and of fortune. In the mean time, the troops under Colonel Stuart moved forward into the second works, which the enemy had abandoned. This movement threw the French into confusion, forced them to retire in their turn, and fixed the result of this disjointed scene in favour of the English. The honour of this day would have been greater, had the battalions of the right of our line rallied, and returned to the charge. The grenadiers
of

of the 73d regiment continuing to advance, carried the Choultry, which they called Brickmir's Post. Behind this Choultry, the French formed themselves in order of battle, and, having nothing serious to contend with elsewhere, they came on, and poured in upon this party severe showers of all kinds of shot. The post was maintained by our men for a considerable time. The fire growing heavier and heavier on the grenadiers, Colonel Stuart ordered them to fall back. Major Lamont, the senior officer of the 73d, on seeing their ground occupied by the enemy, also retired, in tolerable order, after having lost thirteen officers, and half the number of the common soldiers. Seven field-pieces, that lay about Brickmir's Post, after they had fallen into the hands of our men, were left, and recovered by the enemy. It was agreed, on all hands, that if it had not been for the exertions of the 73d regiment, under Major Lamont, and the grenadiers under Colonel Cathcart, our army must have been captured, or cut to pieces.

1783. The memorable 13th of June 1783, presented a battle in fragments. The evening broke it off, leaving the English army in possession of the Vandy-Pollam Hills, the enemy's second works, and about twenty guns. Praise, a little tinged with censure, is due to both sides : to the French, for so well defending such extended and unfinished trenches, after being surprized from their most advantageous situation, and losing, without resistance, a number of guns, and the only work they had completed : to our men, for maintaining the ground which gained the day, after encountering him where he was strongest, instead of making their attack, and pursuing their advantage, where he was most vulnerable. For the time that this action lasted, and for the small number of troops that were actually engaged, nothing more hot and bloody had happened during the course of this war. Nine hundred and twenty-one of our soldiers, and sixty-two Officers, most of them Europeans, and of the King's troops, were left dead, or mortally wounded, in the field of battle

battle. Among the gallant individuals lost 1783.
to their friends, and the Company's service,
on that day, were Captain Walter Douglas
and Captain Peter Campbell.

During the night of the 13th, the English lay upon their arms in a posture of defence, expecting that the enemy, who knew the fatigued state of our troops, would attempt to recover, by an attack in the night, the ground they had lost in the action of the day. This measure was in fact strongly recommended in a Council of War, by almost all their officers : but the old and infirm Marquis de Bussy, who began now to contemplate objects through the mist of age, and saw only the hazards against himself, cautiously carried off every thing, while it was dark, within the walls of Cuddalore. Nothing more material than the common operations of breaking ground, came to pass for three days.

But the sea, on the 17th, presented a most interesting spectacle, both to the enemy and our army. It was Sir Edward

1783. Hughes and Monf. Suffrein manœuvring with the English and French fleets. Suffrein, with fifteen sail of ships, half of them in very bad condition, made a shew of an intention to attack Sir Edward, who, with eighteen sail of coppered ships, (but their crews greatly debilitated by sickness) lay at anchor, covering the operations of the army. The next day, Hughes was out of sight, and before night, Suffrein rode at anchor in the place Sir Edward had left. On the 19th, both fleets were in view of the camp. On the 20th, Suffrein, being to windward, bore down on the English fleet. Sir Edward waited for him; and, between four and five in the afternoon, a heavy cannonade commenced on both sides, which was kept up without intermission. The enemy then, who had kept at a prudent distance during the whole of the engagement, hawling their wind, sheered off, and were discovered next day at anchor, in the Road of Pondicherry. Here the English Admiral, for a whole day, offered battle. He then sailed for Madrafs, for a necessary supply of water.
- Monf.

Monf. de Suffrein, with his crazy fleet, 1783. beat up againft the wind, and, on the 23d, ftationed his fhips, at anchor, in a line covering Cuddalore. The French forces, at fea and land, harmonious, and confiftent in their operations, now threatened our army, weakened by battle and fevere duty, infomuch that they had not reliefs for the trenches, and the neceffary guards. Sal-lies were therefore expected, and our men were not unprepared for that which was made on the 25th. On the morning of that day, while it was yet dark, the enemy came on, in fo loofe and undisciplined a manner, that they were beat back with lofs and difgrace. Colonel Gordon commanded in the trenches, affifted by Colonel Cathcart, who, with his grenadiers, fupported and repelled every alarm. We loft Major Cotgrave, with about feventy men. The French about 300, with their Commandant, a Colonel, who was taken prifoner. Colonel Stuart and every Field-Officer received the General's animated thanks for the fuccefs of our arms. The whole army on this, as on other occafions,

1783. admired the blooming virtues of Colonel Cathcart, who united martial courage with military skill, and the proper pride of family with that modesty which becomes a fellow-citizen of a free country.

The French General and Admiral, who knew the state of our army, determined to make a new and more vigorous sally. It was to consist of 5,000 Europeans, and to be made on the 4th of July : but, on the 3d, the *Medea* frigate arrived with a flag of truce from the Government of Madras, requiring a suspension of hostilities, as a general peace had taken place in Europe. The application they made was in these words, “ That they, on their part, had “ ordered a suspension unconditionally, “ and independently of any resolution that “ might be taken by the Marquis de “ Bussy.” The Marquis having agreed to the suspension, above half the army marched to reinforce that which was commanded by Colonel Fullarton, in Tanjore : the remaining part encamped on the 17th of July at the Mount.

A ne-

A negotiation for peace was now carried on with Tippoo-Saib, who, flushed with the retreat of one English army on the coast of Malabar, and the capture of another, was by this time employed in the siege of Mangalore ; the desperate defence of which, conducted by the gallant Colonel Campbell, will probably be considered by future historians, for whom it is our object to transmit these notes, as the most brilliant scene in the whole course of this war. The successes of Colonel Campbell sprung wholly from the resources of his own manly and persevering spirit. Though from a combination of mismanagement and misfortune, this intrepid Officer was left to his fate, he did not capitulate before his faithful garrison were reduced to their last pint of rice ; or before they had fed on the putrid carcases of animals held in aversion and horror ; or before a large force, sent to their aid from Bombay, had anchored before Mangalore, tantalizing the garrison for three days with the delusive hope of relief. But these are matters which deserve to be more minutely related.

It

1783. It will therefore be proper to resume our narrative of what passed on the Coast of Malabar, from the reduction of Calicut by Major Abingdon : and for this end, it will be necessary to go back to that military and naval force, originally intended for the reduction of the Cape of Good-Hope, which sailed from England in 1781.

In the beginning of 1780, a secret expedition was planned by his Majesty and Privy Council, the object of which was generally supposed to be some of the Spanish Settlements in South America. The new regiments of 1,000 men each, named the 98th and the 100th, were completed in January, 1781, and put under the command of Mr. Mackenzie Humberstone, a young gentleman of the family of Seaforth, and Mr. William Fullarton, who had signalized both his ability and his zeal in the service of Lord North's Administration, in a civil capacity.* To these troops, quickly disciplined, were added, the

* These Gentlemen, who had been at great expence in raising and disciplining the troops, were allowed the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel during the time of the war only. A like condition was granted to the Laird of Macleod.

the 2d battalion of the 42d regiment, under the command of Mr. Norman Macleod, a Gentleman of the Isle of Sky, one of the Islands on the Western Coast of Scotland; four companies from other regiments, commanded by Major Robert Douglass, with a detachment of royal artillery, under Lieutenant Hislop. The whole of this force was to be headed by Major-General William Meadows, an Officer of approved abilities. The fleet which carried it from Spithead in March, 1781, was commanded by Commodore Johnstone, an Officer who possessed the reputation of great activity and intrepid courage. It consisted of two ships of the line, three of 50 guns, three frigates of 32 guns, two sloops of war, two cutters, the *Infernal* fire-ship, and *Terror* bomb-ketch, two ordnance store-ships, seven armed transports, with coppered bottoms, four hired uncoppered transports, five victuallers, and thirteen Indiamen: the whole making forty-five sail, replete with troops, and stores of every kind for a long voyage, and 1,000 stand

1783 stand of arms. This fleet anchored in Praya Bay, in the Island of St. Jago, one of the Cape de Verds, on the 10th of April. On the 16th, at eight in the morning, the *Isis*, being the ship that was stationed the furthest out at sea, made a signal that there was a strange fleet in sight. All Officers were immediately ordered to repair on board; and about nine, a fleet of fifteen sail being now in view, a signal was made to clear the ships for action. The strange fleet now separated into two divisions: one of ten, the other of five ships. The first was a convoy; the last, ships of war. At half past nine, the headmost of these entered the Bay, under French colours, the other four following in a line a-head. It was the French fleet under the command of the celebrated Suffrein. He lost not a moment to begin a furious attack on the English, who reserved their fire, from a notion that the French Admiral would not, by committing hostilities in a neutral port, violate the laws of nations. The British fleet, though scarcely yet clear for action, and with seven hundred of their
best

best seamen on shore, opened on the ene- 1783.
my, and returned their fire with equal vi-
gour. The action was continued with
great heat about an hour, when the French
Commander gave the signal for his fleet to
bear away, and pursue their destination.
It was past three o'clock afternoon, before
our squadron split their cables to go in
pursuit of them, though they had seized
and carried off the Infernal fire-ship, and
the Hinchinbrook Indiaman, as well as
taken one of their own disabled ships in
tow, and given orders to one of our vic-
tualliers, that they had manned, to follow,
which she was doing. They came abreast
with the enemy, by the time the sun was
going down, about six o'clock. Though
our Commodore was to the windward of
the French, he did not bring them to an
action. He kept abreast of them till mid-
night: but in the morning not one of
them was to be seen. The three ships
seized by the French found means to make
their escape; and came safely into the Bay
of Praya some days after.

On

1783. On the 1st day of May, our fleet, being now nearly refitted, was ordered to unmoor, and, the next morning, to weigh anchor. About four o'clock afternoon the whole fleet was under sail. The north-east trade-wind carried them within thirty degrees of the line ; after which another trade-wind brought them to the Island of Trinidad, a romantic but desolate island, claimed by the Portugueze as the first discoverers, opposite to the coast of South America. They lay in sight of that island for two days. Hitherto, both our Officers and men were ignorant of their destination : but now, the fleet proceeded in a south-easterly course, avowedly for the Cape of Good Hope. The troops being removed, on the 19th of June, out of eight Indiamen, and crowded into the other ships of the fleet, those Indiamen pursued their voyage : and one Indiaman having parted from our squadron on the 25th of May, for St. Helen's, there remained now only four out of the thirteen which sailed from Spithead, namely, the Osterley, Latham, Locko, and Valentine. A Dutch prize was brought

brought into our fleet on the 1st of July, by 1783.
some of our frigates. The Dutchman being
outward-bound, had on board 60,000l.
in bullion: but, what was of greater consequence to our fleet, now within fifty-five miles of the Cape, the packet which it carried, contained information of considerable importance to the attainment of their chief object. Suffrein, with his ships of war, a frigate, and one or two of his transports, had arrived in False Bay. The guns and men of the disabled ship of war, called the Hannibal, which he had dragged along with the rest of his squadron under jury masts, were landed, and placed in strong batteries erected on purpose for receiving them. In the Bay of Saldannah, from twenty to twenty-five leagues distant, five homeward-bound Dutch Indiamen had taken shelter, and, as soon as they should be informed that the English were arrived off the Cape, they were to slip out, and sail directly for Europe. In consequence of this intelligence, the fleet lay to, the night of the 9th, and all the 10th, in order to deliberate

rate

1783. rate what was best to be done. On the 21st, about ten in the forenoon, they entered Saldannah Bay, where they took, almost without resistance, the five ships of which they had received such exact intelligence, with two of smaller value. The whole were estimated considerably above 800,000*l*. but one of them was burnt by her crew, and two of them unfortunately lost in their passage to England. On the 26th, the prizes, with some transports, and on the 28th, Commodore Johnstone, with all the ships of war, excepting four, having previously conducted what remained of the fleet, passed Table Land and False Bay. The General, while our fleet lay yet in Saldannah Bay, demanded of the Commodore in public, because he found it a very difficult matter to obtain an official answer from that impracticable man on any subject, whether he would land him and his soldiers in Table Bay. The Commodore replied in the affirmative; but added, that he would not stay a moment to aid him, in case of discomfiture.

The

The same packet which fortunately directed Commodore Johnstone to Saldannah Bay, determined General Meadows to go onward to India. For he had gleaned from fundry Dutch letters, some intelligence, though imperfect, of the war with Hyder-Ally, the capture of Colonel Baillie's army, and the distress of the English settlements in that part of the world: Our reduced fleet now consisted of the Hero, Monmouth, and Isis ships of war, the coppered transports, the four hired transports, the two ordnance store-ships, and four Indiamen: the whole now under the command of Captain James Alms of the Monmouth. The Active frigate had been sent forward to India with dispatches. The Prince of Ternate, with his three sons, and the Prince of Tidore, with his only son, who were relieved from bondage with the Dutch at Saldannah, were taken on board the Hero, to be restored to their friends and the possession of their territories. The first of these unfortunate families had been brought prisoners to the Cape six years before, and the last had been there three years. It was the inten-

1783. tion of the Dutch to have sent those captives, whose only crime was their opposition to the tyranny of their oppressors, to Europe in the same ships that were seized by our squadron at Saldannah.

Comodore Alms, with all the ships under his command, anchored safely in the bay of *Zamooda*, off the watering-place in Johanna, the chief of the Comorrah islands, situated between Madagascar and the coast of Africa, on Sunday the 2d of September. Here he landed all his sick men, consisting in one third of the fleet and army. They were afflicted chiefly with the scurvy : but not a few with dysenteries and ulcers. The greatest part of all our invalids recovered during the twenty-two days they remained in that delightful place.

The island of Johanna is most romantically beautiful, being very mountainous, yet exceedingly fertile. It produces excellent black cattle, from four to six dollars each, goats at one dollar, a great deal of wild game, and a great variety of delicious fruits and herbs :

herbs ; pine-apples, guavas, pappas, mammas, bananas, oranges, limes, cocoa-nuts, pompkins, melons, sugar-canes, rice, yams, potatoes, purslain, and wild cresses. And, to crown the whole, the water is excellent. Strangers are surprised to find almost every black inhabitant of this sequestered island speak tolerably good English. The grantees, here, are a set of Arabian Mussulmen, who have assumed authority over the simple natives. The Arabian Lords of Johanna have, every one of them, assumed the name of some noble English family. The Prince's first son is familiarly called the Prince of Wales : and there are Dukes, and Marquisses, and Earls amongst them by scores. It is very common to find a Duke or Marquis waiting for your getting up in the morning to solicit your cloaths to wash, which is done by their slaves. They are exceedingly covetous of money ; nor would a Johanna nobleman scruple much to steal, if he had a tempting opportunity. The natives are of the African race. They are very rude, though by no means savage, and have scarcely any ideas of religion.

1783. They nurse a species of duck upon a sacred lake in the centre of the island, to which they do not admit strangers without great reluctance. They pay those birds a kind of adoration. The animals are so familiar as to come to their worshippers and eat out of their hands. The island of Johanna being the largest, assumes authority over the other Comorrah islands. But at this time that authority was vigorously disputed by the inhabitants of Mayotta, who, having heard of the revolt of our transatlantic colonies, said, "Mayotta like America."

On the 24th of September, our fleet sailed from Johanna, and pursued their destination. A most alarming fever attacked such of those as had, when on shore at Johanna, slept on the banks of two rivulets at the watering-place, whilst those who had pitched their tents at a distance from them remained well. This malady carried off great numbers of officers and men, of both the navy and army. The 42^d regiment suffered most, having been encamped on the banks of one of the rivulets. After
a calm,

a calm, which lasted from the 11th of October to the 5th of November, the shifting of the Monsoon obliged them, though only two hundred and sixty leagues from Bombay, to steer in a north-easterly course, which brought them within sight of the land of Arabia Felix on the 15th. They beat off and on the Arabian coast, endeavouring to work to the eastward, but without success till the 26th, when they stood in, and anchored in Morabat Bay. The Indiamen, having taken the 42d regiment on board out of the transports, fell to leeward, and went to Kiffin Bay, in expectation of joining Admiral Hughes's fleet at Bombay.

At Morabat there was nothing to be had but a few half-starved goats, and very small lean bullocks with caravanferas, and some dried grass from the mountains for fodder. Fowls are very scarce and consequently dear. There is hardly any fruit or grain of any kind, except a little caravanferas. What rice the Arabians have, is brought from the coast of Malabar. They produced some

1783. preserved dates, and some bad limes. Their water is brought from mountains five miles distant, either by their women, or on the backs of camels. Our men sunk a great number of casks in the sand, from whence they obtained abundance of brackish water, which was found not unwholesome during the remainder of the voyage.

The poor inhabitants were astonished at this, and the Sheik, or Chief Personage in that part of the coast, requested as a mighty favour, that four or five casks might be left as a common blessing to him and his people: which was readily granted. There is, however, plenty of game, such as antelopes, roes, hares, pheasants, and partridges of a very large size. The chief food of the inhabitants is fish, of which they have great variety and abundance. Though this division of Arabia cannot in general boast of a fertile soil, yet it is not improperly denominated happy, since kind nature, guarding against the evils of luxury on the one hand, and of want on the other, holds out to her children salutary and even delicious

scious food, if they will but seek after it. 1733.
The men here, strung by their hardy manner of life, in a country that gives nothing without exertion, are a well-formed race of people, with sleek black hair, piercing black eyes, and of a martial appearance. Each man carries a spear and a target; and some two swords with a target, wearing a sword on each side. Not a few of them, in addition to these weapons, have matchlock-guns, in the use of which they are very expert.—The Arabian women seem very ill made. They live, like all the women of the East, in a very reclusive manner, and all of them wear veils.—The character of the Arabians will be best understood by viewing it in contradistinction to that of other neighbouring nations: and this comparison every man has an opportunity of making who has resided any time at Bombay. Here, besides Europeans of all countries, you meet with Turks, Persians, Arabians, and Armenians. The Turks are stately, grave, and honest in their dealings. The Persians are more gay, lively, and conversible, but less to be trusted in matters of

1783. trade than the saturnine Turks. The Arabians are all life and fire, and when they treat on any subject, whether of business or conversation, will make you a fine oration in flowing numbers, and with a musical cadence: but in their commercial dealings, they will take every advantage in their power. The Armenians, compared with the Arabians, scarcely appear to be of the same gender: they are handsome and soft in their features, mild in their tempers, and in their nature, kind and beneficent. The Turks and Persians are, for the most part, stout-bodied men: the Arabians, though of a smaller stature and slender, are accounted the best soldiers, possessing great agility, and courage equal to their activity.

A war-pantomime is sometimes to be seen at Bombay, between a number of Persians on the one side, and Arabs on the other. The Persians keep their ground, and ward off the blows that are aimed at them in the best manner they can: the Arabs, on the contrary, when a stroke is aimed at them, spring up in the air to an incredible height, and

and instantly make an attack on their antagonists. On the whole, the present Arabians are such as we might expect that ancient and unconquered people to be, who, at one period of their history, extended their arms over the greatest part of the civilized world. Nature, by granting them but little without industry, in a climate that subjects them not to the enervation of fixed habitations, has qualified them to conquer the possessions of their effeminate neighbours: and were such a spark of enthusiastic excitement to fall among them now, as called them forth into splendid, though sanguinary action in the sixth century, the materials being still the same, it would raise an equal flame.

The ships of war, the Monmouth, Hero, Isis, and the Manilla, with the Royal Charlotte and Raikes, having on board the 98th regiment, proceeded, on the 6th of December, to join Admiral Huges, leaving the 100th regiment in the coppered transports, and the conduct of the convoy to Captain Smith of the San Carlos; but the Charlotte,

1783. Charlotte and Raikes, having each sprung a top-mast, were obliged to put back and join the rest of the convoy in Morabat Bay. Here Major Rooke, of the 100th regiment, left the army to return by Suez to England. General Meadows and Colonel Fullarton were on board the ships of war; and Colonel Mackenzie Humberston was left to command the troops in the transports, with those that had joined them in the Raikes and Royal Charlotte. Colonel Humberston's squadron, then consisting of thirteen sail, inclusive of a Portugueze ship which furnished them with wines, left Morabat on the 9th of December, 1781, and arrived at Bombay on the morning of the 22d of January, 1782.

The Colonel landed the soldiers on Old Woman's Island, for refreshment; re-embarked them on the 27th; on the 8th set sail for Madras; on the 4th of February anchored in the road of Tellicherry; and on the 9th of the same month, off Anjengo, in the dominions of the King of Travancore. Here intelligence was received that Hyder-
Ally

Ally had over-run the whole of the Carnatic; that he threatened the kingdom of Tanjore, and the states of the Marawas, of Madura, and Trinivelly, with utter destruction; that he had circumvented and cut off two British armies, and, in consequence of the improvidence, pusillanimity, and dissensions of the Government of Madras, insulted the dispirited and astonished garrison of Fort St. George itself. Colonel Hum-
berston was now impatient to go round by Cape Comorin and join the army at Madras, but, on receiving undoubted intelligence that the French fleet were at that time to assemble off Point de Galle, and that commissaries had been sent some time ago to Columbo and other ports in Ceylon, to lay up magazines for their fleet and army, he called a council of war, and laid the situation of affairs before them. Some proposed, after a passage of near twelve months, to return for the refreshment of the seamen and soldiers to Bombay, and there to wait a favourable opportunity of going round to Madras: and others to march such of the soldiers as were able across the Peninsula,
from

1783. from Anjengo to the Carnatic, and to send the ships with the sick and lame back to Bombay. But Colonel Mackenzie Humberston, their commander, was struck with the delays of the former plan, and the dangers of the latter. He therefore proposed, that with his own troops, which did not amount to one thousand, and what Sepoys could be spared from Tellicherry, the siege of which had been lately raised with so much military skill and perseverance by Major Abington, to make a diversion on the coast of Malabar, in favour of our army in the Carnatic: a measure which was readily approved by the council. In pursuance of this plan, it was determined that the little army should land at Callicut; which had fallen into the hands of the Tellicherry troops, of which Humberston could claim the command as an officer of superior rank to that of Major Abington. Here, accordingly, the army debarked, and encamped in a cocoa-nut grove on the 18th of February.

On the 27th of March, the flank companies of the army, with four companies of grenadier Sepoys, took the field under Major Robert Douglas, second in command, but accompanied by the commander in chief. The rest of the army, under the conduct of Major John Campbell, were ordered to follow. Proceeding southward by short marches, they determined, on the 7th of April, to attack the fort of Trincolore. The flank corps, accordingly, marched at the dawn, and after passing some difficult ground, came up with the enemy about eleven o'clock forenoon, drawn up in a field behind a hedge, and betwixt our army and the fort. An attack was opened upon our men by surprize. The enemy, however, soon gave way, and were pursued with great slaughter, for about three miles, to the other side of Trinigardo. They continued to retreat with percipitation till they reached Ramgurree, twenty miles from Trincolore plains: their strength was about one thousand five hundred horse, and three thousand foot. Their commander, Mugdum-Ally-Khan, was a near relation of Hyder's, who was killed

1783. killed in the action. The loss sustained by the enemy must have exceeded four hundred men, and several hundred horses. Ours was very trifling. The army rested three days at Vangally-cottah. In their march to Ternavey, on the 13th of April, which was very sultry, fourteen of the soldiers, unseasoned to the climate, dropped down at the same instant, and suddenly died. It is remarkable that these men were, every one of them, the stoutest that day in the line.

On the approach of the rainy season our troops retired to cantonements at Calicut, where they arrived by the 27th of May, 1782. They again took the field on the 2d of September, with their eye fixed on Pallacottah, a strong fort situated about one mile from Pallacatcherry, which commands the great southern pass between the coasts of Malabar and Coromandel. The second battalion of the 42d regiment having now joined them, our army consisted of above nine hundred British, and two thousand Bombay Sepoys.

Colonel

Colonel Humberstone, in order to make 1783.
the diversion he had in view the more respectable, solicited aid from our good ally and friend the King of Travancore, and obtained twelve hundred Sepoys with European officers and Serjeants, maintained at the King's expence. Our little army was accompanied by a train of artillery of six eighteen pounders, two twelve pounders, eight six pounders, and four amuzettes : the whole managed by above eighty European, and one hundred and fifty black or native artillery-men. But, for want of draught bullocks, they were obliged to leave the half of their eighteen pounders, and both their twelve pounders, at Pananah. For the same reason they were obliged to leave all their mortars and howitzers at Ramguree. They came before this place on the 20th of September, and were preparing to open mortar batteries against it, as its lofty situation did not admit of any other mode of attack, when it was deserted on the night of the 6th of October. Ramguree is situated thirty miles inland from Pananah, exactly midway between that place and Pallacottah. They
therefore

1783. therefore garrifoned it with convalefcents, and fome men that had been flightly wounded, and made it the centre link of a chain of communication.

On the 14th they took Mungara-cottah, with about ninety foot prifoners. Here they left all their women and heavy baggage, and on the 18th marched to Pallacatcherry, about ten miles diftant. About three miles from the fort they encountered the enemy, who gave way almoft without refiftance. Our troops purfued them till they reached their camp, which they had burned to the ground. The Englifh formed their encampment near it, as the enemy were either difperfed or had fled into Pallacottah; and the inhabitants of Pallacottah into the country. On the 19th, they marched and encamped within gun-shot of the fort. An ineffectual cannonade was kept up by the enemy, and various movements were made by our army, one of which encouraged a vain attempt on our camp, from the 19th to the 21ft of October, when the Commander, convinced that he could not reduce

Pallacottah

Pallacottah without heavy artillery, gave 1783. orders, late at night, for the troops to be under arms, at four o'clock next morning, in order to retire to the ground which they had occupied on the night of the 18th.

Unfortunately the Brigade-Major, who directed the retreat, instead of putting the line to the right about, ordered them to counter-march, which threw the stores and baggage into the rear, and exposed them to the enemy, who had early intelligence, which they did not fail to improve, of this movement. The English, in entering the town of Pallacatcherry, were obliged to pass through a narrow defile. Near the farther end of the town, a small party of the enemy, called a *videt*, was posted on an eminence, with a small light. When the van of our army approached this light, the *videt* extinguished it; and this was the signal for an assault. They justly concluded, that when our van reached so far, not above one third of our line would remain on their side of the defile, and that with them only they would have to combat.

1783. bat. The event exceeded their most sanguine wishes, for, by the time that our van had reached the light, scarcely any thing remained to enter the defile but the rear-guard and the baggage. On these the enemy made a furious attack: whilst our van faced to the right about, and went to their assistance. The rear-guard, and a small part of the baggage were saved by a movement of the flank companies: but the whole provision of the army was lost, and almost all their ammunition, besides private baggage. Several of our men were mortally wounded; and among these Major G. Hutchinson of the 98th regiment. His death was deeply regretted by the whole army. Even the black troops shed tears at his interment. The little English army had taken post on the ground they had intended to occupy, when orders were given to retreat. Colonel Humberston intended to have remained in camp, on this ground, for some time, and to send back all the bullocks he could collect, to bring up some battering guns from Ramgurree. But, after the late disaster, scarcely any bullocks were
to

to be found : and there was now no resource 1783.
but in retiring to the coast. But they were
scarcely on the line of march, when they
were attacked from every thicket, and ex-
ceedingly harraffed both in their flanks and
rear. About sunset they reached the river
Caveri, which the late falls of rain had
rendered impassable. They therefore rested
upon their arms all night, while the en-
gineer's people were employed in construct-
ing rafts of wood to float them over in the
morning. This day they had not tasted any
food. Lieutenant Wheeler, with sixteen
soldiers was wounded, and several Sepoys
killed.

The swelling of the river having subsided
in the night, they passed through in the
morning undisturbed, and, at night, reach-
ed the banks of the river near Mungarah-
cottah, which was impassable. This, too,
was a day of fasting. With some difficulty
a few rice cakes were conveyed in the even-
ing, across the river, from Mungarah-cot-
tah ; from whence also plentiful supplies
of bullocks and rice were sent, and convey-

1783. ^{ed} with greater ease, next morning. During these three last days, a prodigious desertion took place among the Sepoys, one of whom, caught in the act of deserting, was blown from the mouth of a cannon. Colonel Humberston, on the 2d of November, removed his camp to the Mungarah-cottah side of the river, and covered his right flank with the fort. Having previously sent off the sick and wounded, the women, and the baggage to Pananah, he sprung mines under the four bastions of Mungarah-cottah Fort. Two of the mines blew the bastions above them to destruction: the other two misgave. At night they reached Cunitery, and, the night after, they regained their old ground at Ramgurree, which they blew up on the evening of the 18th.

Here they received repeated and certain information, that Tippoo Saib, during the inaction of our army in consequence of the civil disputes at Madras, had left the Carnatic, and was advancing towards them at the head of an army of twenty thousand men,

men, and twenty-four pieces of cannon. 1783.
Orders were immediately given for the line to be ready to march by four in the morning. A picquet of about one hundred and fifty men were stationed at the distance of near three miles from Ramgurree, the present station of the army. This picquet the Major of Brigade accidentally neglected to call in, in the evening of the 18th, and, in the morning of the 19th, it was with difficulty that a messenger could be found who would venture to go to their post, as it was said that the enemy had been seen in the interval. Lieutenant Halliday, at last, brought them in, after the line had been under arms four hours waiting their return. It was about nine o'clock, before noon, when our small army began to march: but scarcely had they advanced three miles from their ground, when Tippoo Saib, who had previously sent forward detachments to be posted in advantageous situations for galling them as they passed, opened a cannonade on their rear. They at first attempted to reach Pananah by a short route, through a flat country of rice grounds, without passing the river at all. But they were obliged,

1783. after marching some miles, to return to their former course. They were obliged to fight their way all day long, both with musketry and cannon. It was nearly dark when they reached that curve, or concave, where there is a ford of the Panamah river : but it was so swollen with the late rains, that it was deemed both by the enemy and our men, impassable.

In this perilous situation they halted for two hours in the utmost incertitude.— People were sent above and below the ford, to find, if possible, a practicable pass. It was determined, if these should return unsuccessful, as the only desperate resource that remained in a desperate case, to beat up the enemy's camp before the approach of morning, and either conquer or die.— A ford, however, was found ; and though it was so deep as to take ordinary men to the chin, and the strength of the current lifted many off the ground, yet, by clinging to one another, and assisting each other, not a man was lost. A few men of short stature were obliged to let go their muskets and ammunition, which they carried on their

their head, in order to save themselves ; 1783: and only two black women were lost out of the whole army. This was done in the dark, and happily unperceived by the enemy. The 100th regiment covered the passage of the river, for fear of interruption.— After having passed, they proceeded with as little noise as possible to the high ground at Ternavey, about five miles distant, and there halted near two hours, kindled large fires, and dried their clothes. Before dawn they moved off, and two miles forward they passed Pananah river, at the second ford, eight miles above the town of that name, without molestation. The enemy imagining them to be still in the concave of the river, did not stir all night, expecting them to become an easy prey in the morning. This Tippoo afterwards acknowledged at Mangalore.

They were much surprised, therefore, to find, on the morning, that our men had escaped them, and had also repassed the river at the other ford, before even their cavalry came in view of them. Thus the

1783. English proceeded on their march without molestation till they came within two miles of the town of Pananah, when some of the enemy attempted to harrafs their rear, but without almost any execution. They entered Pananah about four o'clock after noon, and the army was divided into three divisions, and properly posted to defend the town, which continued to be blockaded to the 5th of December, when Hyder-Ally's death called Tippoo to affairs of greater importance.

Thus Colonel Mackenzie Humberston, with his little army, at last effectuated his original design, of creating a diversion on this coast, in order to relieve the Carnatic ; for, till this æra, the Carnatic armies could do little more than march in sight of the enemy *once* a month, and then return to the Presidency, or the Mount, for provisions. The frequent supplies necessary to be thrown into the fortrefs of Vellore exhausted half the exertions of our army in escorting them ; but now that Tippoo had withdrawn himself,

self, the Carnatic armies began to act with 1783.
greater effect, as well as freedom.

No sooner had Humberston drawn Tip-
poo Saib to the coast, than the arrival of
Colonel Macleod, a senior officer, superseded
him in the command on the very day of his
arrival in Pananah. When Colonel Hum-
berston first landed his little army on the
Malabar coast, he had painted the advanta-
ges of his intended plan in such strong co-
lours to the Bombay government, that it was
immediately adopted; and this being com-
municated to the other Presidencies and
the India-House, it was resolved that rein-
forcements should be sent both from Madras
and Bombay, to his little army. Had this
plan of Humberston's been left to his exe-
cution, in all probability it would not only
have proved the salvation of the Carnatic,
which it ultimately proved, in spite of the
weakness and misguided measures of the
succeeding commanders, but might have ter-
minated in a total dismemberment of the
rising empire of Mysore, and prevented the
calamities which afterwards befel the chief
officers

1783. officers in particular, and the inferior officers and men in general of that army, and those who afterwards joined them.

Our army being closely blockaded, were employed in raising lines of defence, when, on the morning of the 28th of November, before dawn, a general assault was made by the enemy on the centre post, commanded by Major Campbell. The enemy were headed by Mr. Lally and a party, if not all his men, on foot; they came on in columns, took a small mud fort without our lines, and dislodged our Sepoys without resistance. The alarm was immediately given, and the blockaded were instantly in arms: the enemy, however, had already reached our lines, and were in possession of our guns. The 42d regiment attacked them vigorously with the bayonet, and soon turned their front back upon those who supported them. These, attempting to flee, put their followers in confusion. A general rout took place, though they repeatedly endeavoured to rally. The contest lasted several hours, when the enemy retreated, leaving about one hundred and
fift

fifty killed and wounded upon the field. 1783.
Captain de L'Isle, and a young ensign, were
made prisoners ; the first mortally wounded.

In January, 1783, Brigadier-General Mathews landed with an army under his command at Margee, about three hundred miles north of Pananah, and sent orders for the southern army to join him without loss of time. Tippoo having raised the blockade of Pananah, on the 5th of December, left our army there, wholly unembarrassed, and they forthwith embarked, about Christmas, for Margee ; but the Sepoy corps and all the black artillery and baggage, draft and pack bullocks and horses, went by land, coastways, to our settlement of Tillicherry. The first division, consisting of the Europeans, left Tillicherry on the 1st of January, and five days afterwards, boats having been provided for the black troops, they also embarked and proceeded immediately. Before the southern army could join that under Brigadier-General Mathews, he had made a descent upon the coast, and with several small forts of little consequence had taken the fortress of Onore

1783. Onore, which was esteemed a place of some strength and importance. This fort, after a vain summons to the Keeladar to surrender, in order to prevent the effusion of blood, was taken by storm on the 5th of January. The enemy had about four hundred killed and wounded. We took above two thousand prisoners; and here, according to the usual custom of our little army, they set all the prisoners at liberty, after disarming them, excepting three or four men of some rank, from whom ransoms were expected.

The first division of the southern army landed at Rajamondroog on the 2d and 3d of January, and soon after marched to form a junction with General Mathews, which they effected on the 17th at Cundapore, a place also upon the coast, which had just fallen into his hands without much assistance. The army, consisting of about twelve hundred Europeans, and eight battalions of Sepoys, with a proportionate number of artillery and Lascars, moved forward, directing their line of march towards the great pass, which leads to the table-land of Hindostan,

over

over that vast chain of mountains which run from Cape Comorin northward into Persia. 1783.

This pass is called Hussain-gurry Ghaut. From the bottom to the top of this Ghaut, or Pass, a space of about five miles, the road winds in various directions, as the natural steepness and ruggedness of the ascent could be easiest overcome by art, and made practicable to the human foot. At every turning there was a battery of guns or a well-manned redoubt. The army reached the foot of the Ghauts on the 24th, and early on the morning of the 25th made the attack. The British troops carried every thing before them, and chiefly with the bayonet. One strong redoubt at the top of the Ghauts they almost despaired of being able to reduce. But a detachment found means to clamber up the rocks, and by making a detour came round upon the back of it. Here all who made resistance were put to the sword, and the Ghauts were now their own. Next day they proceeded for Hyder-nagur, or Bednore, the capital of the country which bears its name,

1783. name, and distant from the top of the Ghauts about nine miles. Upon their approach to that great capital, with only six rounds of ammunition each man, Hyat Saheb, the Jemmadaur, who was the highest military, as well as civil officer in Canara and the Bednore countries, sent out a Captain Campbell, an English prisoner, to offer terms of surrender.—He stipulated that his own private property should be secured, that he should be continued by the English in his former station and dignity, and that he would surrender all public monies and property to the captors, and would give instant orders for all the dependencies on Bednore, to open their gates to the English troops. These terms were promised, and our troops took quiet possession of Bednore and all its immense treasures, without a single blow; orders were accordingly issued by the Zemindar, to forts Mangalore, Ananpore, Deckull, Cowlydroog, Sujapore, Siccapore, Samfatcha Ghautt, Caricall, and Mont Bidrure, with other places, to surrender to the English arms. Some of these obeyed the summons, others of them obstinately

stinately refused, and breathed defiance.— 1783.
These were Mangalore, Deckull, and Ananpore. This last fortress, after violating the rules of war, by detaining our flags of truce and sending them off prisoners, stood the storm on the 14th of February, after a practicable breach was made. It was, however, assaulted and carried, and all who resisted were sacrificed to the rules of war subsisting among civilized nations, to the amount of about three hundred men. Two hundred and eleven of these were buried in one grave, which was a draw-well, the same day. From Ananpore our troops appeared before Siccapore, but made no serious attack upon it. Mangalore was next attacked. After a practicable breach was made, and our men prepared to storm it on the 9th of March, Rustan-Ally-Beg, the Commandant, endeavoured to rouse his people to defend the breach, but in vain. They refused to obey him, and he was obliged to surrender. They were permitted to depart without arms, but with their private property untouched. About one hundred and fifty Frenchmen of Lally's corps were made prisoners.

1783. prisoners, who solicited employment as artillery-men in ours, with the same rank that they had held in their former service. They were told that this could not be done by the General; but that if the government of Bombay approved of it, they would entertain them accordingly, to which they all consented.

The unfortunate Keeladar, Rustan-Ally, for giving up this fortress, although he compounded for his head and paid part of the ransom, was executed on the hill, in sight of Mangalore, on the 22d of November, 1783. After Mangalore fell into our hands, General Mathews, with four companies of the 102d regiment, and part of the black troops, returned to Bednore.— A prodigious treasure was found here, by all accounts not less than one million of pounds, besides jewels and other precious stones, the most of which was public property. But, notwithstanding the reasonable request of the army to have part of that spoil divided, their leader positively refused their request, though they were then in great distress from want of money, having
received

received no pay for almost twelve months, 1783. and some of them in arrears sixteen and eighteen months. On such an unjust and impolitic refusal, loud complaints ensued. Remonstrance upon remonstrance, signed by the whole army, was presented to no purpose. The most arbitrary measures were pursued ; and, though no confusion arose, yet the discontents ran so high, that Colonels Macleod and Humberston, and Major Shaw, left the army, and went straight to Bombay, to lay the matter before the Governor and Council. Their representations were so well supported, and the conduct of General Matthews so flagrant and unjust, that the Governor and Council immediately superseded him, and appointed Colonel Macleod, the next in command, Brigadier-General and Commander in Chief. But this unfortunately happened too late : for in the mean time, it is confidently asserted, that General Matthews sent off about the sum of 300,000*l.* including what Hyat-Saheb sent for him to Cundapore, as if for himself : and this treasure was all delivered to Cap-

1783. tain Matthews, brother of the General, who conveyed it to Goa, to be remitted to Europe. Some circumstances have since occurred, which confirm this supposition. The 4th and 8th grenadier battalions of sepoy, and some small detachments, were left at Mangalore, and directed to reduce Deckull, a fort on the coast, thirty-six miles south of Mangalore. These troops, commanded by Captain Brown, after summoning it to surrender in vain, battered and stormed it on the 3d of April. The enemy made a brave resistance, repulsed our sepoy, with the loss of Captain Brown, Lieutenant Scott, and fifty-three men: and our sepoy refused again to attempt the breach. An escort of fifty Europeans, of the 42d and 100th regiments, under Lieutenant Dunbar, arriving at Mangalore, was ordered to march to Deckull to lead the storm, which again took place on the 7th, where it was carried, and considerable havock made among those who resisted. In this bloody action we had only four Britons killed and wounded.

Colonel

Colonel Macleod, now Brigadier-General 1783.
ral and Commander in Chief, with Colonel
Humberston and Major Shaw, on their re-
turn in the *Ranger* shew to join the army,
on the 7th of April, off Geriah, fell in with
the Maratta fleet of five sail of square-rigged
vessels. Peace had been agreed on with that
people, and proclaimed at Bombay before
the departure of the *Ranger*, though the
Marattas did not know of it. The new
General, rather than come to an eclairecisse-
ment, or be taken into Geriah for a day,
impatient to push on and to signalize him-
self, madly recommended fighting the
whole fleet. The battle was most obsti-
nate : nor did it cease till almost every
man in the English ship was killed or
wounded. Among the former was Major
Shaw, of the 100th regiment ; and among
the latter, Brigadier-General Macleod, and
Colonel Humberston. The Captain of the
ship, Pruin, and Lieutenant J. Taylor,
were carried prisoners into Geriah, a port
of the Marattas, where they remained for
several weeks. Here Colonel Mackenzie
Humberston died of his wounds, in the

1783. twenty-eighth year of his age. An early and habitual conversancy with the heroes of antient, as well as modern times, nourished in his mind a passion for military glory, and supported him under unremitting application to all those studies by which he might improve his mind, rise to honourable distinction, and render his name immortal. His untimely and lamented death severely arraigned the conduct of him who had occasioned it : to whom he formed in many important respects a contrast ; being not only acute, but profound and steady in his views, gallant without ostentation, and spirited without temerity and imprudence. Soon after these gentlemen left the army for Bombay, Major Campbell, with the 42d regiment, was ordered from Bednore to Monbiddry and Carical, two small forts below the Ghautts. Detachments from the army were sent every where to occupy every village, and every town and mud fort : so that the army became exceedingly dispersed, and these detachments not having been made by detail, or in any regular manner,

ner, the Officers could not even account 1783.
for their men.

In this state of affairs, the army, dreaming of nothing but riches, inattentive to all intelligence, and neglecting to repair the defences or the fort, Tippoo's army came upon them on the 9th of April, drove in a detachment stationed at Fat-tiput, four miles distant, and having taken the town of Bednore, with a considerable quantity of ammunition, which no precaution had been taken to lay up in the magazines, closely besieged the fort. As nothing very remarkable happened during the siege of this place, unless it be two *sorties* made upon the enemy, which were ill conducted, and which produced no consequences of any importance, let us leave it besieged for a moment, and just notice an occurrence or two which were the natural effects of that extreme improvidence, with which almost the whole army seem to have been infatuated.

1783. The Ghautts of Hyder-Ghur and Samshatfah were attacked and carried on the 9th of April. Cundapore was evacuated on the 10th. Major Campbell thought it proper to make a prudent retreat from the forts of Monbiddry and Carical, and retired with the 42d regiment, and some convalescents and sepoy, to Gurpore, seven miles from Mangalore and the Coast, where he encamped. On the 20th of April, Major Campbell, conceiving it necessary, from the intelligence he had of the situation of affairs, came to *Mangalore*, and took the command from Captain Sartorius, who was chief Engineer. On the 26th, the 42d regiment, and the 8th battalion of sepoy, (who had no guns) were driven in by the enemy from Gurpore, and presently after, a considerable body of the enemy encamped on the Coodry Hills, about three miles distant, and in view of Mangalore fort. While these things were passing, Tippoo was carrying on the siege of Bednore, with effect, against a garrison unprovided with shelter or casemâts, their provisions exhausted, their ammunition

ex-

expended, no hope of succour, and still 1783.
less of effecting a retreat to the Coast, before such a numerous and well provided army, already in possession of all the passes and the country around them.

The number of the English, diminished by disease as well as the sword, now found themselves (on the 30th of April) obliged to capitulate. Honourable terms were *promised* them, and on the 2d of May they marched out with the honours of war, grounded their arms at a considerable distance from the fort, and began to think of preparing for to-morrow's march for Sadafhagur, upon the Malabar Coast, where, the articles stipulated, they should embark for Bombay or Tellicherry. But they were soon awakened from that agreeable reverie, by a large body of troops who came to surround them. Tippoo said, that the army had forfeited their claim to be set at liberty, by a breach of the articles of capitulation, in embezzling and secreting the public money, which was all, in good faith, to be delivered up. And in this, there was

1783. but too much truth: for it is said, that even the bamboo of the General's palanquin was, by his own desire, pierced and filled with pagodas; and even after he had agreed and signed the capitulation, he took the public money, and issued to the troops two months pay, which came to a considerable sum, but which was all pillaged from them by the enemy's sepoys. Thus, avarice, the ruling passion of this unfortunate man, not only reduced himself to ruin and disgrace, but was the cause of misery and destruction to many gallant Officers and soldiers. The sufferings of these gentlemen have been impiously considered by fanatical spirits, as visitations of Providence: while others of undoubted liberality of sentiment, for who will not allow the conductors of the New Annual Register to be such? misled by erroneous accounts from India, have represented them as the natural, if not the judicial consequences of their own enormities.--- Fired with indignation at these reproaches, the surviving Officers of the army commanded by Brigadier General Matthews,

to

to the number of 53 gentlemen, published, in concert, a satisfactory vindication of their conduct. But, in this apology, they are obliged to encounter and arraign the exaggerations, absurdities, and lies of certain young men of their own order : and thus they make, at once, their own defence, and that of the publication of which they complain. It is a maxim, that the corruption of the best things, renders them the worst. The press is accordingly, a powerful engine of good or evil ; but fortunately, it possesses in itself an antidote to the evils to which it may give birth : since no man needs to be long injured by calumny, where he is at liberty to investigate and discover the truth.

The unfortunate garrison of Bednore, (or Hydernagur), were put in irons, and marched like felons to the different prisons of Seringapatam, Shittledroog, Capal-droog, Gutty, Bangalore, and other places ; and on their march, and during their imprisonment, they who *survived* it, suffered treatment, the idea of which fills the

1783. the mind with horror. Intelligence of these untoward circumstances, caused a considerable desertion among the sepoys, and of *one* caught going off to the enemy, it was deemed necessary to make an example. He was, therefore, blown from the mouth of a cannon at Mangalore, on the 2d of May.

The enemy having assembled in force upon the heights of Coodry, to the number of 7,000, which put our foraging parties in danger, it was thought necessary to try to dislodge them. On the 6th of May, therefore, before dawn, all the troops in garrison, (the 4th company of grenadier sepoys excepted) marched out together, with the 1st battalion of sepoys arrived yesterday from Bombay, about 1400 men in all, came upon the enemy before they were aware, just at the dawn, put them immediately into confusion, killed a considerable number of them, and took 2 brass and 2 iron ordnance, 3 tumbrils, 185 bullocks, and some horses.--- They had two Officers wounded, and two
foldier.

foldiers killed, and one wounded in this 1783. affair.

Intelligence was now brought, that a large army was approaching, and confirmed the melancholy account of the fall of Bednore. Every thing now boded an approaching siege, and every exertion became now necessary, in order to be prepared for sustaining it. Rice was laid up for four months, but rather with a *sparing hand*; and other things, (even such as could be got) with the same parsimony. On the 16th, a scout of about 20 horsemen appeared; next day, a greater body reconnoitred the heights of Coodry, the field of action of the 6th instant. Next day, part of their army encamped there, and were augmented daily till the 20th; when they drove in our picquets, and made themselves masters of part of the town, while our troops defended the other part of it with 4 guns, and a part of the 100th regiment, &c.--- The 1st and 8th battalions of sepoys, stationed upon a hill 1200 yards distant, and esteemed a post of consequence, were, on
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1783. the morning of the 23d, attacked, nearly furrounded, and hard purfued to the gates of Mangalore. We, from that moment, were clofely invested.

In this purfuit we had a Captain and Enfign killed, and two fubalterns wounded, with three fepoys and about three hundred black troops killed and miffing. The whole coaft now acknowledged its former mafter, Mangalore, with its dependencies, Onore and the fmall fort of Carivar, only excepted.

Mangalore is the chief place of ftrength, and commands the beft harbour in Canara. It is fituated in the thirteenth degree of north latitude, at the conflux of two rivers, which difembogue themfelves into the fea under the muzzles of its guns, at which place it is about half a mile wide, and within the bar forms a fpacious harbour for fhips of 500 tons. The fort is nearly fquare, and is built of ftone. It has three towers, with very thin and weak battlements : and artillery is mounted on
each

each of its sides, which face the four cardinal points. On the west side, next the sea, there is an oblong addition to the fort, on very low ground, reaching the whole length of that side, with four circular turrets and guns. The fort of Mangalore has a pretty good ditch, except to the eastward, where about sixty feet of the rock was not cut through: and round the covered way there are eight towers, with artillery mounted on each of them. The ditch is not wet towards the north-east and south-east quarters; and in summer even the western part of the ditch becomes very dry. It would exceed the limits within which it has been thought proper to confine these Memoirs, to enter into a detail of the siege of this fortress. Let it suffice, for the present, if we state the force that was brought against it, that by which it was defended, and some of the principal actions and occurrences, which may serve to convey an idea of the resources, both of the besieged and the assailants.

The

1783. The force that now invested Mangalore, consisted in 60,000 horse; 30,000 disciplined sepoy; 600 French infantry, under the command of Colonel Cossigny; Mons. Lally's corps, composed of Europeans and natives; a French troop of European dismounted cavalry, under the command of Mons. Boodena, an Officer in the French service; many thousands of irregulars, and near 100 pieces of artillery. The whole of this vast army amounted to 140,000 fighting men. The front of their encampment extended, from right to left, three miles: and parties were stationed upon and behind the adjacent hills. They were commanded by Tipppoo-Sultan in person. His brother Kirrum-Saib, and Mahomed-Ally Khan, one of his father's most trusted commanders and confidential friends, were also present.

The strength of our garrison was composed of 696 Europeans, including ninety-one Officers, and 2,850 black troops, amounting in all to 3,546 fighting men, besides pioneers and camp followers.

The

The enemy broke ground on the north 1783. side of the fort, and by the 27th of May completed eleven embrasures. A party of our men went out to destroy this work, and to spike their guns, but were repulsed. On the 29th, the garrison was astonished with volleys of large stones, some of them weighing 150 pounds. The stones were affixed to wooden plugs or stoppers; and these fitted, and by means of a sledge, forced tightly into the calibres or chases of mortars. They generally fell within the fort, being directed with great precision. When they met not with any resistance, their velocity, accelerated by the height from which they fell, buried them in the earth. Where they were opposed by any body harder than themselves, they were dashed into a thousand pieces. There was no shelter for our troops from these terrible annoyances. Their noise in the night was dreadful, and their effects often horrid, and always fatal. They who were struck by them in the body were cut off by a sudden, and of course, an easy death: but the unfortunate sufferers who were crushed

1783. crushed by them in their extremities, often lingered in excruciating pain for several days. Some amputations were performed: but there was not so much as one instance of recovery. The stones also destroyed the roofs of huts and houses, which materials were wanting to repair: a circumstance, in the height of a monsoon, truly deplorable. A constant and heavy cannonade was kept up from batteries erected on the north, on the east, and on the south. On the evening of the 4th of June, the whole north face of the fort, with its towers, was entirely dismantled. A few days after, a practicable breach was effected in the wall, which, it was expected, the enemy would storm; especially as they had rejected with disdain a flag of truce. In vain did the English repel with the bayonet, repeated attacks on batteries constructed on commanding ground, without, but near the fortrefs: in vain they silenced the batteries of the enemy, and spiked their brass mortars and guns. New touch-holes were drilled with incredible expedition. Those destructive machines were
opened

played anew, in triumph: masked batteries were opened: the approaches of the enemy were brought so near, that they threw fascines on our covered way and the edge of the glacis: and at length, repeated summonses of surrender being treated by the Colonel with contempt and defiance, they determined, on the 4th of July, to storm the breach which had been practicable ever since the 7th of June. A body of their troops, armed with couteaus, two feet long, of the shape of pruning hooks, and with spears mounted on light bamboos, 147 feet in length, sallied from their trenches, and rushed into the tower on the left of the outer eastern gate, while the guns that had played against that tower, were directed elsewhere, but still kept up their firing. Their whole line was now in motion, pressing on to support the party that had penetrated into the tower, and gained an adjacent rampart. But, after a short struggle, in which Captain Bowles of the artillery was killed by a random shot, they were forced to retreat. This attempt on the part of the enemy, was re-

1783.

1783. turned on the 6th of July, by a sally of thirty men, into a lodgement they had made in our works, opposite to the gate and tower just mentioned, and dislodged them. This drew out the enemy from their camp, to a general attack on our northern covered way, which was resolutely and gallantly assaulted, but with superior gallantry and resolution defended against fresh troops and superior numbers. In this action, one of the hottest during the siege, we lost some of our best officers; Ensign Macintyre, and the Lieutenants Gordon, Boyce, Fireworker, and Macgregor. About forty of our men were killed, and one hundred wounded. The enemy, by the 15th of July, had wrought themselves along the whole of our northern covered way, and begun to fill up the ditch opposite to the breach. The gates of the fort, being much damaged, were shut up, and two sally ports cut, to supply their place. New batteries were raised by the assailants: and in one of their assaults, which were now very frequent, they scaled the walls of a fort situated at
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the junction of the river with the sea, 1783.
called, from its figure, the Octagon, which
had hitherto remained undisturbed, and
destroyed an hospital with some men. In
the mean time, our men, while they were
thus assailed by Tippoo Sultan without the
fortress, were forced to contend, with want
of necessary subsistence, and with other
inconveniencies, within. Their stock of
cattle did not at first exceed 300, and near
a third part of these, from distress of
weather, and sundry neglects, died in the
great ditch. The weather being wet, and
the air close, the stench that arose from
the putrid carcases of the animals was in-
sufferable. From the 13th of June, the
Europeans were put on half allowance of
beef. The hospital was now excessively
crowded with sick and wounded, and to-
tally unprovided with beds, medicines,
and proper nourishment: no tea, sugar,
sago, wine, or any thing else that could
alleviate distress. The sick men became
averse from going into the hospital, which
they considered as their grave, and gave
themselves up to despair.

1783. In the midst of these discouraging circumstances, two boats arrived from Mr. Sibbald, President at Tellicherry, with the agreeable information that three or four battalions would certainly join the garrison, from Bombay, by the 10th of August; that 1500 British and Hanoverians, destined for Mangalore, had actually left Madras under Colonel Gordon, so early as the 20th of May; and that Colonel Fullarton, at the head of an army of 500 European soldiers, and 16,000 sepoys, with 22 pieces of cannon, managed by a good train of artillery, having reduced several small forts, had advanced, in his march to the coast of Malabar, near to Pallacatcherry; that an army had gone against Arcott, and that hopes were entertained of the reduction of Seringapatam, and of the dismemberment of the Mysorean empire. The garrison, animated by this intelligence, gave a *feu-de-joy*, with three cheers, from the ramparts. Tippoo Sultan, as well as the French Resident at his Court, had been informed, some days before this, of the general pacification

1783.

tion in Europe, in which Tippoo was included as an ally of France, though they had concealed it from our men, in the hopes that, from the extremities to which they were reduced, they would be induced to capitulate. But the *feu-de-joy* having led them rightly to conclude, that the English too, had received intelligence of the peace, the French troops refused to co-operate any longer with Tippoo in reducing Mangalore. A letter was received, under a flag of truce, by Colonel Campbell, from Monf. Piveron de Morlay, Envoy at the Durbar of Mysore, from France, with very particular news from the coast of Coromandel, where there was now a cessation of arms, respecting a peace in Europe. These he wished to communicate to Colonel Campbell in person, without being blindfolded, as is customary during hostilities, when he should come within the English works. Monf. de Piveron, with his retinue, was very politely received by the Commander of Mangalore, with whom he had a long conference. But, in the mean time, even while a flag of

1783. truce was flying, Tippoo persevered in carrying on war against the fort above mentioned, which commands the entrance of the river, and which being without a ditch, and incapable of a long defence, surrendered on terms, after a practicable breach was made in its walls. During the progress of hostilities, but especially after it was understood that there was some prospect of peace, there are not a few instances of the enemy's centinels, when they perceived our people off their guard, beckoning to them to get under cover, lest they should be obliged to fire at them. Our men were not behind them in this act of humanity; but, it is only justice to say, that they set the example. The French Envoy came a second time into the fort, on the 22d of July, and in order to favour a negotiation for peace, a suspension of hostilities was agreed on for two days. In this interval, and even while some of Tippoo's principal people were in the fort, a mine was sprung under the outer eastern gate, which almost smothered the whole of the guard with rubbish, but wounded several
several

several foldiers and sepoy's, and buried 1783. others in the ruins. Of this disaster, which was represented as flowing accidentally from the ashes of a tobacco-pipe thrown carelessly on the line of powder laid before the suspension, Tippoo-Sultan declared his entire ignorance, and offered to deliver up the person supposed to be in fault, to be punished at the English Commander's discretion : a sacrifice which Colonel Campbell did not require. The English Engineer lost not a moment to fill up the opening that was made in the wall. During this short suspension of hostilities, the enemy erected, towards the south-east quarter of the fort, a battery of 10 guns : upon which our men, exasperated at this appearance of treachery, brought all the guns they could, to bear with uncommon fury. After frequent, though short suspensions of hostilities, and a great deal of correspondence between the French Envoy, the Sultan, and our Commandant, a cessation of hostilities was ratified on the 2d of August, in which the garrisons of Onore and Carwar were included. The enemy allowed, at this juncture, that by disease and the sword, they had lost 7,000 men.

1783. Our loss was also great. The troops were worn down with constant fighting in the day, and hard duty at night. Their short intervals of repose were interrupted by the noise of those tremendous stones that were thrown from mortars, which impressed their minds, even amidst their slumbers, with dread and horror. Nor did there ever pass a day, in which several of our men were not cut off by a large and heavy kind of musket, called a *jingall*. It is very long in the barrel, larger than a common musket in the bore, and it is sledged on a rest, for the purpose of taking a steady and sure aim. At different intervals, very thick planks were posted, musket proof, and pierced with several eyelet-holes, through which the enemy shot at every one of our people they could set their eyes on. But a truce having now taken place, the garrison enjoyed a degree of liberty, and walked out occasionally, and conversed with the French Officers under Colonel Cossigny. This gentleman, who had refused to co-operate with Tippoo, from the moment he knew of the peace in Europe, now demanded a passport for his detachment to Maheé, with pro-

provisions, draught cattle, and boats for ^{1783.} crossing certain unfordable rivers, all which the Myforean, provoked at his forbearance to act any longer against the English, haughtily refused. But Cossigny, having privately received hatchets and cordage for making rafts, from Colonel Campbell, suddenly marched off one morning before dawn. Tippoo sent 600 horsemen after him, not to *request*, but to *command* him to return. Cossigny formed his men, in order to receive them, and bid them come on at their peril : on which, after a short parley, they returned to their camp,

Though it is education and example chiefly that form the characters of nations and men, yet among the human race there are strong marks of distinction, originally impressed on the frame of the body and mind by the hand of Nature. In the very bosom of luxury, and before the very throne of barbarian bigotry, a family has arisen in our times, who, uniting the greatest valour with the most profound sagacity, and the loftiest ambition, have laboured with success to learn the European arts, that they might thereby be enabled

1783. to oppose and overturn European, and particularly the English dominion in Asia. Nor were the hostile intentions of Hyder-Ally-Khan confined to that quarter of the world: he formed the magnificent plan of raising by degrees such a fleet as might dispute with England the sovereignty of the sea, and even retort, it is said, the invasions that had harrassed India, on the Island of Great Britain. He possessed all the materials for ship-building in superior abundance, and some of these of superior excellence to any to be found in Europe.* He allured artificers into his service from foreign countries, and trained up workmen in his own. For several years he had been employed in building, and in the year 1781, had nearly finished six ships of the line of battle, some of which were a-float, together with several frigates and sloops of war. All these were exceedingly strong and thick in the planks, being intended to encounter the European seas, the water of which, he had heard, was very *strong* and *thick*: a confused idea of ice. The ships of Hyder were destroyed in

* There is a species of wood in India, called teak-wood, which is almost impenetrable by cannon-shot.

in 1782 and the beginning of 1783, by 1783. our fleet ; nor did he live to repair their loss. But his son Tippoo, the heir of his dominions, his genius, and his vast designs, neglected not any means, or the pursuit of any accomplishment or art, by which these might be carried into execution. He was instructed in the Persian and French languages, and he also knew a little of the English, in which the word of command was given to his soldiers.--- He learned the Elements of Mathematics, and was familiarly conversant with the principles of gunnery, and military architecture and tactics. With the baggage of the Officers that fell into his hands on the 23d of May, there was found, Sime's Military Guide, a book belonging to Ensign Spottiswood. This book was carried to Tippoo by some of his people, who, according to their superstitious notions, supposed that the draughts which it contained, related in some mysterious manner to arts of incantation. The Sultan, who instantly discovered its nature, began to shew great civility to Mr. Spottiswood, by sending cloth to him and other presents. At last a person from the Sultan

1783. requested him to translate the Treatise into the Moor's language, which he spoke fluently. But Mr. Spottiswood politely excused himself, saying, that he could not answer for translating a military book, without orders from his Commander.---- They who take delight in tracing resemblances between antient and modern characters, will be able to find many points of comparison between Tippoo and Hannibal : both at once subtle and brave ; studious of the knowledge of their times ; trained up by their fathers in hostility to the first power of the age ; exciting the vengeance of all nations against that power ; and in this career, taking a wider range than that which usually bounded their views : Hannibal extending his intrigues to the nations on the Red Sea ; Tippoo Saib to Constantinople, and other seats of power on the Mediterranean.

No sooner was the cause of Tippoo Sultan abandoned by the French, than he sought to connect himself with all other powers whom he considered as the natural enemies of England, and endeavoured to convert the Mahomedan religion into a
band

band of union among different nations, 1783. for the purpose of expelling the Europeans from Hindostan. He broke through almost every article of the cessation of arms. It was an article in the Armistice, that the Nabob should furnish for the garrison, three times a week, a buzar stored with all sorts of provisions, at the rate of his own markets. A buzar was accordingly furnished; but every article was so exorbitantly dear, that there was scarcely any thing which the men could purchase. The prices were daily raised, till a fowl sold from nine to twelve rupees, a seer of rice for four, a seer of salt for three, and a frog for sixpence. Seven boats laden with provisions from Bombay, were seized by Tippoo, and the articles they contained were sold by his people in the buzar, at the dreadful rate just stated. This plan of the Sultan's, for reducing the fort of Mangalore by famine, was carried to the utmost height within his power, by a total stoppage of the buzar. Horses flesh was now delicious food. Frogs, snakes, ravenous birds, kites, rats, and mice were sought after, and eaten with voracity. For the last two months of the
siege,

1783. siege, from seven to fifteen men died every day for want of the necessaries of life. A deep melancholy, arising from weakness of body, and nourished by every surrounding object, rendered the men who survived their fellow-soldiers indifferent how they interred them, so that they often became the food of the jackall and the pariah dog. The famished soldier lay in wait with his musket and a stolen cartridge, to kill those horrid animals in the act of tearing up the dead: and when he succeeded, the animal was carried in with triumph. G. Macleod, who came on shore by permission from the Nabob, on the 28th of August, witnessed this scene of sorrow, and remonstrated with the Sultan in vain. A reinforcement of 300 Hanoverians appeared off Mangalore in two ships of war, with other ships in company: but, as the troops could not land according to the terms of the Armistice, they were ordered to sail to Tellicherry. Gen. Macleod also appeared on the 28th of Nov. with 10 ships and 11 smaller vessels, having on board the long-promised relief for the garrison, with 1,000 Europeans, 3,000 sepoy, and 350 marines, seamen, and artillery-men. The General had made signals to the garrison, and was ad-

advised by a Council of War, held on board 1783.
his ship, to land his succours, when, in
consequence of a negotiation he carried on
with Tippoo, by means of his Secretary,
whom he sent on shore for that purpose,
he set sail with the reinforcement on the
31st of December, having stipulated with
the Sultan that provisions should be ad-
mitted into the garrison for 18 days. This
supply, drawn from damaged stores, pur-
chased from a navy-agent, was of so bad
a quality, that not one in twenty pieces of
the beef and pork could be eaten by our
men, and that it was rejected by the
very dogs. Our Officers now feared
a general desertion of the sepoys ; and
a mutiny among the Europeans, par-
ticularly the 42d regiment, one of whom,
on the parade, “ Swore by G-d, that they
should not further submit to such treat-
ment.” When Macleod failed, the gar-
rison signified, that they were unable to
hold out any longer. The General an-
swered by signals, that they soon should
be succoured. He now made sail to the
southward, and took and pillaged Cana-
nore, which made a resolute defence, the
Rajah or Queen of which had sent two
English

1783. English Officers, with 30 sepoy's cast on her coast by a storm, to Tippoo Sultan. The hyperbolical style in which he gave an account of this exploit, became a subject of laughter to the army. Colonel Fullarton, at the head of an army of 14,000 men, a great proportion of whom were Europeans, with a suitable train of artillery, had by this time reduced several small forts, and on the 14th of November, that of Pallaccherry. The Colonel was about to march onward, either towards Mangalore or Seringapatam, when Commissioners of Peace, sent to Tippoo from Madras, ordered him not to proceed any farther. The haughty Mysoorean declined to see them, on various pretences, from day to day, drew them after him from one place to another, and at last, seated on a throne, surrounded by the Ambassadors of the Princes of India, he gave audience to our Commissioners, desiring all present to bear witness that he granted peace to the intreaties of the English. The fortress of Mangalore was evacuated. The Sultan agreed to the proposals of the garrison, who marched with arms, accoutrements, and the honours of war, to Tellicherry.

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